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ABSTRACT
This dissertation argues that there are three basic types of health care systems used in
industrial nations: free market (private insurance and provision), universal (public insurance and
private provision), and socialized (public insurance and provision). It examines the role of
market forces (supply and demand) within the health care systems and their effects on health
outcomes by constructing an integrative model of health care markets and policies that is lacking
within the scientific and academic literature. The results show that, free market systems have
decreased access to care, good quality of care, and are economically inefficient resulting in 2.7
years of life expectancy lost and wasted expenditures (expenditures that do not increase life
expectancy) of $3474 per capita ($1.12 trillion per year in the U.S.). Socialized systems are the
most economically efficient systems but have decreased access to care compared to universal
systems, increased access to care compared to free market systems and have the lowest quality of
care of all three systems resulting in 3 months of life expectancy lost per capita and a saving of
$335 per capita. Universal systems perform better than either of the other 2 systems based on
quality and access to care. The models show that health insurance is a Giffen Good; a good that
defies the law of demand. This study is the first fully demonstrated case of a Giffen good. This
investigation shows how the theoretically informed integrative model behaves as predicted and
influences health outcomes contingent upon the system type. To test and substantiate this
integrative model, regression analysis, Time-Series-Cross-Section analysis, and structural
equation modeling were performed using longitudinal data provided and standardized by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The results demonstrate
that universal health care systems are superior to the other two systems.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Health care expenditures are a major concern for all countries as the costs of health care
continue to rise faster than the rate of inflation and consume larger portions of a country’s
wealth. These high costs limit access to care and severely reduce the health outcomes of those
without access. A recent survey from National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the
University of Chicago and the West Health Institute found that 40% of Americans skipped
recommended medical tests and 44% did not seek medical care when sick or injured due to costs
of care (NORC, 2018). This self-rationing of care causes premature mortality (Mazziotta, 2018).
Solving this issue is not as simple as restricting the costs of care, as cost restrictions may lead to
decreased quality of care and waitlists for services despite increasing access to care. Developed
nations are using a wide variety of policy interventions to reduce the cost of care while
attempting to maintain the quality and increase the access to care (Ellis, Chen, & Luscombe, 2014;
Joumard & Nicq; OECD, 2010). No matter the country or system of health care, the poor have the

lowest access to care, and bare the largest burden of decreased access to care (Blendon et al.,
2002). Most of the literature that analyzes these policy interventions uses benchmarking and
Data Envelopment Analysis to evaluate the outcomes and the efficiency of the interventions.
Benchmarking can lead to good advice for countries on how to improve efficiency but does not
establish causation and is based on estimates of “relative” efficiency. The literature that attempts
to establish causation looks to the economic market structures within health care that influence
price, quality, and access to care. These studies use the market forces to predict and determine
health outcomes and quality of care. There are no studies that attempt to integrate these two
1

aspects of health care—the market forces and the policy interventions, into an integrative model
that allows for the evaluation of health outcomes based on policy interventions while controlling
for economic forces. The purpose of this study is to develop and evaluate an integrative model
of health care systems and markets that can account for the differences in economic efficiency,
access to care, quality of care, and health outcomes that is lacking within the academic literature
using newly released data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and analyzes the model using regression analysis, Cross-Sectional-Time-Series
analysis, and structural equation modeling (SEM) to establish causative relationships between
health care system types and health outcomes. The results from this analysis demonstrate an
increase in total life expectancy of over 1 billion years for the 34 OECD countries included
within the data set.
Health outcomes across the developed world differ based on the quality of care and
access to care; these differences in quality and access to care are caused by the funding
mechanisms and provision mechanisms within the health care system. Within the developed
world three main systems of health care that are used for the funding and provision of care:
1. Free market—where both the provision of care and the funding of care (health insurance)
are private for profit.
2. Universal—where the provision of care is private for profit, and the funding of care is
public and non-profit.
3. Socialized—where both the provision of care and the funding of care are public and nonprofit.
Each system will have differing effects on the economic efficiency of care, the quality of care,
and access to care based on the forces of supply and demand within the health care market.
2

These differences in economic efficiency, quality, and access will cause measurable differences
in health outcomes. The academic literature has yet to disaggregate performance and outcomes
due to a lack of a systems framework. This dissertation uses a systems framework (Wan, 2002)
to discuss these connections of context, design, performance, and outcomes within health care
that will allow for the evaluation of policy interventions, shown in Table 1:
Table 1: A Health Systems Framework
Context →
Market Forces
Population Wealth
Population Rates of
Health Life Style Factors

Design
→
Public or Private
Provision of Care
Public or Private
Insurance

Performance →
Price of Care
Access to Care
Quality of care

Outcomes
Life Expectancy
Infant Mortality
Rates

Markets determine the price, quantity, and quality of all goods and services based on supply and
demand. In health care economic terms these concepts are discussed as economic efficiency
(price), quality of care (quality), and access to care (quantity) (Brekke, Cellini, Siciliani, &
Straume, 2010; Costa-Font, Sato, & Rovira Forns, 2017; Gaynor, Ho, & Town, 2014). Market
forces (Context) do not differ between countries; however, the structures of those markets based
on health policy (Design) do differ, leading to different levels of economic efficiency, quality of
care, access to care (Performance), which causes differences in health outcomes (Outcomes).
Due to a lack of empirical analyses of health care systems within the academic literature
and a lack of a systems framework for evaluation, this dissertation develops an integrative theory
with a testable model of health care system components, including the context/market, design,
performance, and outcomes. This theoretically specified model argues that differences in health
outcomes are based on the policy choices of governments in regard to the funding of health
insurance and health care provision, and attempts to demonstrate that the demand for health
insurance behaves as a Giffen Good (Jensen & Miller, 2007). Because markets function in
3

predictable manners, the differences between health outcomes must be based on health care
systems in terms of the policy choices of governments (Design), and no country is an outlier in
terms of performance and outcomes.
The fundamental issue within the academic literature that this analysis addresses is, the
divergence in theory between the fields of economics and health policy analysis. Economic
theory states that consolidated markets increase costs and decrease quality due to monopoly price
setting and a lack of competition. Health policy theory suggests that consolidated markets
decrease costs, and increase quality due to increased efficiency, communication between
providers, and a reduction in redundancy.
1.1: Background
Health care is a unique market due to important differences from normal competitive
markets (Crawford, 2010; OECD, 2010; Olsen, 2009)
1. In health care, there are two separate demands for care: A. The theoretical demand (those
that need treatment), and B. The demand with the ability to pay for said care. The
theoretical demand for care is perfectly inelastic—those that need care, need the care at
any cost. Utility of care is not based on consumer choices alone, but rather on the overall
health of the consumer and the consumer’s family (Hurley, Mentzakis, Giacomini,
DeJean, & Grignon, 2017).
2. Consumers rarely directly pay for health services, instead purchasing health insurance to
cover the costs of health care (Gaynor, 2006; Gaynor et al., 2014; Gaynor, Mostashari, &
Ginsburg, 2017; Olsen, 2009). Even with insurance, consumers must also pay out of
pocket for care through copays and coinsurance that were never negotiated prior to
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receiving the care (Gaynor et al., 2014). Medical providers do not tell clients the costs
for their portion of the care before the care is given, and clients receive a bill afterward
that they legally must pay without negotiation; essentially any price the provider has
deemed necessary (Batty & Ippolito, 2017; Crawford, 2010). Most providers will work
with their clients’ financial situations, and many providers do behave altruistically, but
the standard policy is to bill, and then negotiate after the service has already been
provided with price reductions only considered due to financial limitations. Essentially,
after having provided the care, medical providers can say, “Here is how much you legally
owe me. If you cannot afford it, give me everything you currently have (and then some
through debt)”. This does not occur in normal competitive markets.
3. The demand for health insurance is fundamentally different from the demand for health
care (Dunn, 2016; Lieber, 2017; Wigger & Anlauf, 2007). For those at high risk, the
demand for insurance is only limited by the ability to pay (or previously, by the insurance
company’s acceptance of those high-risk clients). For those fortunate enough to be in
good health, the demand for insurance is based on their individual cost benefit analyses
based on their perceived risk. Health insurance utility is usually based on the family unit
and not the individual unit. Health insurance companies are profit motivated—they are
not motivated to provide care for their clients. In fact, health insurance companies make
substantially higher profits by not paying for care for their clients, which is the reason for
countries requiring insurance to cover all despite pre-existing conditions. The demand
for health insurance, which will be argued in this dissertation, functions as a Giffen
Good; as price increases, demand increases until the point where insurance becomes
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unaffordable or unreasonable in the eyes of consumers, and demand begins to
correspondingly decrease.
4. And lastly, health care providers act as a series of regional monopolies and cartelistic
oligarchies, rather than direct competitors or oligarchical competitors. Rampant
monopoly price setting occurs within health care, and differential pricing occurs after the
fact through price discounts based on financial ability (as mentioned above) to further
maximize profits to health care providers (Batty & Ippolito, 2017; Crawford, 2010;
Gaynor et al., 2017; Krabbe-Alkemade, Groot, & Lindeboom, 2017).
Because health care differs from a competitive market, governments have intervened with a wide
variety of policies to compensate for the market failures in health care and achieve better quality
and equity within health care provision (Ellis et al., 2014; OECD, 2010; Olsen, 2009). Policies
dealing with the provision of care and funding of care determine the type of health care system a
country uses. The interaction between supply and demand for health care (the market), and the
system (determined by policies about the provision of care and insurance of care) determines the
“market model based on the system”.
The literature using econometric modelling and market analysis of supply and demand in
health care is substantial, but the majority of the academic literature focuses on supply and
demand within various aspects of the health care market such as: the insurance market (Lieber,
2017; Wang, 2017), the provision of primary care services (Simon, Soni, & Cawley, 2017), the
provision of acute hospital care, negotiation of prices, and quality between insurers and providers
(Lyon, 1999), but few studies focus on the role of market forces within the system as a whole
(Gaynor et al., 2014; OECD, 2010; Squires, Chilcott, Akehurst, Burr, & Kelly, 2016). The
studies that measure efficiency based on the different policies used within countries primarily
6

rely on Data Envelopment Analysis, which measures relative efficiency based on differing levels
of inputs and outputs (OECD, 2010; Ozcan & Khushalani, 2017).
1.2: Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to create and evaluate an integrative model of health care
systems and markets lacking within the academic literature through the systems framework
(Wan, 2002). Therefore, the central research questions focus on the context of health care (the
market forces), the design of health care systems (health care funding and provision policies),
and the performance and outcomes of the interaction between the context and the design:
1. Context: What are the market forces at work within health care and how do these forces
differ from a competitive market (how does supply and demand in health care differ from
supply and demand within competitive markets)?
2. Design: Based on these market forces and their effects on the overall health care market,
what are the differences in health care policies and structures that lead to disparate health
outcomes in terms of quality, access, and economic efficiency in advanced industrial
nations (based on the supply and demand in health care, what are the different policies
used in advanced industrial nations that lead to different outcomes in terms of quality,
access and economic efficiency)?
How do the health care policies and structures in a country affect the market forces for
health care within said country (how do different health care policies affect the supply
and demand of care)?
3. Performance: What are the differences in price, quality, and access to care caused by
these policy interventions?
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4. Outcomes: What are the individual effects of price, access, and quality of care to health
outcomes based on these different policies and market forces?
In other words, how do supply and demand markets affect health policies, and how do health
policies affect the supply and demand of health care? And, how do these differences affect the
price, quality of care, access to care, and health outcomes?
1.3: Study Layout and Approach
Chapter 2 delves into previous studies and discusses their findings in depth regarding the
provision of health care, the demand for care, and the demand for insurance. The next two
subchapters in Chapter 2 discuss existing models of health care that involve combinations of the
above aspects of health care, and studies that attempt to evaluate health outcomes based on
policy interventions, respectively. And, the last subchapter of Chapter 2 discusses the gap within
the academic literature that this dissertation attempts to fill. Chapter 3 develops a system wide,
integrative market model of health care systems that is lacking within the academic literature.
Chapter 4 discusses the methods that will be used to test this market model against real world
data and analyze the differences between systems based on economic efficiency, quality of care,
access to care, and health outcomes. Regression analysis, Time-Series-Cross-Section analysis,
and structural equation modeling will be used to test the model created in Chapter 3 based on the
most recent data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as well as
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
1.4: Terminology and Abbreviations
In this dissertation the “health care market” refers to the supply and demand of health
care and their interactions with each other. The “health care system” refers to the policy
8

combinations chosen by a government regarding health care provision and insurance. The
“market model based on system” refers to the integrative model of the interaction between the
health care market and the health care system. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development is known as the OECD, Data Envelopment Analysis is abbreviated as DEA
analysis, Time-Series-Cross-Section analysis is abbreviated as TSCS, and Structural Equation
Modeling is abbreviated as SEM.

9

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior to 2009, data on health care systems’ funding and provision of care was limited and
had to be collected from individual government agencies. To address this issue, the OECD
developed a uniform survey sent to all member nations about their funding systems, provision
systems, and health care policies in 2009 (OECD, 2010). They provided this data to the public
for the first time ever in 2012, with a follow up survey in 2016. This survey adds greatly to a
more nuanced understanding of health care systems within OECD nations. The data
demonstrates that not all universal or socialized systems are the same across countries (Gaynor et
al., 2014; OECD, 2010). Due to a lack of comprehensive comparative data on health care
systems, there have been few studies on this topic. This dissertation examines the previous
literature on market forces within the health care sector, but as systemic market models are few
and far between (Gaynor et al., 2014; Squires et al., 2016), a unique theory and model of
systemic health care markets had to be created in Chapter 3. This current Chapter discusses
previous literature on market forces within health care systems separated by supply of care,
demand for care, and demand for insurance within health care. These individual aspects affect
the quality of care, the access to care, and the economic efficiency of care. The United States
has the most “free market” health care system, therefore the discussion of health care based on
markets is primarily focused on the United States because other countries alter the functioning of
the free market through greater levels of policy intervention. Subchapter 2.4 discusses the few
studies that attempt to analyze multiple aspects of health care systems simultaneously. Chapter 3
discusses and builds the theory and model of health care systems and markets from an integrative
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perspective that is lacking within the academic literature that will be used within this study.
Chapter 4 discusses the research methods and the statistical methods and models used to evaluate
the theory and model created in Chapter 3.
2.1: Markets and the Supply of Medical Providers
Studies dealing with market forces within the provision of health care, and supply of care,
primarily analyze the role of competition and its effects on quality of care (Gaynor et al., 2014).
Economic theory clearly shows that increased competition leads to increases in investments in
quality and product differentiation. Price increases lead to higher entry into the market as new
firms enter to gain economic profits: as competition increases the price should decrease to attract
consumers. These studies generally focus on how competition for consumers increases the
quality of care through increased investments in quality by providers to attract consumers
whether within free market systems or within single payer systems (Chandra, Finkelstein,
Sacarny, & Syverson, 2016; Gaynor, 2006; Gaynor et al., 2014). Increased prices should
therefore result in more competition, a higher quality of care, and eventually a slowing of the
growth rate of prices due to price competition. However, some studies within health care have
actually found that increased competition has led to lower quality of care (Propper, Burgess, &
Green, 2004; Volpp et al., 2003), or led to increases in costs (Krabbe-Alkemade et al., 2017).
Krabbe-Alkemade, Groot and Lindeboom (2017) analyze the market for health provision
within the Netherlands due to the recent changes in policy dealing with health provider price
competition. The Netherlands had public insurance and changed to managed competition of
insurance. They examine whether hospitals focus their price competition to different aspects of
the provision of health care. Their major findings are that inpatient costs increased (for unknown
reasons according to the authors) and outpatient costs decreased due to a decrease in the number
11

of activities to treat outpatients. They conclude that hospitals primarily look for cost savings
through more efficient outpatient treatments (Krabbe-Alkemade et al., 2017).
There is relatively a large agreement within the literature that health care markets contain
a high level of market concentration and that market concentration is increasing, particularly in
the area of acute care hospitals (Dunn & Shapiro, 2012; Gaynor et al., 2014; Kleiner, White, &
Lyons, 2015). Primary care practices tend to be concentrated as well, but to a lesser extent than
hospitals and with great variation in concentration based on regional differences (Dunn &
Shapiro, 2012; Gaynor et al., 2014; Kleiner et al., 2015). Specialty practices, like hospital
practices, tend to be highly concentrated and increasing in concentration (Kleiner et al., 2015).
In economic theory, concentration of markets leads to higher prices of care and often decrease
the quality of goods and service (Gaynor & Town, 2011). Anti-trust laws are created to avoid
the concentration of markets to stave off price increases and decreases in quality. However, in
health care, market concentration appears to have no effect on the quality of care either
positively or negatively (Gaynor et al., 2017; Kleiner et al., 2015; Romano & Balan, 2010).
These two aspects of competition within health care provision create a paradox; higher
prices are a product of market concentration but do not lead to decreases in the quality of care
like market concentration causes for other goods and services. Higher prices lead to more
competition for consumers which should lead to lower prices and increase in investments to the
quality of care. Therefore, market concentration causes high prices, which should, in turn,
increase competition over time, and cause a decrease in prices as firms attempt to attract
consumers, but the studies are divided. A lack of competition allows for price setting, and high
prices without ensuring the provision of good quality of care. These high prices should then
increase competition as new suppliers enter the market. Competition should then increase the
12

quality of care and decrease price. However, in health care, the markets are becoming more
concentrated and prices continue to rise, while simultaneously investments in quality continue to
increase. In health care the trend is for increasing market concentration, increasing prices, and
increasing quality of care despite the increase in overall market concentration (OECD, 2010).
Kyle and Williams (2017) offer one explanation for this apparent paradox. They argue
that fee-for-service and no supply constraints leads to the rapid adoption and diffusion of medical
technologies with small or unknown benefits which drives cost upward. Medical providers
rapidly adopt new technologies and treatments to compete for consumers, but these “new”
technologies cost more and do not necessarily increase health outcomes (Kyle & Williams,
2017). Therefore, competition can lead to higher prices and does not lead to higher quality of
care despite the investments in increasing the quality of care.
However, Gaynor, Ho, and Town (2014) offer a slightly different explanation for this
apparent paradox. They argue that;
A standard result in models with administered prices is that non-price (quality)
competition gets tougher in the number of firms so long as the regulated price is set
above marginal cost. Firms facing tougher competition will increase their quality in order
to attract (and retain) consumers. This result is essentially the same as in models of
industries with regulated prices (e.g. airlines, trucking) from a number of years ago. […]
As is well known, the increased quality due to tougher competition can benefit
consumers, but in general is not necessarily welfare increasing [does not reduce prices].
In particular, with entry costs, if firms neglect business stealing effects there can be
excessive entry. In equilibrium firms capture less demand than they had anticipated, due
to business stealing, so the benefits of entry from increased quality are more than offset
by the entry costs of the additional firms. (pg 8)
Simply put, when price is set (whether by the government or due to market concentration), if the
price is higher than the marginal costs of care, firms will compete for customers by increasing
investments in quality of care (non-price competition) not by competing for consumers by
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offering lower costs of care (price competition). The costs of this increased investment in quality
are not spread out among consumers evenly due to business stealing which leads to higher prices
overall. Firms invest more in quality than they recoup from their consumers, so they increase
prices on their consumers to recoup costs. In other words, there is an excess of investment in
quality in the market which leads to higher prices without creating proportional benefit to health
outcomes despite the increased investment in quality of care due to business stealing (Gaynor et
al., 2014). Another part of their explanation is that the measure of market concentration—the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index:
[…] (or any market structure measure) is likely endogenous. Unmeasured variation in
demand and cost factors affect both quality and market structure. For example, a firm
with low costs is likely to both have a high market share (leading to a high HHI) and
choose high quality. Alternatively, if high fixed cost investments improve quality, then
hospitals in high density markets will have higher quality simply because they spread
these costs over more patients. (pg. 12)
Gaynor, Ho, and Town then also examine the role that health insurance plays in the supply of
care which will be discussed further in subchapter 2.4, as well as another explanation offered by
Dunn and Shapiro (2012) offered for this apparent paradox by incorporating the role of health
insurance when interacting with health care providers.
Trends in the supply of health care, therefore, are increasing prices due to increased
market concentration and counterintuitive increases in investment into the quality of care which
does not usually occur simultaneously with increasing market concentration. Figure 1 shows
this interaction based on the argument by Gaynor, Ho, and Town (2014):
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Figure 1: The Market and the Supply of Care
Figure 1 begins with a somewhat concentrated supply of health care providers. The increased
market concentration causes an increase in prices. High prices lead to the ability to gain
economic profit, which causes more competition in the supply of health care, which leads to
more investments in the quality of care to attract consumers instead of price competition.
Business stealing due to competition leads to more market consolidation as firms consolidate to
recuperate costs of quality investments, and this consolidation, in turn, continues to increase
prices. The market for the supply of care, therefore, leads to increasing costs through increasing
consolidation of services, and, also increasing costs due to increasing investments in quality of
care.
2.2: Markets and the Demand for Health Care
The demand for health care cannot be viewed as only a question of utility based on
consumers’ willingness to pay; health care is also based on need. Defining need is not
necessarily straight forward in health care. Often patients do not know what care is “needed”
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and must rely on the expertise of health care professionals and gate-keeping (Gaynor et al., 2014;
Lieber, 2017). Most studies avoid defining demand based on need, and instead assume that the
demand for care can be assumed as the amount of care sought rather than a theoretical need for
care. This view of demand for care, is more accurate as a view of demand based on the ability to
pay for care, rather than the need for care. Viewing health care demand as the ability to pay for
care has led to many arguments about “moral hazard” being caused by decreasing the price of
health care. Under this view, consumers will demand more care because they will not safe guard
against risk if the care is free or inexpensive. Kill and Arendt (2017) found this to be true even
in countries with public insurance, by analyzing the use of secondary private health insurance.
They found that secondary insurance did increase the amount of services sought (Kiil & Arendt,
2017). Financial penalties for injury and illness will, therefore, reduce the demand for care as
consumers will take better care of themselves and work to avoid risk suggesting that demand for
care will decrease when consumers are forced to pay a portion of the costs, thus reducing
“unnecessary” treatments. The problem with this view is that it is based on the assumption that
receiving care, is the same as needing care. Obviously, those that have guaranteed payment of
care will seek more care than those that must pay for the care themselves. This is because more
consumers that need care will have access to care that they could not afford without the
guaranteed care. Lieber (2017) shows that consumers often do not know the cost of care due to
health insurance, thereby allowing providers to charge more than a normal market. This means
that those with insurance may demand more care than they would if they directly paid for the
services (the uninsured) even without moral hazard being an issue. Proving moral hazard
requires proving that the demand for care shifts to the right due to insurance, not that demand
decreases along the demand with the ability to pay curve as prices rise (Simon et al., 2017). In
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other words, moral hazard cannot be assumed simply because the insured seek more care than
the uninsured; the need for care could very likely be identical, and the different levels of usage
are based on the ability to pay for needed care (Gaynor, Haas‐Wilson, & Vogt, 2000). Gaynor,
Haas-Wilson, and Vogt (2000) assume moral hazard within health insurance, but then show that
it has no real effect on the market due to the already inflated prices of care within the United
States. A more nuanced understanding of the demand for care needs be developed that
incorporates the two aspects of demand—the demand for care based on need, and the demand for
care based on the ability to pay for care.
Some studies do attempt to empirically analyze and quantify health care demand based
on need. Hurley, Mentzakis, Giacomini, DeJean, and Grignon (2017) attempt to define need
based on the public’s perception of need within health care using survey data collected by the
authors. They begin by defining three aspects of need within economics and how they relate to
health care:
1. Health Status—A person has need if he or she experiences a deficit relative to the norm
in terms of overall health.
2. Ability-to-benefit—A person has a need for health care only if there is an ability for the
person to benefit from the care (someone may be sick, but there is no treatment).
3. The amount of resources required to exhaust benefit—A person has need for health care
if gaining the care does not exhaust resources from others (minor health issues may be
expensive to remedy, and therefore are not a need because they take away resources from
other that have a higher ability to benefit from those resources).
Their findings are that the public views all three aspects are important for determining need for
care, but the highest weight in the public is given to health status.
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Simon, Soni, and Cawley (2017) also examine the role of need versus the ability to pay
for care by examining the role of Medicaid expansion under the ACA. They compare the effects
of insurance expansion to the poor in States that took the Medicaid expansion to those that did
not accept the Medicaid expansion. Need, based on their study, is measured by preventative
care. Preventative care can be considered a need despite current health status. Medicaid
expansion led to increased access to care, and more preventative services. Simultaneously,
expansion of Medicaid did not lead to increases in risky behavior in States that expanded
coverage compared to those States that did not expand Medicaid. Overall demand for care
increased in Medicaid expansion States, but no increase in risky behaviors occurred. This means
that there is no evidence of moral hazard (Simon et al., 2017). Demand in health care, therefore
has two different demand curves—those that need care, and those that can afford care. Medicaid
expansion led to an increase in the demand for care because more consumers that need care
received care that they could not previously afford. Utility in health care demand cannot be
measured by an individual’s revealed preferences, e.g. it cannot be based on a consumer’s
willingness to pay.
2.3: Markets and the Demand for Health Insurance
Like medical providers, the health insurance market is also highly concentrated within
the United States. A 2009 study by the Government Accountability Office found that insurance
markets were highly concentrated and are becoming more concentrated (Dicken, 2009). Single
payer health care systems are also highly concentrated, hence “single payer”. Some single payer
countries have increased competition and decreased concentration within their systems in an
attempt to reduce costs and increase economic efficiency (OECD, 2010). Concentration of
insurance markets may have multiple theoretical effects when the prices are not mandated.
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Concentrated markets could have higher premiums, a reduction in coverage (Dafny, Duggan, &
Ramanarayanan, 2012), but also increased negotiating power with medical providers and
economies of scale which could reduce overall health care costs (Ho & Lee, 2017; Scheffler &
Arnold, 2017). Premiums for health insurance are set after insurance companies have negotiated
with providers and created networks (Dunn & Shapiro, 2012; Gaynor et al., 2014), and younger,
healthier, and poorer consumers are the only consumers of low cost, low coverage insurance
plans (Bes, Curfs, Groenewegen, & de Jong, 2017). The price of health insurance premiums has
mixed effects on the demand for insurance depending on the quality and benefits of the insurance
at the given price (Bes et al., 2017; Krabbe-Alkemade et al., 2017; Lyon, 1999; Wang, 2017).
2.3.1: Market Concentration, Costs of Care and Insurance Premiums
Dafny, Duggan and Ramanarayanan (2012) examine the role of insurance market
competition on the costs of premiums and the levels of coverage provided within the U.S. private
health insurance industry. They hypothesize that insurance market concentration could have
multiple effects on the costs of health care: increased premiums due to price setting, increased
bargaining power over providers and economies of scale leading to a lowering of premiums.
They use longitudinal data to control for exogenous factors that may cause markets to
concentrate or premiums to rise outside of concentration. They find that most insurance markets
are concentrated and becoming more concentrated. Premiums are not rising faster in
concentrating markets than in non-concentrating markets, but major shocks in concentration have
led to a 7% increase in premiums. They also find that consolidation of insurance leads to a
change in health care employment, fewer M.D.s, and an increase in nurses (Dafny et al., 2012).
This means that slowly concentrating markets are not causing premiums to rise, but
consolidation of the largest insurers does lead to increases in premiums despite being able to
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negotiate lower reimbursement rates with providers, and that providers are substituting nurses for
M.D.s as insurance increases in bargaining power.
Ho and Lee (2017), like Dafny et al. (2012), examine the role of market concentration of
insurance premiums. They use data from the State of California and model the removal of
insurance providers. Their findings are similar to Dafny et al (2012) with one caveat: insurance
competition decreases premiums, but insurer consolidation also increases negotiating power for
reimbursement rates thus also decreasing premiums if employers (payers) limit amount of help to
employees causing insurance companies to offer lower premiums to attract customers. If
employers do not successfully place restrictions on insurance plans, consolidation leads to higher
premiums despite the lower reimbursement rates (Ho & Lee, 2017). This implies that a
monopolistic health insurer can negotiate fairer prices with medical providers than competing
firms, but these savings are only passed on to consumers if the price of premiums and profits of
insurers are mandated through policy or by employers having enough power to do so.
2.3.2: Quality and Price of Insurance, Effects on Demand
Bes, Curfs, Groenewegen and de Jong’s (2017) article, “Health Plan Choice in the
Netherlands: Restrictive Health Plans Preferred by Young and Healthy Individuals,” examines
the demand for restrictive health insurance plans compared to less restrictive health insurance
plans within the Netherlands. Restrictive plans require the use of chosen networks of providers
in exchange for lower health insurance premiums. These restrictive plans increase the
bargaining power of insurers with medical providers to keep costs lower. The authors argue that
the goal of this “managed competition” system is to decrease costs of care by providing
consumers with greater choices of insurance providers. They found that restrictive plans were
selected by the young and the healthy, or those with low income. Those that need care (based on
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health status) did not select these plans and preferred unrestricted plans that have higher
premiums. According to the authors, “This means that [enrollees] who use care will be unlikely
to choose a restrictive health plan and, therefore, health insurers will not be able to channel them
to contracted care providers. This undermines the goals of the health care system based on
managed competition.”(Bes et al, 2017, pg. 345). This increased competition within health
insurance does not lead to lower costs of care, or cause price competition among health insurance
companies meaning there is no decrease in premiums to attract consumers. And, these plans
remove the young and healthy from the insurance pools that include those that use the most care.
Increasing health insurance competition by allowing a wide variety of plans does not reduce
overall costs, as different types of consumers purchase the different levels of insurance based on
income, and health status with more expensive insurance plans being more desirable than less
expensive insurance plans.
Lakdawalla and Sood (2005) examine how health insurance markets affect the quality of
care provided by examining how paying for insurance ex ante in exchange for a ex post fixed
cost sufficiently rewards innovators economically for their innovations. Lakdawalla and Sood
(2005) state that:
Society must make a difficult choice between rewarding today’s patients with lower
prices, or rewarding tomorrow’s patients by inducing more innovation. In many respects,
this is viewed as a zero-sum game that requires trading off the welfare of one group for
the welfare of the other. However, in the particular context of health care innovation,
society may be able to achieve efficiency for both today’s and tomorrow’ patients. The
unique and important role of insurance in these markets explains why. Health insurance
resembles a two-part pricing contract, in which a group of consumers pays an upfront fee
in exchange for lower prices in the event of illness. Such two-part pricing contracts can
guarantee both the efficient utilization of a product for today’s patients, and a sufficient
level of profit to induce innovation on behalf of tomorrow’s patients. (pg. 2)

21

Pre- paying insurance for future use leads to innovations in health care because consumers are
given a guaranteed payment of services used and innovators can charge insurance for these new
innovations when there is competition in the insurance market. However, a lack of competition
within the health insurance market leads to less innovations as payment can be below marginal
costs of future innovations. They argue the reason for insurance market concentration leading to
a lack of innovation is because monopolistic insurers can reduce payments to medical providers
below the marginal costs of the innovation. They also note that the uninsured will not have
access to care, and therefore, they do not benefit from innovation due to monopoly price setting
of medical innovators (Lakdawalla & Sood, 2005).
2.4: Comprehensive Market Analyses of Health Care
Lyon (1999) examines the role of insurance competition on the quality of care, price of
care, and supply of care, but also adds in the role of quality of care helping determine the choice
of consumers on their selection of health plans. His analysis attempts to examine the interaction
between health insurance demand, the supply of providers, and the effects on the quality of care.
His model argues that consumers prefer insurance that provides a choice between providers
because consumers do not know quality differences beforehand, and choice allows them to
change providers due to perceived quality. Choice of providers within insurance forces
providers to compete and invest in quality of care. Managed care reduces quality due to lack of
competition of providers (Lyon, 1999). Lyon (1999) states that:
Pure insurance competition softens price competition between hospitals, leading to high
prices; the resulting high margins induce hospitals to invest excessively in innovation as a
way to attract consumers away from rivals. As the cost of quality enhancement rises, the
insurance equilibrium is vulnerable to entry by managed care plans that lock up market
share by eliminating ex post choice of hospital. Entry by managed care plans has a
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prisoner’s dilemma character, however, and hospital prices and revenues fall as a result
[…] hospitals to control costs by reducing investments in quality of care. (pg. 574)
Competitive insurance markets mean less bargaining power for insurers and providers can set
price, this high price leads to competition between providers through quality investments. The
high costs lead to managed care plans (that limit choices for consumers) reducing profits and
investments in quality of care, which induces consumers to prefer health insurance plans that
provide choice of providers.
Herring and Trish (2015) examine the slowed growth in national health care spending in
the United States during the Great Recession to determine if the recession decreased the growth
of health care spending or if other structural changes occurred. Their work is pertinent to this
study, not because of their analysis of the Great Recession, but due to their model of health care
markets that incorporates the role of the insurance market and the provider market. They create
a regression model that finds that the variables with the most explanatory power for health care
spending are: income, insurance market characteristics, and provider market characteristics
(Herring & Trish, 2015).
Another study to analyze health care markets more comprehensively was performed by
Dunn and Shapiro (2012), “Physician Market Power and Medical-Care Expenditures”. They
examined only the U.S. health care market, and thus does not include an analysis or comparison
of effects between the different system types. They attempt measure and analyze how market
concentration within both the provision of care and the insurance market affects costs of care and
utilization of care using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (a commonly accepted measure of
market concentration) (Dunn & Shapiro, 2012; Gaynor et al., 2014). Market concentration being
the level of competition within the health care system—the more concentrated markets having
less competition. Physician practices are less concentrated than hospitals, and therefore allowed
23

the authors to compare concentration level’s effect on price and quantity of care. Their findings
are (Dunn & Shapiro, 2012):
The effects of physician bargaining power are important given the observed consolidation
of physicians over the past few decades, and the potential increase in consolidation due to
health care reform. This paper studies the role of physician bargaining leverage in
determining service prices and service utilization—the two components of physician
medical-care expenditures. Our estimates suggest that those physicians with greater
market power relative to insurance carriers are able to receive higher service payments.
Unlike typical markets, these higher payments do not correspond with lower utilization
and may in fact increase utilization. We attribute this result to a low proportion of price
sensitive patients as well as the presence of an upward sloping supply curve. Market
power of insurance carriers also plays an important role. We provide evidence that
insurance carriers with greater market power are able to negotiate lower service prices
and are also able to reduce the generosity of physician benefits. (pg. 42)

The important findings in their research are: 1) physician concentration leads higher prices; 2)
insurance concentration leads to lower prices, although both with low R squares of 0.001; 3)
insurance concentration leads to higher out of pocket expenses and premiums; 4) price changes
to the consumer (in terms of out of pocket expenses) do not affect demand for vital services
(cardiology versus orthopedic services); and 5) provider concentration leads to higher prices, but
not a reduction in quantity demanded, and in some cases causes an increase in quantity
demanded (Dunn & Shapiro, 2012). These findings lead to important implications for the model
of health care systems and markets laid out in Chapter 3:
1. Higher prices are a product of provider concentration; monopolies and oligopolies in
health care provision cause higher prices.
2.

Insurance concentration can negotiate lower reimbursement rates.
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3. Insurance concentration allows insurance companies to increase profits by offering lower
levels of service and higher premiums without increasing quantity of care, or quality of
care.
4. Demand for care is dependent on need, not on price.
5. Higher prices of health care may increase demand for care, meaning that health insurance
possibly acts like a Giffen Good.
Studies considering the interplay of multiple aspects of the health care market may lead to a
more accurate interpretation of the effects of supply and demand within health care.
2.5: Analyses of Health Care Systems Based on Quality and Technical Efficiency
Ozcan and Khushalani (2017) attempt to integrate the analysis of system type and
technical efficiency measures. They use Dynamic Network DEA analysis to compare efficiency
of health reforms within the OECD by comparing them to their counterparts. Unfortunately, their
analysis does not specify the type of reform in terms of increasing or decreasing markets within
the systems. Their results showed that health care systems that altered policies to become more
economically efficient, or efficient in the allocation of resources were all successful. In fact,
countries that continually worked to become efficient were more efficient than countries that did
not alter their policies (Ozcan & Khushalani, 2017).
The OECD’s (2010), “Health Care Systems: Efficiency and Policy Settings” released
their preliminary analysis of health care quality and efficiency caused by policy interventions
based on their newly created survey in 2009. The study separates health care systems into six
categories of systems based on policy differences within universal and socialized health care
systems (the U.S. did not participate in the 2009 survey). The OECD study is large and has
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several implications for this dissertation, and these differences within system type (universal and
socialized) are discussed in further depth in Chapter 3.2. The study used DEA analysis to
compare the efficiency of countries’ health care systems by comparing them to their counterparts
within these six groups and between groups within these six groups of countries. The OECD’s
(2010) main finding was that:
There is no clear indication that one health care system systematically outperforms
another. On the contrary, countries performing well can be found in all institutional
groups. Countries doing poorly are also present in most groups. (pg. 138)
DEA analysis is limited in its ability to establish causation, and these in group results merely
show that some countries are more efficient than others with similar policies and inputs. The
interesting and important implication of their results, however, is that the between group
variation was not as large as the within group variation. No system was more efficient at
allocating resources than any other system (OECD, 2010).
There is a plethora of academic research on the efficiency and quality of health care
within each system type that utilize a wide variety of statistical methods. Within system
variation and outcomes show that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between quality and
efficiency (both efficiency and quality could be increased/decreased simultaneously) (Lee, Wan,
& Kwon, 2013; Lee & Wan, 2002; Stange, 2014; Tang, Wan, Ortiz, Meemon, & Paek, 2011;
Wan, Lin, & Ma, 2002; Wan, Zhang, & Unruh, 2008). These studies focus on mechanisms for
increasing both economic efficiency and quality of care within a given system type. The
findings are substantial on policy interventions within a system that increase or decrease
efficiency and quality of care.
Wan, Lin, and Ma (2002) examine the role of integration mechanisms in integrated health
care delivery systems. Integration being the horizontal and vertical connection and network of
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providers combined to provide seamless continuation of care to consumers. In economic terms,
these networks represent a consolidation of small practices to reduce costs of care and increase
the quality of care through coordination between providers and reduce waste and redundancy.
Using SEM they find that integration of health care delivery systems are able to increase
efficiency of care and quality of care (Wan et al., 2002). From a policy prospective (rather than
an economic perspective), the consolidation of medical providers can lead to better economic
efficiency and quality of care. This leads to important implications for health care markets,
consolidation leads to higher quality and more efficiency for consolidated networks of providers.
However, from the economic perspective, the efficiency increases caused through consolidation
are not passed on to consumers as seen in the previous subchapter. Integrated health care
delivery systems can increase the quality of care and efficiency of care, but these networks do
not necessarily pass on these economic savings to consumers.
Lee and Wan (2002) confirmed the result that integration did not lead to an immediate
financial benefit to consumers. They used structural equation modeling to analyze clinical
integrations effects on economic efficiency and quality of care looking at the average total
charges passed on to consumers. Their major finding was that:
With the negative efficiency indicator used in the analysis, hospitals with lower average
total charges for treating patients were considered more efficient as compared to others.
Clinical integration was regarded as the strategic behavior of hospitals to reduce charges
on the patient bill. Our data analysis does not support this assumption. The extent of
structural clinical integration is significantly associated with the average total charge per
discharge, but the sign is opposite to expectation. Hospitals with highly clinically
integrated structures showed higher average total charges than others with less clinically
integrated structures. (pg. 241)
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Integration of health services should lead to better economic efficiency (for the provider) and
quality of care, however, these results show that any savings through integration were not passed
on to the consumer (Lee & Wan, 2002).
An important implication of these studies analyzing health care systems effects on quality
and technical efficiency is that; quality and efficiency are not mutually exclusive, and that within
each system there is great variation in efficiency and quality that needs to be accounted for and
included in any analysis of health care systems and markets. An integrative model needs to
account for this within system variation.
2.6: Theoretical Framework for Analysis
As seen above, there is an extensive academic literature dealing with various aspects of
health care markets. And, there is great variation within each health care system used by OECD
countries (Ellis et al., 2014; OECD, 2010). For the purpose of simplicity and beginning the
discussion, this dissertation begins with a generalized version of each system type; and a basic
supply and demand model based on these generalizations. Figure 2 lays out the most simplistic
version of the market model that will be developed and analyzed within this analysis:
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Figure 2: Basic Market Model of Health Care Based on Health System
This model builds upon my Master’s Thesis (Helligso, 2007). In that research, a model of health
care markets was created due to lack of previous literature using integrative system wide models
of supply and demand (Figure 2 is a variation on that original model), and was analyzed using
regression analysis and dummy variables for health care system types. Regression analysis,
unlike DEA analysis, allows for an establishment of causation. In Figure 2, the basic argument
is that the type of health care system determines per capita expenditures (price) of health care,
which determines the supply and quantity of care provided. Free market systems, due to
provider price setting, will cost substantially more than the ideal price that would cause supply
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and demand to meet. This elevated price will increase competition for providers entering the
market, which will increase the quality of care. However, this elevated price will simultaneously
reduce access to care as consumers are priced out of the market. Universal systems will force a
negotiation between the single payer for care and the monopolistic providers of care. Due to
information asymmetries, providers will be able to negotiate a price slightly higher than the point
that the short-term costs of care meet the demand for care. This slight elevation in price will
increase competition and thus quality of care, and full demand will be met. Socialized systems
will push price closer to the point where long-term costs meet the demand for care (which is
lower than the point where short-term costs meet demand). This occurs because the government
controls the provision of care, and therefore knows the long-term costs of care. This will lead to
possible shortages in supply creating waitlists, as all consumers are guaranteed care. It will also
cause a decrease in the quality of care, as there is little financial motive for entry of new
suppliers and therefore less competition. Mathematically these relationships and testable
hypotheses of causation are expressed as Equation 1:
Equation 1: Relationships between Health Outcomes and Health Care System Types
Health Outcomes = ƒ (Access to Care + Quality of Care).
Access to Care = ƒ (Price).
Quality of Care = ƒ (Price).
System Type = ƒ (Level of Free Market Insurance + Level of Free Market
Provision).
Price of Care = ƒ (Wealth + System Type).
Therefore,
Health Outcomes = ƒ (Wealth + System Type).

Equation 1 shows that, controlling for the wealth of a country, health outcomes are determined
by the type of system used for funding care and providing care.
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The results from my initial analysis of these relationships were encouraging and
statistically significant at the 0.001 level and an R square of 0.71 (Helligso, 2007). The results
showed that system type determined health care expenditures and that expenditures had a
quadratic relationship with health outcomes as access to care and quality of care differed
between system types. The use of dummy variables for system type created limits to the
analysis, as policies within system types could not be analyzed. After my initial theory and
analysis, the OECD has updated its data set and now includes data on funding mechanisms for
insurance and private versus public provision of care based on surveys in 2009, 2012 and 2016.
This new data allows for a more nuanced statistical analysis of health outcomes based on a
variety of free market versus public policy choices within multiple aspects of health care
systems.
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CHAPTER 3: BUILDING AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF HEALTH CARE MARKETS
AND SYSTEMS
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are no integrative theories or models for health care
markets and their interactions with health care policies. To address this issue, Chapter 3
develops an integrative theory and model of health care markets and health care systems. Using
a systems framework, this Chapter is divided into multiple subchapters shown in Table 2:
Table 2: The Health Systems Framework and Chapter Organization
Context

→

Market Forces: Subchapter
3.1
Demand for Care
Supply of Medical
Providers
Demand for
Health Insurance

Design

→

Health Care System Type:
Subchapter 3.2
Free Market Systems
Universal Systems
Socialized Systems
Variation within
System Type

Performance →

Outcomes

Integrative Model and
Performance Hypotheses:
Subchapter 3.3
Price of Care
Access to Care
Quality of care

Methods for Testing
the Integrative Model
and Health Outcomes:
Chapter 4
Analysis and
Health
Outcomes

Subchapter 3.1 discusses the economics of health care systems in terms of supply and demand.
Because the demand for insurance and the demand for health care are separate but interrelated,
the supply and demand for health care requires a discussion of the demand for care, the supply of
medical providers, and a separate discussion of the demand for health insurance. Subchapter 3.2
discusses the role and effect of health care policies on the market for health care separating the
policies into three major subgroups (free market, universal, and socialized). Then the differences
within each subgroup are discussed. Subchapter 3.3 presents the final model based on the
economics of health care and the interaction with health care policies based on the two previous
subchapters.
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3.1: Economics: Visualizing Supply and Demand within an Abstract, General Health Care
Market
The market for health care is based on the supply of medical providers, and the demand
for care based on the ability to pay for care. The ability to pay for care is based on health
insurance; therefore, the market for health care is dependent on the demand for health insurance,
the supply of care, and the demand for care.
3.1.1: The Demand for Care
Health care markets in every country, like markets for all goods and services, should be a
function of supply and demand. In health care the demand for actual care is based on the need
for care (Hurley et al., 2017). There are two separate demands for care within any given time
period (Hurley et al., 2017): 1. The theoretical demand (Dt), those that need health care, 2. The
demand with the ability to pay for care (Da) in Figure 3, those that can afford to pay for said
care at a given price:
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Figure 3: Base Supply and Demand Model for an Abstract, General Health Care Market
As seen in Figure 3, the theoretical demand for care is perfectly inelastic; no matter the price of
the care, consumers still demand the care. The price of care is not a factor for the theoretical
demand for care. As discussed in Chapter 2, the need for care is not equivalent to a consumer’s
choice in seeking care based on a given price (Hurley et al., 2017; Simon et al., 2017). If a
consumer has cancer, that individual “needs” care no matter the price. The famous “RAND
Health Insurance Experiment” found that the demand for care changed based on the level of
coinsurance that consumers paid (Brook et al., 1984). Higher prices caused consumers to seek
out less medical care whether they “need” the care or not. Consumers sought less health care in
general, and the poor showed higher frequencies of sever health outcomes based on the increases
in coinsurance (Brook et al., 1984). The poor still “needed” care but did not seek out care due to
34

the high costs. This leads to two different views on the demand for care—the “Theoretical
Demand” and the “Demand with the Ability to Pay”. This price-demand relationship is
expressed as the “Demand with the Ability to Pay for Care” in Figure 3, and the “need” for care
is expressed as the “Theoretical Demand for Care”. The theoretical demand for care, like all
inelastic demands, is represented as a vertical line at the quantity point that represents everyone
that needs care. The demand with the ability to pay for care, however, will decrease as price
increases. It would be a curvilinear relationship, as consumers would do anything necessary to
pay for the care (including selling all assets or going bankrupt). These demands for care are
represented in Figure 3, as Dt and Da respectively. The gap between Dt and Da represents those
that need care but cannot afford care at any given price.
Figure 3 is not drawn to scale (if it were, the demand for care, and supply would be
vertically elongated; making the figure much taller and thinner. Additionally, the demand for
insurance would be horizontally elongated, making it shorter and thinner, and expanding much
further right than the demand for care). Figure 3 is drawn to represent multiple concepts in a
visually appealing manner that allows for the concepts to be visualized from their abstractions,
and with spacing set up for future analysis and information to be added. Demand for care is
represented in black, the supply of care is represented in orange, and the demand for insurance is
represented in red.
3.1.2: The Supply of Care
An important assumption for this analysis is that medical providers will act as normal, for
profit suppliers, like suppliers for other goods and services based on their costs and revenues
(Brekke et al., 2010; Crawford, 2010; Dunn & Shapiro, 2012; Gaynor et al., 2014). It could be
argued that many, in the medical community, enter the medical field for reasons other than profit
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(perhaps they are altruistic), and many organizations are non-profit. However, this analysis
assumes that they will still behave as profit motivated actors (Brekke et al., 2010; Crawford,
2010; Dunn & Shapiro, 2012; Gaynor et al., 2014). The marginal revenue for providers, in
Figure 3, for the demand with the ability to pay (Da) is either the demand curve itself (if
provision occurs in perfect competition), or is one half the demand for the ability to pay for care
(as with all marginal revenues for all monopolies) (Crawford, 2010) . The average total cost of
care, and the marginal cost of care are drawn for visual representation and analysis based on
“normal” economic concepts (Brekke et al., 2010; Crawford, 2010). In the short term, the
marginal costs are the supply curve for health care provision (Gaynor et al., 2014); and in the
long term, the average total cost of care is the supply curve for medical provision, as more
providers will enter the market diminishing the economic profits (Brekke et al., 2010; Crawford,
2010). The average total cost represents the cost for treating a given quantity of patients
including normal profit, there are always normal profits on the line even if there is zero
economic profit (Crawford, 2010).
3.1.3: The Demand for Insurance
Health care is an extremely personal and intrinsically individualistic commodity. In
academia, we often overlook the personal and individualistic—but to understand the nature of
health care economics, and health care markets, requires an understanding of individual motives
and utilities of those within the system. The demand for health insurance (Di in Figure 3) is
different than the demand for health care (Dunn & Shapiro, 2012; Wang, 2017). The demand for
care and the demand for insurance are related and have effects on each other, but they represent
two separate demands for two separate goods or services (Bes et al., 2017; Dunn & Shapiro,
2012; Gaynor et al., 2014; Wigger & Anlauf, 2007). Consumers are willing and able to spend
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less per month over a longer period of time to cover their expected use and/or perceived risk of
medical complications (Ferreira & Gomes, 2017; Wang, 2017). Therefore, the demand for
health insurance is based on a mixture of current need, and a cost benefit analysis of the
consumer’s risk on an individual basis (Bes et al., 2017; Gaynor et al., 2014; Wang, 2017). If
one is high risk (currently needs substantial care due to chronic illness or disease), the demand
for insurance behaves the same as the demand for care with the ability to pay (Bes et al., 2017).
If one is not high risk, the demand for insurance is based on the judgement of individuals as to
whether or not the recurring costs of the insurance will at least cover their possible future
complications and/or use of health care. Individuals perform a cost benefit analysis based on the
plans offered, and a calculation about how likely they will need to use the coverage (Bes et al.,
2017; Gaynor et al., 2014; Wang, 2017; Wigger & Anlauf, 2007). Consumers will also look at
the long term use of insurance, and they may choose to pay for insurance over a longer term,
believing that, even if it is not utilized in the short term, it will eventually be worth the cost over
the long term as complications arise (Wigger & Anlauf, 2007). How risk averse the individual is
will also influence the decision to purchase health insurance (Olsen, 2009; Wang, 2017). Even if
an individual is in good health that person may purchase more expensive plans due to risk
aversity (Wang, 2017). The calculation looks something like Equation 2:
Equation 2: Cost Benefit Analysis for Utility of Health Insurance
Utility = ((# of utilizations per year) * (cost per utilization covered by the insurance)
* (# of years)) + (Perceived likelihood of a catastrophic event per year * Risk
Aversion) * (Cost of a catastrophic event) * (# of years)) ≥ ((Insurance cost per year)
* (# of years)).
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Under the assumptions from Equation 2, it would be very difficult for insurance companies to
make a profit, as only those that think they will break even or come out ahead, in the long term,
will choose to purchase the insurance plan (Bes et al., 2017). Due to incomplete information,
however, many consumers will overestimate their costs and risks while others will
underestimate, and insurance is almost guaranteed a profit due to this miscalculation of cost and
risk (Gaynor et al., 2014; Wigger & Anlauf, 2007). Insurance companies also use more
sophisticated models to determine and price risk than their customers. Even though insurance
companies have an advantage in risk pricing, due to information asymmetry (Gaynor et al.,
2014), profits are somewhat limited because consumers are making these cost benefit
calculations. Insurance companies will also negotiate with health care providers to keep costs of
care low (lower than the perceived costs to consumers) to further increase health insurance
profits (Ho & Lee, 2017).
If the demand for health care is based on a given quantity needed within a given year, the
demand for insurance would be represented as lower than the total demand for care at its highest
point, but would exceed, in quantity, the actual demand for care at lower prices. Those that do
not currently need care will still purchase insurance out of a perceived risk based on their
individual cost benefit analyses (the highest price point on Di is lower than the highest price
point on Da, and the quantity demanded on Di exceeds the quantity demanded on Da in Figure
3). To demonstrate how the demand for health insurance functions requires an examination of
individual family utilities and budget constraints:
Case 1: The Middle-Class Family, Diabetic Child
Insurance is usually purchased at the family level, whether single member families or
multimember families. The lower the cost of health insurance, the less coverage the insurance
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provides. Low cost insurance, to save consumers money on their monthly premiums, will have
limited coverage, high copays, high coinsurance, and high deductibles, or any combination
thereof (Bes et al., 2017). As a result, these insurance plans offer little benefit for moderate
health care utilization (Bes et al., 2017). The lowest cost health insurance plans are only
desirable for those that will use them infrequently and only need catastrophic coverage (Bes et
al., 2017). Those that need more frequent care will prefer to pay more per month for plans that
reduce these copays, coinsurance and deductibles (Bes et al., 2017). Therefore, as the price of
lower cost insurance decreases, the desirability of the plan will decrease, thus the demand will
decrease. As the price of lower cost health insurance increases, the desirability of the plan will
also increase, thus the demand will increase. This is counterintuitive unless one understands that
inexpensive health insurance is an inferior good, and that higher priced plans are viewed as
providing better returns on investment for consumers through a reduction in copays, coinsurance,
and deductibles.
To demonstrate these concepts requires a look at budget constraints for various family
units. Budget constraint analysis graphically demonstrates the decision-making process of
individuals while choosing between two goods or services while facing budget limits. Figure 4
represents a family of four, with a moderate family income, and one family member that has a
chronic illness. In this scenario, “The Middle-Class Family, Diabetic child”, there is a twoparent household, with two children, one of which has Type 1 Diabetes:
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Figure 4: Budget Constraint for Moderate Income Family, Price Decrease of Inexpensive
Insurance

In Figure 4, under the original budget constraints the family can afford inexpensive insurance
for five family members, or expensive insurance for two and a half family members (partial
insurance plans cannot be purchased). The family chooses to purchase the better plan offered for
sale for their Diabetic child and the other three family members purchase the inexpensive plan
(point A in Figure 4). Under this scenario the head of household’s employer offers a new, less
expensive health plan for purchase, or the price of the existing plan decreases. A new budget
line is created using the new price of the inexpensive insurance. Under the new budget line, the
family can now afford inexpensive insurance for a family of 10. The price of the expensive plan
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has not changed, and therefore the family can still only afford the expensive plan for two and a
half family members. Because the inexpensive plan has become even more affordable, there
should be an incentive for the family to substitute the inexpensive plan in place of the more
expensive plan they are currently purchasing (the substitution effect). However, the new price
means that the family can now afford to purchase the more expensive plan for both of their
children, and still afford inexpensive coverage for the parents (the income effect). More income
has been freed up to purchase the more expensive, and desirable plan due to the decrease in price
of the inexpensive plan. The substitution effect pushes the family to purchase more of the
inexpensive insurance (point C in Figure 4), but the income effect outweighs the substitution
effect in the opposite direction (point B in Figure 4). Ultimately, the family now chooses to
purchase more of the expensive insurance and less of the inexpensive insurance—a decrease in
price caused a decrease in demand for the good.
Conversely, take this same family, but the price of the inexpensive insurance increases.
This increase in price then causes the family to increase their demand for the inexpensive
insurance. Figure 5 represents the inverse of Figure 4, where the price of the inexpensive
insurance increases while the expensive insurance remains unchanged. Using the point B in
Figure 4 as the starting point for Figure 5, an increase in in the price of inexpensive insurance
will cause an increase in the demand for inexpensive insurance as the income effect (inexpensive
insurance is now consuming more income leaving less for the more desirable good) again
outweighs the substitution effect.
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Figure 5: Budget Constraint for Moderate Income Family, Price Increase of Inexpensive
Insurance

At moderate levels of income; as the price of inexpensive insurance increases the demand
increases, and as the price of inexpensive insurance decreases the demand for inexpensive
insurance decreases. Demand for insurance is functioning counterintuitively, and in opposition
to the law of demand at moderate levels of income for a family with a high-risk family member.
This is not a stand-alone case; this scenario represents a significant enough portion of the market
to influence the overall demand within the market. It does not represent the entire market,
though.
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Case 2: The Upper-Middle Class American Family
Not every family has moderate levels of income or high-risk family members. Case 2
examines a wealthier family than case 1, with or without a high-risk family member. Risk is not
as important of a factor for this family, because the family’s income makes the risk of
catastrophe decreased due to the family having enough money to cover events that a poorer
family would still find catastrophic (a $10,000 medical event would be catastrophic for a poor
family but would not be catastrophic for a wealthy family). This is the view of the family in an
unrealistically idealized America, the America that most incorrectly assume, is how the “normal”
American family and health care market functions—referred to now as “The Upper-Middle Class
American Family”. This is a somewhat unrealistic view of the “average” American’s wealth and
risk of catastrophe that many use as an example to discuss the “normal” American families—
despite being above average, this family does occur within the market and provides insight into
health care systems and markets. This is a family that is wealthy enough to afford good
insurance for all family members, but not wealthy enough to pay out of pocket for seriously
catastrophic events. This family desires good quality insurance, will make some sacrifices to
attain the good insurance, but cannot sacrifice all its disposable income to do so. Unlike in case
1 where the price of inexpensive insurance changes, in case 2 the price of expensive, good
quality insurance changes. The family has enough income to afford good insurance and will not
purchase inexpensive insurance unless forced to do so due to income constraints. Figure 6
demonstrates, that with a higher level of income, as the price of insurance increases the demand
for insurance will decrease because the costs become prohibitive:
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Figure 6: Budget Constraint for Wealthy Family Income, Price of Expensive Insurance
Increases

The wealthier family’s original budget line allows them to purchase expensive insurance for all 4
family members with excess money left over for their disposable income (point A in Figure 6).
Both the income effect and the substitution effect reduce the number of family members covered
under the expensive insurance plan. This family can no longer afford expensive insurance for all
four family members and leave enough disposable income for other goods and services. This
family will substitute less expensive insurance plans for some of the more expensive plans,
which leads to an increased demand for moderate insurance plans through the substitution effect.
This price for insurance is above the Max line for the demand for insurance in Figure 3. Beyond
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this max line in Figure 3, insurance prices become prohibitive, and demand decreases as price
increases due to a lack of income, not due to the utility for the consumers.
Health Insurance as an Inferior Good
As seen in the above scenarios, inexpensive health insurance is an inferior good. This
argument can be further substantiated by comparing inexpensive insurance to expensive
insurance based on various levels of income simultaneously:

Figure 7: Inexpensive Insurance Demand Compared to Expensive Insurance, Multiple
Budget Lines
Figure 7 shows that inexpensive insurance is an inferior good compared to expensive insurance
(Bes et al., 2017). Each grey line represents a different income level. As incomes increase, the
families are able to purchase more insurance. The fourth budget line shows that even though the
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family could save money by purchasing the inexpensive insurance, they would purchase an extra
expensive plan. At incomes beyond this point, the demand for expensive insurance continues to
increase while the demand for inexpensive insurance decreases. Families only purchase
inexpensive health insurance because they cannot afford expensive insurance. Expensive
insurance is also an inferior good as wealth increases. For the very wealthy, health insurance is a
needless expense in the sense that, as wealth increases, the willingness to purchase health
insurance decreases as the price of insurance consumes more disposable income. An uppermiddle class family may be willing to pay 10% of their disposable income to provide good
quality insurance for all family members, but not 20% of their disposable income. Whereas, a
middle-class family may be willing to pay 20% of disposable income to provide good quality
insurance for all family members. An increase in wealth causes a decrease in demand for
insurance based on the percent of disposable income consumed. The quantity demand for health
insurance may be the same for both an upper-middle class family and a lower-middle class
family at a given price, but the demand based on the percent of income consumed is drastically
different.
Health Insurance Functioning as a Giffen Good
A Giffen Good (named after Sir Robert Giffen and first published by Alfred Marshall in
Principles of Economics, 1895) is a good that violates the law of demand, in which the demand
for the good increases as the price for the good increases, and usually only applies to the very
poor (Jensen & Miller, 2007; Marshall, 1895). There is a debate as to whether Giffen Goods
actually exist in reality, or are just theoretically possible (Jensen & Miller, 2007). For a Giffen
good to exist it must meet certain criteria (Jensen & Miller, 2007):
1. The good must be an inferior good.
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2. There must be a lack of substitute goods.
3. The expense of the good must consume a substantial portion of income, but not all of
income.
4. A Giffen good will have a demand that increases when price increases in opposition to
the law of demand.
5. The income effect will dominate the substitution effect for the good, causing this
counterintuitive effect on demand.
Health insurance meets every criterion of a Giffen good:
1. As demonstrated in Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7, inexpensive health
insurance is an inferior good (Bes et al., 2017).
2. There are no substitutes available for health insurance.
3. Health care currently accounts for 17.8 percent of the U.S.’s GDP, representing roughly
$9,900 per capita. The median household income in the U.S. is $56,156.
4. Figure 4 and Figure 5 clearly demonstrate that, at moderate levels of income, as the
price of inexpensive health insurance increases the demand increases—and, as the price
of inexpensive health insurance decreases the demand decreases.
5. Figure 4 and Figure 5 clearly show how the income effect dominates the substitution
effect and that the two effects work in opposition to each other for inexpensive health
insurance plans.
Despite the debate around whether Giffen Goods exist in reality, health insurance meets every
criterion for a Giffen good, and demand follows the predictions of a Giffen Good including the
role of the income and substitution effects as seen in Figure 4 and Figure 5. A preliminary
examination of the data available from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, shown in Table 3:
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Table 3: U.S. Health Care Spending by Decile
Source: The US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017
All
Lowest Second Third Fourth
Fifth
Sixth Seventh Eighth
consumer
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
units
percent percent percent percent percent percent percent percent
Income after
taxes
Mean
Average
annual
expenditures
Mean
Healthcare
Mean
Share
Health
insurance
Mean
Share

$64,175

$6,774 $16,841 $25,423 $33,404 $42,410 $52,949

$57,311 $23,588 $26,675 $34,221 $39,308 $43,975 $51,351

Ninth
10
percent

Highest
10
percent

$66,676 $83,424 $108,743 $205,391

$59,395 $70,411

$87,432 $136,873

$4,612
8.0

$1,742
7.4

$2,565
9.6

$3,136
9.2

$3,918
10.0

$4,144
9.4

$4,388
8.5

$5,160
8.7

$5,722
8.1

$6,772
7.7

$8,577
6.3

$3,160
5.5

$1,210
5.1

$1,752
6.6

$2,173
6.4

$2,759
7.0

$2,922
6.6

$3,102
6.0

$3,619
6.1

$3,963
5.6

$4,491
5.1

$5,614
4.1
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The Bureau of Labor Statistics separates health care spending by decile and uses only private
spending data. Therefore, the private spending per capita is less than the total per capita
expenditures on health care of roughly $9,900 per capita, this also includes the public
expenditures and employer expenditures on health care and health insurance. As seen in Table 3
as income level increases, spending on health care increases. However, the percent of spending
used for health care fluctuates based on income with the middle class willing to spend more than
either the poor or the wealthy. Spending on health insurance also follows the same pattern of
increasing as incomes increase, and then decreases at higher income levels. Further analysis will
use State level data from U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) on enrollment
and insurance selection through the “Health Insurance Exchanges” (CMS, 2018). This
preliminary examination of the data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics suggests that more
expensive health insurance is more desirable than inexpensive insurance; demand is only limited
by income (increasing spending based on income levels). Inferior goods have declining demand
as incomes increase because the wealthy purchase less of the good, therefore if health insurance
is an inferior good the wealthy should pay less for health insurance than the poor. However, the
increased expenditures on health insurance do not represent an increased quantity of insurance
being purchased. Rather, it represents the purchase of more expensive health insurance plans
while the same quantity of health insurance plans is being purchased. In other words, as incomes
rise, the quantity of inexpensive health insurance plans decreases, and consumers purchase more
expensive insurance plans. Similar to the findings of Bes et al (2017), the only group willing to
purchase inexpensive health insurance is the poor--these plans entail higher out of pocket
expenses (shown by the lower level of spending for insurance premiums, and less proportion on
expenditures being spent out of pocket in the lowest decile). And, the middle class is willing to
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spend more for insurance as a percent of spending and income than any other group as would be
predicted of a Giffen Good (Jensen & Miller, 2007).
To test the statistical significance of the data and demonstrate how a Giffen good should
behave at different income levels, a preliminary regression analysis was performed using these
deciles from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Table 4 shows the results from this preliminary regression analysis based on income
deciles from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:
Table 4: Preliminary Regression Results for Testing Insurance Demand as a Giffen Good
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients
B

1: Dependent
Variable =
Mean Insurance
Expenditures
2: Dependent
Variable =
Percent of
Expenditures
Spent on
Insurance

(Constant)
Mean
Income for
Decile
(Constant)
Decile
Decile
Squared

Std. Error

1994.98

241.445

0.016

0.002

4.828

0.413

0.800

0.173

-0.088

0.015

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

Model R
Square

Beta
8.263

0.000

6.794

0.000

11.678

0.000

2.730

4.633

0.002

-3.370

-5.720

0.001

0.923

0.852

0.878

Regression Model 1, in
Table 4, tests income’s effects on the willingness to purchase more expensive health insurance
(increasing demand, and thus spending, due to increases in income). As expected, the data is
significant at the 0.001 level, and shows that, as wealth increases, private spending on health
insurance increases. The purchase of health insurance is limited by income level, and more
expensive health insurance plans are more desirable than less expensive health insurance
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(inexpensive health insurance is an inferior good). That said, the wealthy spend more on most
basic goods and services in general, but they spend a significantly smaller portion of their
incomes on these goods (Engel’s Law). For example, the wealthy spend slightly more on food
than the poor, but this increased spending on food represents a smaller percent of their
expenditures than it does for the poor. Figure 8 shows the differences in types of goods in
relation to spending based on income level:

Figure 8: Relationship of Aggregate Spending, Proportional Spending, and Income for
Types of Goods
Because insurance expenditures increase rather than decrease as incomes rise, it may lead people
to believe that insurance is a necessity good, or a luxury good as seen in Figure 8. However, the
increased expenditures are not due to increases in quantity demanded, but rather due to
purchasing more expensive health insurance plans. Therefore, inexpensive health insurance
plans should have decreased demand as income rises meaning it is an inferior good. To further
test if health insurance spending is functioning like an inferior good, model 2 was created to test
which group is willing to spend the largest portion of their expenditures on health insurance. As
seen in model 2, percent of expenditures is used in place of percent of income because the lowest
deciles spend more than their income, therefore to compare across deciles requires comparing
proportion of expenditures in place of proportion of incomes. The model shows that as income
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increases, the willingness to spend a larger proportion of income on health insurance increases,
with an R square of 0.878 and all variables significant at the 0.01 level. More expensive health
insurance plans are preferred over less expensive insurance plans as income levels rise as a
proportion of income; Figure 9 graphically shows this concept:

Figure 9: Quadratic Relationship Between Income and Insurance Expenditures as Portion
of Expenditures
In Figure 9 the linear regression line suggests (linear regression was not statistically significant,
p=0.09) that; as income increases, the willingness to purchase more expensive insurance plans,
which would take up a more significant portion of expenditures, does not increase. In fact,
consumers become less willing to purchase more expensive health insurance as a proportion of
their total spending under the linear model, thus making health insurance appear to be a necessity
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good or inferior good. Despite this, health insurance cannot be viewed as a necessity good. The
negative linear relationship is not statistically significant and, the increasing expenditures in
model 1 represent purchasing more expensive health insurance plans, not increasing quantity of
health insurance purchased. The quadratic model shows that, as incomes increase from the low
end of the deciles to the middle decile income levels, the willingness to purchase more expensive
health insurance policies increases. Consumers are willing to purchase more expensive health
insurance in both total spending and as a higher proportion of their expenditures as incomes rise
from the lowest decile toward the middle deciles. And, as income levels increase from the
middle deciles toward the top decile the willingness to purchase more expensive health insurance
as a proportion of expenditures decreases. This results in the creation of the “inverted-U pattern”
similar to results found by Jensen and Miller (2007) which may be the only empirically
documented Giffen behavior (Jensen & Miller, 2007). Another way to interpret this would be to
say: as incomes rise from the lowest decile toward the middle deciles, the income elasticity of
demand is positive (meaning more expensive health insurance plans are a luxury good for the
very poor because they cannot afford better plans), but as incomes rise from the middle deciles to
the top deciles, the income elasticity of demand is negative (meaning health insurance is an
inferior good). The least expensive health insurance plans are not desirable to the middle
incomes; they prefer more expensive health insurance, and all health insurance becomes less
desirable as wealth reaches the highest deciles represented by the decreasing proportional
spending. This mirrors the findings of Bes et al (2017), which found that more expensive, less
restrictive health insurance plans, were more desirable than inexpensive, restrictive plans. This
highly suggests that health insurance is acting as a Giffen Good; more expensive health
insurance plans are more desirable than less expensive plans when controlling for level of
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income (Jensen & Miller, 2007). Consumers prefer more expensive health insurance plans to
less expensive health insurance plans if they can afford to purchase them up until a point where
they will not purchase plans, as the prices become unreasonable and insurance becomes less
desirable. This preliminary regression analysis shows health insurance spending behaving as an
inferior good and a quadratic function (because the poor simply cannot afford to purchase
insurance, and the wealthy decrease spending on the inferior good), as would be predicted of a
Giffen Good (Jensen & Miller, 2007).
Aggregate Demand for Health Insurance
Based on the above discussions and models, the demand for health insurance will act as a
Giffen good, or perhaps a new type of hybrid necessity/luxury/inferior good, depending on
income level and prevalence of need based on health status (the insurance demand in red, Di, in
Figure 3). Jensen and Miller (2007) also had to specify that Giffen behavior was only found at
specific income levels. At the aggregate level, demand for health insurance will increase as the
price of insurance increases until the point Max in Figure 3. After the Max point in Figure 3,
the demand for health insurance will decrease as the price increases for two reasons: 1.) The
price becomes prohibitively expensive, even though it is still desired at lower levels of income,
and/or 2.) As wealth increases, the utility of health insurance decreases. Full demand for
insurance (everyone in society having coverage) will never be fully met due to the following
logic:
Below the Max point in Figure 3
1. The price is too high, due to low income (as shown in Figure 9 as a lower portion of
expenditures going toward insurance) (Bes et al., 2017).
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2. The demand for insurance is decreased due to a perceived low quality based on the low
price (as shown in Figure 9 as the increasing portion of expenditures for the middle class
going toward insurance) (Bes et al., 2017).
Above the Max point in Figure 3
3. The demand is higher than the ability to pay for the insurance due to income levels versus
the cost of insurance.
4. Insurance lacks utility due to high family income levels and a lack of utility (as shown in
Figure 9 as the decreasing proportion of expenditures going toward health insurance).
3.2: Public Policy: Health Care Systems
Currently, the United States, which relies on a free market health care system to provide
services for the public, pays more for services than the rest of the developed world that provides
health services for all of their citizens. Why is the United States paying more for health care
than the rest of the developed world, while simultaneously averaging a lower life expectancy?
To answer this question, the health care policies within these countries must be understood. As
discussed in the previous Chapter, the demand for insurance is different than the demand for
health care. Due to this difference between demand for care and demand for insurance, health
care systems must be classified by the identity of the provider of care (the demand for care) and
the identity of the insurer of the care (the demand for insurance). There are three different basic
systems of health care (based on differences in public policy) that are currently used in advanced
industrialized nations as previously discussed: 1) Free market Systems, where insurance is
private, and the provision of care is private. 2) Socialized Systems, where both insurance and the
provision of care are public. 3) Universal Systems, where insurance is public, but the provision
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of care remains private. No system uses public provision of care with private insurance.
Because free market health care relies on the demand for insurance, but the other two systems do
not, the effects for the demand for insurance will differ between the systems. If demand for
insurance functions as a Giffen good, it will have no effect on the two types of single payer
systems (socialized and universal), as insurance purchase is required through taxation (which
may be why health insurance has not been thought of as a Giffen good previously, as the only
advanced industrial case is the United States). The previous Chapter discussed the role of
economics on health care markets, and this Chapter discusses how health care policies interact
with those markets.
Health care is a commodity that consumers need to live. Therefore, the optimal price
(PL) and quantity (QFull Care) for services would be the point where the supply of providers for
profit in the short term equals the theoretical demand (the pink point L in Figure 10). Everyone
that needs treatment would be able to receive treatment because there would be enough supply of
providers in the short term to meet the demand for care. However, this price at point L is higher
than what consumers can afford (the quantity at QFull Care is higher than the quantity on Da at
point L):
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Figure 10: Integrative Model of Health Care Systems (Public Policies) Applied to the
Supply and Demand Model (Economics)

Figure 10 analyzes the three different systems based on supply and demand within the health
care markets and will be discussed in depth in this Chapter beginning with the free market price
range.
3.2.1: Free Market Health Care Systems
In a free market health care system, the provision of care and the financing of care are
private (some insurance for the poor and elderly may be public, public clinics may also exist, but
the majority for both is private). Within this system of private provision, providers can act as
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regional monopolies or oligarchies (Crawford, 2010; Gaynor et al., 2017). Consumers do not
negotiate prices up front, and lack information on the actual cost of care (Gaynor et al., 2014;
Olsen, 2009). This information asymmetry allows providers to manipulate price (Batty &
Ippolito, 2017; Olsen, 2009). In rural regions, there may be only one major hospital, and a
limited number of primary care providers; thereby allowing rural medical providers to act as
monopolies (Gaynor et al., 2017). In urban areas there is more competition (though still limited),
and providers act as an oligarchy. Oligarchies can be competitive or operate in cartels.
Providers in urban areas, through law, can use prevailing payments to set price (Batty & Ippolito,
2017). Providers do not conspire to manipulate price, but due to information sharing, know what
their “competitors” charge, and the government uses these regional estimates to set Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement rates (Gaynor et al., 2014). Providers only marginally compete directly
with each other within urban areas (Brekke et al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2017). Insurance
companies navigate their customers to certain providers and away from others based on provider
networks, further decreasing direct competition in provision of care (Bes et al., 2017; Gaynor et
al., 2017). Emergency care is provided by the closest provider, not the least expensive provider.
Often, providers do not even know the costs associated with treatments, or reimbursement rates
when ordering tests and treatments for patients as the provider is usually more concerned with
treating their clients. As discussed in Chapter 2, the trend in the health care market is toward
increasing consolidation of services with limited competition. Moreover, this competition does
not necessarily lead to lower prices (Gaynor et al., 2017; Kyle & Williams, 2017; Propper et al.,
2004; Volpp et al., 2003)
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Whether acting as regional monopolies or cartelistic oligarchies, providers can be price
setters rather than price takers (Crawford, 2010). Price setting allows providers to select the
price where marginal costs meet marginal revenues (point K in Figure 11) (Crawford, 2010):

Figure 11: Free Market Health Care Systems, Insurance Costs and Coverage

In Figure 11, the area above the max line represented in blue represents the best coverage
insurance price range, but at an overly expensive price that decreases demand; and the price
range below the Max line represented in grey in Figure 11 represents lower coverage plans; that
represent declining demand as price decreases. For prices lower than point L, insurance
companies would only offer catastrophic plans that do not cover pre-existing conditions,
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otherwise every ill person would purchase these plans. As the price of expensive insurance
decreases, the total demand for insurance increases. As the price of inexpensive insurance
increases (thus offering better coverage), the total demand increases. Most consumers would not
purchase catastrophic only insurance unless there were no other options available (Bes et al.,
2017). This means that the individual mandate in the ACA has little to no effect on the demand
for health insurance. The same number of consumers (or only a marginally increased number)
will refuse to purchase health insurance without the individual mandate. However, the
individual mandate has one method of increasing demand for insurance—some consumers that
think they cannot afford good coverage, and that do not want inexpensive low coverage
insurance, will check to see if the subsidies provided through the ACA alter their utilities to
avoid paying the penalty. In other words, the individual mandate may scare some consumers
into looking at their insurance options in the health care exchanges that would not have looked
into them before. Another benefit of the individual mandate is economically punishing those
that miscalculate their risk (underestimate their risk of a catastrophic event when choosing
whether to purchase insurance, often younger consumers that believe they are invincible) (Bes et
al., 2017) by forcing them to reimburse some of the costs of their care without insurance.
However, the subsidies within the ACA is what increases the demand and purchase of health
insurance. The subsidy allows consumers that could not afford good coverage insurance to
purchase good coverage insurance (Courtemanche, Marton, Ukert, Yelowitz, & Zapata, 2017;
Ferreira & Gomes, 2017). These consumers would not purchase inexpensive plans prior to the
subsidy due to the lack of benefits provided by the inexpensive plans based on their cost benefit
analyses, but will purchase the better plans if they can afford them (Courtemanche et al., 2017;
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Ferreira & Gomes, 2017). The ACA also expands coverage and reduces costs of care through
the expansion of Medicaid (Simon et al., 2017).
Furthermore, Figure 11 shows that consumers at point C are completely different
consumers than those at point M. At point C, consumers purchase insurance due to health issues
despite the high cost and are willing to sacrifice disposable income to attain this coverage
(insurance is even too expensive for wealthier families not just poorer families). The same
quantity of consumers purchase inexpensive, catastrophic only insurance plans at point M, as the
quantity of high risk, wealthier families that purchased at point C, but the identity of the
consumers differ. At point M, the consumers would have lower incomes; whereas, the
consumers at point C would have higher incomes and most likely are still willing to pay this high
price due to having high risk family members. Point C is dependent on price point PBC and point
M is dependent on price point PM. Point M has no direct relationship to point C other than the
spurious relationship of having the same quantity (dependent variable) demanded in the market
based on their different prices.
Looking at Figure 11, price setting by providers leads to point A, price point PA and
quantity QA in Figure 11. This price creates a massive gap between the theoretical demand and
the demand with the ability to pay. This gap reduces access to care and reduces aggregate health
outcomes, as not all those that need care have access to care. This artificially elevated price also
leads to an increase in competition in the supply of care due to the highly elevated economic
profits. This increased competition in supply increases the quality of care through competition
for consumers and willingness of providers to enter the field and invest in increasing quality
(Brekke et al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2014).
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It is argued that health care prices would decline with more competition in the provision
of health care, which would force providers to become price takers (Gaynor et al., 2014).
However, even if providers became price takers through increased competition, the price and
quantity would be point C, where the demand for insurance meets the demand for care. Another
complication that increases costs within a free market health care system is that, due to
inexpensive health insurance having high deductibles and copays, consumers put off preventative
care and only seek care when absolutely necessary. This elevates the average cost of care, as
costs increase due to increased complications that could have been less expensive to treat if they
were treated earlier (Simon et al., 2017). Figure 12 discusses the interaction of price
negotiations occurring within Figure 11, between providers and insurance companies, with the
effects on price on the Y axis, and the effects on quantity on the X axis:
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Figure 12: Free Market Health Care Flow Chart for Price Negotiation

Figure 12 shows that starting point for price negotiation in Figure 11 is point A. From point A,
price is negotiated downward (Batty & Ippolito, 2017). There are two prices that need to be
discussed (Batty & Ippolito, 2017): 1.) The price providers charge (reimbursement rates), and 2.)
The price of insurance offered to customers (Dunn & Shapiro, 2012; Gaynor et al., 2014; Ho &
Lee, 2017). Health insurance companies will attempt to negotiate for a lower reimbursement rate
to avoid demand for care exceeding the demand for insurance (the difference between point A
and point B in Figure 11). In an attempt to offer lower insurance prices to their customers,
insurance companies will push to reduce this reimbursement rate further. Consequently, this
would increase the demand for insurance because the demand for insurance is above the Max
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point at this price (point C in Figure 11) (Ho & Lee, 2017). At point C, only those that need
treatment and can afford insurance at this price would be treated. Insurance companies only
negotiate these discounts for their customers; those without insurance will still pay the elevated
price (reimbursement rate) at point A or go without insurance and care (Batty & Ippolito, 2017).
Insurance companies will create insurance plans at point E in Figure 11. The price of insurance
offered by insurance companies is reduced to this point to attract more consumers which results
in slightly lower costs, and access to care is increased (Ho & Lee, 2017). Consumers pay price
PE for insurance which increases the quantity of care provided to QE. However, this does not
change the price of care that providers are charging (PBC) unless the insurance company has
enough market power to force the reimbursement rate down even lower to point D (Ho & Lee,
2017; Scheffler & Arnold, 2017). What this means though, is that to increase access to care and
reduce reimbursement rates, it is better to have fewer insurance companies to force providers to
become price takers and to increase competition in the provision of care enough to force them to
become price takers (Ho & Lee, 2017; Scheffler & Arnold, 2017). Whether increasing
competition in provision of care, or increasing the market power of insurance companies through
a reduction in competition, will have a similar effect—access will be increased (to quantity QE),
and costs to health insurance consumers will be decreased to PE in Figure 11, whether health
care providers are being reimbursed at the prices at point C or point D. Note that as the price of
expensive insurance is decreasing, the price of inexpensive insurance offered by insurance
companies is increasing. These two prices, however, are independent variables, and are
independent of each other as demonstrated in Figure 11. Insurance companies can further
maximize profits by offering expensive insurance plans with good coverage, and inexpensive
insurance plans with poor coverage for those that cannot afford the expensive plan (Ho & Lee,
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2017). Insurance companies will sell catastrophic only insurance plans with an exclusion of preexisting conditions prior to point L in Figure 11, otherwise poorer customers that are high risk
would be purchasing the inexpensive insurance plans and would bankrupt the insurance company
as their expenditures would exceed their revenues. Above price point L, insurance companies
would offer inexpensive insurance that has coverage beyond just catastrophic coverage without
exclusions to pre-existing conditions. Insurance companies will use this variable pricing to
maximize their profits (Ho & Lee, 2017). Overly expensive plans will be offered due to a
perceived benefit to consumers, and less expensive options will be offered for those that cannot
afford the expensive plans (Ho & Lee, 2017). In other words, insurance companies will offer
plans at point E, J, and point L in Figure 11. The plans at point E produce greater revenues than
the insurance company pays out because more customers purchase the plans than use the plans
(the difference between quantity QFull Care and QE), and the quantity purchased at point J exceeds
demand for care (quantity QG2 is greater than QFull Care). To make sure that consumers do not take
advantage of the insurance at point J, copays and deductibles will be inflated. Insurance
companies have no incentive to reduce expensive plans below point E unless the total profits are
increased by providing more insurance ((QG2 * PG) – (QG1 * Negotiated reimbursement rate)) ≥
((QFull Care * PE) – (QE * Negotiated reimbursement rate)). This means that the U.S. would be
paying more for insurance and health care to cover fewer people than if there were one price
(and reimbursement rate) that covered everyone (based on income rather than demand)
(Crawford, 2010) even with the ACA helping to subsidize premiums (Ferreira & Gomes, 2017).
Providers still get to set an artificially inflated price based on point K under the ACA, then
negotiate a slight decrease for those insured due to market power of the insurance companies
(point C, D or point F with increased insurance market power)—and the number of people
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insured will increase with subsidies and variable pricing. However, the ACA does nothing to
decrease the costs of care that providers charge through changing the mechanisms of price
negotiation with providers and reimbursement rates; it only increases the number of people
purchasing insurance through government subsidies (Courtemanche et al., 2017; Ferreira &
Gomes, 2017).
Insurance companies also make a higher profit, as medical providers charge a higher
price. This makes logical sense under the ACA as well, even though the ACA limits insurance
profits to 15%; 15% of $3 trillion is higher than 15% of $2 trillion. Insurance companies will
increase the quantity of consumers with insurance coverage through reductions in prices to
attract consumers, variable pricing and government subsidies, but are not incentivized to
negotiate provider discounts because doing so would cause a reduction in insurance profits.
Free Market Systems Conclusions
Free market systems will have elevated price through higher reimbursement rates due to
provider price setting (Crawford, 2010) despite insurance negotiated reimbursement rate
discounts. The quantity of insurance coverage will be greater than the demand with the ability to
pay for care at this elevated price through the use of variable pricing of insurance. These
different priced insurance plans will offer a range of coverage, from catastrophic only to good
coverage with low deductibles and copays. The best-case scenario for price and access to
insurance would be point I in Figure 10, with price PI and quantity QI1 receiving care, and QI2
competition for providers. This increased price will increase economic profits to providers,
which in turn, increases competition (Gaynor et al., 2014). Increased competition for entrance in
to the provision of medical services will increase investments into the quality of care (the blue
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area in Figure 10) (Brekke et al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2014; Kleiner et al., 2015; Kyle &
Williams, 2017; Romano & Balan, 2010). Therefore, free market systems will have an average
elevated price (the purple area in Figure 10), decreased access to care (the grey area in Figure
10), and increased quality of care (the blue area in Figure 10). Free market systems would be
characterized as economically inefficient (extremely expensive), with low access to care (those
that need care go without), but a very high quality of care.
3.2.2: Single Payer Health Care Systems
Single payer systems differ in provision of care and funding mechanisms for insurance
but cover all citizens universally. Whether a socialized system or a universal system, generally
both provide public funding of insurance for all citizens. Insurance is often funded through a
progressive taxation system in which those with more income pay a higher percent than those
with lower income (Ellis et al., 2014; OECD, 2010). This functions as a forced variable pricing
system. However, the high-end price for insurance is far lower than the free market expensive
insurance price (points L and N are lower than point I in Figure 10, which is the lowest
reimbursement rate that health care providers would accept). This is not the only form of public
provision of insurance; there is great variation between the two systems and within the two
systems (Ellis et al., 2014; OECD, 2010).
In both systems, the government is often the sole provider of insurance, which means that
the health care provider monopoly is offset by the government consumer monopoly and allows
the government to force health care providers to become price takers. Because the government is
controlling prices (Gaynor et al., 2014), and mandating health insurance, the demand for
insurance (Di) has no effect on their health care markets. And, because everyone is insured
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through the government, the demand with the ability to pay (Da) has no effect on the market.
The only demand that has an effect on the market is the theoretical demand (Dt), which is known
by the government in the case of socialized systems, as all those that need care seek and receive
care. This allows the government and providers to estimate future utilization of health care
services.
Socialized systems know the average total cost of care because they control the provision
of care. This means they know the projected long-term costs of providing care. Whereas,
universal systems do not know the average total cost of care because they do not provide the care
directly themselves. In a universal system the average total cost of care is determined by the
private health care providers creating an information asymmetry. Providers know the average
total cost, and the government must utilize provider expertise while setting budgets in the
universal system. This allows providers to negotiate reimbursement rates based on the marginal
cost of care (the short-term supply) (Brekke et al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2014) thus, allowing
providers to negotiate a higher price in a universal system than the price set in a socialized
system. This means that socialized systems, in general, will push the price closer to the longterm supply than the short-term supply and universal systems will negotiate a price closer to the
short-term supply. In Figure 10, socialized systems will push the costs toward point N, whereas
universal systems will negotiate a price closer to point L.
Universal Health Care
As described above, in universal systems the government does not control the provision
of health care, only the funding. This gives health care providers an information advantage.
Health care providers are often forced into provider unions (OECD, 2010), and have more
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knowledge about the average total cost of care and the marginal cost of care than the government
(Brekke et al., 2010). These health provider unions meet directly with the government to
negotiate yearly budgets based on current costs and projected quantities of care (OECD, 2010).
This information asymmetry allows for health care providers to negotiate a higher price than the
average total cost of care meaning that universal systems will spend more on health care than is
necessary to provide care for everyone that needs care. This increased price creates economic
inefficiency, but also increases the quality of care through competition. As noted by Gaynor,
Ho, and Town (2014),
A standard result in models with administered prices is that non-price (quality) competition
gets tougher in the number of firms so long as the regulated price is set above marginal
cost. Firms facing tougher competition will increase their quality in order to attract (and
retain) consumers. (pg.8)
Point L being higher than point N in Figure 10 means that there is increased economic profit.
Increased economic profit causes competition which will lead to a higher quality of care (Gaynor
et al., 2014). More providers will attempt to enter the supply of care to earn this elevated
economic profit while existing providers will compete for consumers by increasing quality of
care compared to their competitors.
Socialized Health Care
Controlling both the funding of health care and a large portion of the provision of care
allows socialized systems to select a price point closer to point N in Figure 10. Because
socialized systems have public provision of care, the government has a better understanding of
the average total cost of care, and thus the long-term costs. At point N in Figure 10, the longterm supply meets the theoretical demand for care. This means that everyone that needs care
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will get care. However, because this price is based on the long-term supply and not the current,
short term supply, waitlists can be possible because supply has not yet increased to meet
demand. Even though normal economic profit is included in the long-term supply, there is no
incentive to increase supply due to economic profit, which means a lower level of competition
(Gaynor et al., 2014). With normal economic profit, suppliers are neutral on whether to enter or
leave the market, meaning there is little incentive to increase supply and that means these
waitlists may be durable. Even though there is enough funding to provide care for all, this
decreased competition will lead to a lower quality of care than a universal system and possible
waitlist.
Variation Within Single Payer Systems
Not all Universal and Socialized systems are set up identically (Ellis et al., 2014; Gaynor
et al., 2014; OECD, 2010). Collectively, they are viewed as single payer systems, however some
have multiple payers that may or may not compete for clients. Collecting data on variation
within system types was previously a difficult task. In 2009 the OECD began a new method to
collect this data by sending surveys to the OECD member nations directly and published the
results (OECD, 2010). They currently have the results of these surveys available to the public
for the years 2012 and 2016. In their 2010 report based on their first survey in 2009, “Health
Care Systems: Efficiency and Policy Settings”, they found that there were six different groupings
of policies used in the OECD (excluding the United States which did not reply to the initial
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survey). Figure 13 is taken from that seminal report (OECD, 2010):

Figure 13: Groups of Countries Sharing Broadly Similar Institutions
Source: (OECD, 2010)

Figure 13 first creates two groups based on public versus private provision of care. The group
on the left represents Universal systems and the group on the right represents Socialized systems.
The OECD used cluster analysis to differentiate the groups statistically (OECD, 2010). Moving
from left to right in Figure 13 shows decreasing reliance on market forces. Group 1 is labeled as
“private insurance for basic coverage.” This does not mean that citizens choose to buy insurance
of their own free will, or that these insurance companies are for-profit, instead they are mandated
to be non-profit and purchase is required and prices are often mandated through government
regulation (Gaynor et al., 2014; OECD, 2010). The ACA’s individual mandate was pushing the
United States toward group 1, but does not require health insurance to be non-profit.
Conversely, profits are capped at 15%. These are countries that rely on contracting out health
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insurance services, where the government mandates insurance purchase by citizens through a
choice of non-profit partners that are given power to set reimbursement rates to health care
providers (Ellis et al., 2014). These are not true Free Market systems as the insurers do not have
a profit motive, insurers are given broad authority to set reimbursement rates (within networks or
regions), and can be viewed as competing local health insurance authorities (Ellis et al., 2014).
They are also not true Universal systems as there is not a national or regional single payer.
Groups 2 and 3 are more aligned with Universal systems and differ from each other based on the
availability of secondary private insurance and requirements on gatekeeping (primary care
providers refer clients to specialists). Groups 4, 5, and 6 are all socialized systems that differ
based on clients’ choice of providers, level of gatekeeping and strength of budget constraints.
Single Payer Systems Conclusions
In single payer systems, access to care is guaranteed. However, this does not mean that
the supply of care meets the demand for care. If too little money is spent, supply will be limited
thereby creating waitlists (reflected in Figure 10 by the difference between QN and QFull Care). If
the reimbursement rate to providers is too high, care may have to be rationed, or money will be
wasted without providing a corresponding increase in health outcomes. This rationing is
reflected in the shifted demand with the ability to pay curve in Figure 10. Because care is
guaranteed through the government, full insurance demand is met, but there may still not be
enough money within the system to pay for everyone’s care if health care providers negotiate a
reimbursement rate that is too costly for the public to afford. To reflect this concept, the demand
with the ability to pay curve was shifted to the right (represented in a dashed line in Figure 10).
This is reflected as a shift in demand due to the guaranteed access rather than a shift along the
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demand curve due to changes in price. The new demand with the ability to pay curve (dashed
curve in Figure 10) was shifted to point J where the Max insurance line meets the theoretical
demand (because theoretically, everyone is covered and therefore have the ability to pay for
care). However, looking at the demand for insurance (Di) shows that consumers cannot afford
this price, which means the government would theoretically also not be able to afford this price.
Any reimbursement rate above point J will cause a decrease in access to care along the shifted
ability demand curve, as the government must ration its limited resources. For example, if the
reimbursement price is PI, the quality of care will be elevated due to competition to QI, but the
government can only afford to treat quantity QIh. This leads to a reduction in care from the
theoretical demand to point h (reflected in dark grey in Figure 10). If single payer systems
spend too much money on health care reimbursements, they will see a reduction in outcomes due
to this decrease in access. A second possibility is that this elevated price does not cause a
rationing of care, but instead reflects economic waste as more money is spent without going
toward the care of patients. Either way, the elevated spending will not be reflected in an increase
to health outcomes.
Socialized systems may have decreased access to care compared to universal systems due
to waitlists created through using long term supply instead of short term supply for price setting.
Universal systems will have more competition in supply of care due to this same difference in
price setting, which would lead to better quality of care (Brekke et al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2014) in
a universal system over a socialized system. This higher price in universal systems means that
socialized systems are more economically efficient. Not all socialized systems or universal
systems are equal, and prices will differ within each system, and between systems. This price
range is reflected in teal in Figure 10. Socialized systems should congregate around PN and
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universal systems should congregate around PL. At PN, even though access to care is guaranteed,
there could be waitlist reflected in the difference between point N and point M (where long-term
supply and short-term supply are equal). This decrease in access caused by waitlists is reflected
by the difference between QFull Care and QN. Price PL, in a universal system, increases economic
profit, which leads to increased supply of providers, and subsequently increases the quality of
care (represented in dark blue in Figure 10). Therefore, socialized systems will be characterized
as economically efficient, moderate quality of care, and slightly decreased access due to some
waitlists. Universal systems would be characterized as slightly economically inefficient, full
access to care, and a high quality of care.
3.3: Final Simplified Model of Health Care Systems and Market Forces
Discussing health care systems and markets requires complex models of economic
behavior and effects of policy. As was seen in Figure 10, many interconnected concepts need to
be analyzed simultaneously. In an attempt to simplify and declutter the model in Figure 10,
Figure 14 was created:
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Figure 14: Simplified Integrative Health Care Systems Market Model
In Figure 14, the price for free market health care systems is P3, which would be the price of
good quality health insurance based on the demand for insurance meeting the theoretical demand
for care (point C). The free market price would be a range, with those without insurance paying
price P1; a reimbursement rate at price P3, and access limited to Q2 for those with insurance and a
further decrease in access for those without insurance to Q1. The quantity supplied (or rather,
competing to supply care) would be Q7. Point D represents the lowest theoretical point for price
(P4) that would exist in a free market system if insurance companies had enough market power to
reduce reimbursement rates to P4, which would still have decreased access at quantity Q4.
Because providers are negotiating based on short term costs, short term cost meet the insurance
demand at point D, which would represent the negotiated reimbursement rate.
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Universal systems should congregate around point F in Figure 14, with an average price
of P5, and a quantity of full insurance coverage. This price is significantly lower than points C
and D, has no decrease in access, and has a high quality of care. Some single payer systems,
whether universal or socialized, may have higher prices reflected in point D if medical providers
are able to negotiate a higher reimbursement rate, which would lead to rationing of care to
quantity Q5. This would be a high-quality system, but would have decreased access to care due
to rationing caused by an artificially inflated reimbursement rate negotiated by medical
providers. Socialized systems would congregate around point G with price P6, and a quantity Q4.
There could be waitlists for care, decreased quality compared to the other two systems, but
would also be the most economically efficient system of the three.
Wan (2002) recommends that researchers must use multilevel analysis to test the
between-group and within-group variation in health care systems. He specifies that data bases
need to be organized by context (System level data, demographics etc.) – Design (policy
interventions) – Performance (efficiency, effectiveness, productivity) – Outcomes (health
outcomes) (Wan, 2002). Under this model of health care evaluation, the wealth of a country
(GDP per capita) and life style factors affect the context of health care systems. The
interventions (design) of the system is determined by the policies dealing with health care
funding and provision (free market provision and free market insurance). The performance
would be the expenditures per capita on health care, the levels of access to care, and the quality
of care. The outcomes would be life expectancy and infant mortality rates as shown in Table 1
in Chapter 1. As discussed in Chapter 2, within each system type there will be variations in
performance and health outcomes. Some countries with free market, universal, or socialized
systems will perform better than other countries depending on differences in levels of market
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mechanisms within the provision of care and the insurance of care. A systems framework allows
for testing this within system variation and between system variation. Table 5, shows the
systems framework applied to the market model based on system type created in Chapter 3:
Table 5 lays out the interaction between markets and system type in terms of
performance and health outcomes. Each system works within the context of market forces.
Within each system type, variation in efficiency will occur across countries based on the levels
of market mechanisms within the system type. Some universal systems will perform better than
others, some socialized systems will perform better than others, and some free market systems
will perform better than others based on this within system variation. These differences in within
system variation will lead to measurable differences in health outcomes within each system type
and across system types.
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Table 5: Applied Systems Framework and Testable Hypotheses
Context

Design →

Performance →

Outcomes

Market
Forces

Demand for
Care

Supply of Care

Demand for
Insurance

System
Type

Description

Combined Effects
(Within System
Variation Occurs)

Combined Effects
(Within System
Variation Occurs)

Description

There are 2
separate
demands for
health care; the
theoretical
demand based
on need, and the
demand for care
based on the
ability to pay

Health care
providers
compete for
consumers using
investments in
quality, not
through price
competition

Inexpensive
health insurance is
an inferior good;
Consumers prefer
more expensive
health insurance
plans that provide
better coverage

Free
Market

Providers are
private, Insurance
is private;
Differing levels of
market
mechanisms will
cause differences
in within system
performance

No changes to market
forces; Access to care is
reduced, Quality of care
increased, Extremely
expensive per capita
price of care

Decreased per
capita life
expectancy due to
decreased access;
Individuals with
good insurance
increase individual
life expectancy due
to quality increases

Effects

Not all those
that need care
can afford care.
Access to care is
reduced and
health outcomes
are reduced

Prices are
inflated through
provider price
setting; high
prices increase
competition;
competition
increases quality
of care without a
corresponding
reduction in
prices

Health insurance
functions as a
Giffen Good;
More expensive
insurance is more
desirable than less
expensive
insurance, but the
demand for
insurance is
limited by
income, poor
coverage for the
poor and good
coverage for the
wealthy

Universal Providers are
private, Insurance
is public;
Differing levels of
market
mechanisms will
cause differences
in within system
performance

Access to care is
guaranteed and income
has no effect on access;
Price is mandated, and is
slightly elevated;
Providers compete based
on quality causing an
increase in the quality of
care

Increased per capita
life expectancy due
to full access, and
investments in
quality

Socialized Providers are
public, Insurers
are public;
Differing levels of
market
mechanisms will
cause differences
in within system
performance

Access to care is
guaranteed and income
has no effect on access;
price is mandated, and
reduced to lowest level;
providers do not compete
which does not increase
quality of care

Increased per capita
life expectancy due
to full access;
decreased per capita
life expectancy due
to lack of
investments in
quality, and
possible waitlists
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
Measuring economic efficiency, quality, and access to care is a difficult endeavor. To
illustrate this difficulty: life expectancy is a function of access to care, quality of care, lifestyle
factors, rates of occurrence of disease, and genetics. Disaggregating the effects of access to care
and quality of care on life expectancy is challenging. Data on health care systems are also
limited to an aggregate, annual level for use in comparison. To properly tackle this difficulty
requires specialized statistical methods and models.
According to the health care system market model in the previous Chapter, a free-market
health care system will have the lowest access to care of all three systems, the highest cost of all
three systems, and the highest quality of care of all three systems. A socialized health care
system will have more access to care than a free-market system, but less than a universal system,
the lowest quality of all three systems, and the lowest cost of all three systems. A universal
system will have a higher quality of care than a socialized system, but lower than a free-market
system, less economic efficiency than a socialized system, but more economic efficiency than a
free-market system and will have the highest access to care of all three systems. The system type
should determine the health care reimbursement rates, which determines the per capita
expenditures on health care. The expenditures on health care will affect the access to care and
the quality of care. Increased access to care will increase health outcomes, and increased quality
of care will decrease adverse health outcomes or events. As shown, most countries use a wide
variety of free market and government controls in the practice of health insurance coverage and
health care provision. Statistical models are needed to account for these variations.
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4.1: Data Sources
The OECD provides health care data on all member nations for public use. They are
available online at http://www.oecd.org/health/health-data.htm. The majority of health and
economic data were attained from the OECD’s most recent data sets. The most recent available
year for each variable for each country was used in regression analysis. Data on system type
were attained from the OECD’s Health Systems Characteristics Survey available at
https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=hsc, for years 2012 and 2016 (description of Survey
questions in Appendix). There are 35 countries in the OECD which gives an “n” of 35 for the
regression analyses, but the Slovak Republic had to be dropped from the data set leaving 34
countries in the final data set due to large quantities of missing data. The OECD also reports
economic data in $U.S. Purchasing Power Parity to standardize cost comparisons.
For Structural Equation Modelling the most recent 5 years of data available for all
countries were pooled together and used: 2012 through 2016. There are 35 countries in the
OECD; 35 countries times 5 years equals 175 observations. Unfortunately, the Slovak Republic
inconsistently reported yearly data and also had to be dropped from the data set for SEM leaving
only 34 cases times 5 years for a total of 170 observations for use in SEM.
The U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) data were used to analyze
the demand for private health insurance in the United States through the “Health Insurance
Exchanges”. Data on U.S. health care spending by income through the Health Insurance
Exchanges are available from the U.S. CMS available at https://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MarketplaceProducts/2018_Open_Enrollment.html. Average prices of insurance plans and price caps for
income levels is available from the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF.org, 2018) available at
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https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/change-in-average-marketplace-premiums-bymetaltier/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22
asc%22%7D. All data were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics version 24 (IBM, 2016), and
IBM SPSS AMOS version 24 for all graphic interfaces (path analysis, and SEM models).
4.2: Health Insurance as a Giffen Good
To test the effects of income and price on the demand for health insurance data from the
Health Insurance Exchanges in the United States for 2018 were collected and analyzed using
ordinary least squares regression and path analysis. If health insurance functions as a Giffen
Good, the data should show that as income increases the demand for more expensive insurance
plans increases, and that as the price of less desirable plans increases the demand for the less
desirable plans should also increase. Unfortunately, the data attainable from the government only
relates aggregate level data by State and income level based on 5 ranges. The data set includes
information for all States that use the Federal Exchange at healthcare.gov and a couple of other
States that use their own exchanges, for a total of 39 out of 50 U.S. States. States that did not
report the necessary data to the Federal Government from their State Exchanges were California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington (these States did report some data to the Federal Government but did
not include data on plan metal by income level). There are three “metal” levels for health
insurance plans offered on the exchanges under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). “Bronze” plans
cover 60% of costs, “Silver” plans cover 70% of costs, and “Gold” plans cover 80% of costs
(some states also have “platinum” plans that cover 90% of costs but this data was also not
available for all States). Federal Poverty Level ($12,140 for families with 1 individuals) was
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taken from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services at HHS.gov. The data from
CMS only includes income information for those receiving subsidies through the government, so
income levels are represented as 100% to 150% of FPL, 150% to 200% of FPL, 200% to 250%
of FPL, 250% to 300% FPL and 300% to 400% FPL as only these groups receive the subsidy.
Lower incomes are qualified for Medicaid and higher income levels receive no subsidy. Taking
the highest percentage from these income levels gives a maximum income based on 2018
poverty income for each income rank, $18,210, $24,280, $30,350, $36,420, and $48,560 for
families of 1 individuals, respectively.
Table 6: Variable Description and Sources for Giffen Good Analysis
shows the variables available for the analysis and their sources for the information:
Table 6: Variable Description and Sources for Giffen Good Analysis
Variable Name

Variable Description

Source

Notes

State

State

CMS.gov

Name of State

IncomeRank

Income Rank

CMS.gov

Income Rank 1-5 based on FPL ($12,140),
1=100% to 150%, 2=150% to 200%, 3=200%
to 250%, 4=250% to 300%, 5=300 to 400%

BrzPlanPerc

% of Bronze Plan
Purchasers
% of Silver Plan
Purchasers
% of Gold Plan
Purchasers
Total Number of Bronze
Plans Purchased
Total Number of Silver
Plans Purchased
Total Number of Gold
Plans Purchased
% of Income Level
Purchasing Bronze
% of Income Level
Purchasing Silver
% of Income Level
Purchasing Gold

CMS.gov

CMS.gov

% of Income Level as % of total plans
purchased
% of Income Level as % of total plans
purchased
% of Income Level as % of total plans
purchased
Total number of plans purchased by Income
Level
Total number of plans purchased by Income
Level
Total number of plans purchased by Income
Level
% of Income Level purchasing plan

CMS.gov

% of Income Level purchasing plan

CMS.gov

% of Income Level purchasing plan

slvPlanPerc
GldPlanPerc
BrzPlanNumb
slvPlanNumb
GldPlanNumb
BrzPercIncome
slvPercIncome
GldPercIncome

CMS.gov
CMS.gov
CMS.gov
CMS.gov
CMS.gov
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Variable Name

Variable Description

Source

Notes

PriceCap

Price Cap on Benchmark
Plan Premium as % of
Income

KFF.org

Price Cap of benchmark plan as % of income
level based on FPL

IncomePoverty

Income Rank as Top of
Poverty Level

CMS.gov

1.5=100% to 150%, 2=150% to 200%,
2.5=200% to 250%, 3=250% to 300%, 4=300
to 400% FPL

Price100Poverty

Average Cost of Plan
Based on Metal Level
Price of Benchmark Plan
Based on 2018 Poverty
Level

KFF.org

$US, Nationwide average used

Computed

Out of pocket cost in $US computed for
benchmark plan based on Price Cap, y =
(Income Rank as Top of Poverty Level) *
$12,140 * (Price Cap Based on Benchmark
Plan) - (Average Cost of Plan Based on Metal
Level)

Subsidy2018

2018 Subsidy Based on
Benchmark Plan and
Income Level

Computed

$US cash value of subsidy, y = (Price of
Benchmark Plan) - (Price of Benchmark Plan)
* (Price Cap of Benchmark for each income
level)

BrzPrice

Price of Bronze Plan
After Subsidy

Computed

y = - (Average Cost of Plan Based on Metal
Level) - (2018 Subsidy Based on Benchmark
Plan and Income Level)

SlvPrice

Price of Silver Plan After
Subsidy

Computed

y = - (Average Cost of Plan Based on Metal
Level) - (2018 Subsidy Based on Benchmark
Plan and Income Level)

GldPrice

Price of Gold Plan After
Subsidy

Computed

y = - (Average Cost of Plan Based on Metal
Level) - (2018 Subsidy Based on Benchmark
Plan and Income Level)

PercIncomePrice

Price of Chosen Plan as
Percent of Income

Computed

y = Price of Plan / Income in $US based on
FPL

Price2018Poverty

4.2.1: Statistical Analysis of U.S. Health Insurance Exchanges
According to the above market model and discussion in Chapter 3, as the price of
insurance increases the demand for insurance should increase until a point where the price is
prohibitive, and the demand should then decrease. Bronze plans cover 60% of costs on average,
silver plans cover 70% of costs on average, and gold plans cover 80% of costs on average.
Bronze plans cost less than silver plans which cost less than gold plans, therefore the demand for
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silver plans should be higher than the demand for silver plans, and the demand for gold plans
should be the highest unless the cost is above the point where it becomes prohibitive. Figure 15
examines these concepts based on the ACA data on aggregate number of plans purchased, price
of the plan, metal level, and income level:

Figure 15: Total Number of Plan Purchasers Based on Metal Level, Income and Monthly
Price of Plan
Figure 15 clearly shows that, on the aggregate level, as price increases from bronze to silver
plans, the total number of consumers increases and the total number of gold plans decreases as it
becomes unaffordable across all income levels and controlling for income level exactly as
predicted if health insurance functions as a Giffen Good. Note that when given the option to
receive Bronze level plans for free, the two lowest income levels both prefer to pay for silver
plans instead.
As is also clear from Figure 15, the number of consumers in each income level is not
equal and the prices that they pay after the subsidy are not equal. To compare these subgroups,
and to test the statistical significance of these apparent correlations, percent of income level
purchasing each plan is used in place of total number of consumers to control for the different
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number in each income level. The percentage of income each price point represents is used
instead of monthly price to control for the fact that these differing prices represent vastly
different costs compared to income. A monthly price of $100 represents a drastically different
percent of the monthly income of each income level. Figure 16 shows the relationship between
price after the subsidy (as a percent of income) and quantity (as the percent of consumers in each
income level choosing to purchase the plan):

Figure 16: Percentage of Income Level Purchasing Plan Based on the Price of the Plan as a
Percent of Income
The dips in quantity in Figure 16 represent the gold level prices for income levels 1, 2, and 3,
and the less desirable bronze plan for income level 4 as can be seen by overlaying income levels.
These dips in demand do not represent aggregate dips in demand but represent the dips in
demand based on income level. To control for this fact, data points for income levels 1 through
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3 that purchase gold plans and for income level 4 for bronze plans was dropped from the data set
to run regression analysis for the group as a whole. Price as percent of income after subsidy was
squared to account for the decrease in demand caused by the price becoming prohibitive. Table
7 shows regression analysis of the percentage of income level purchasing each plan a portion of
spending to develop the aggregate demand curve for health insurance controlling for income
level and price as a percent of income for those receiving a subsidy from the U.S. government:
Table 7: Quadratic Regression for Price and Quantity for Health Insurance (Health
Insurance Demand Curve)

(Constant)
Price as Percent of Income
Price Squared

Unstandardized
Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

0.242
18.782
-193.883

2.862
-3.142

t
2.386
3.684
-4.046

Sig.
0.044
0.006
0.004

R Square
0.682

Dependent Variable: Percent of Income Level Purchasing Plan

The regression in Table 7 shows as the price of health insurance increases as a percent of income
the demand for insurance increases, until the point where the price becomes prohibitive (around
5%, with an R-square of 0.682. The demand for health insurance can be defined as:
Equation 3: Demand Curve for Health Insurance
Quantity Demanded (as percent of purchasers in income level) = 0.242 + 18.782
(Price as Percent of Income) – 193.883 (Price as Percent of Income)2.

Figure 17 graphically displays the demand curve created through the regression with areas for
reference for plan type and income level:
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Figure 17: Demand Curve for Health Insurance Across All Income Levels and Plan Metals
The demand curve in Figure 17 encompasses roughly 68% of the variation in the data, and
clearly shows that, for those receiving the subsidy to purchase health insurance from the U.S.
government, the demand for health insurance is functioning like a Giffen Good. The graph also
suggests that if the top three income levels were offered Silver insurance plans for roughly 5% of
income, the demand would significantly increase.
To further test these connections, a path analysis was performed using the percent of each
income level purchasing the three different plans. Because the percentages add up to 100%, the
percentage of any two plans can be used to directly predict the value of the third plan which
creates a non-positive definite correlation matrix when all three percentages are included
simultaneously in the path analysis. This means a path analysis had to be built in steps to test for
statistical significance and goodness of fit. Figure 18 shows a path analysis for income, the level
of the 2018 subsidy and the choice of consumers between plans:
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Figure 18: Path Analysis for Health Insurance Choice
Figure 18 shows that as income increases, consumers become more likely to purchase gold
plans. As consumers choose gold plans, the number of silver plans correspondingly decreases.
The subsidy that consumers receive is dependent on their income through law and applies
equally to all metal plans. As the subsidy decreases, it correspondingly increases the cost of all
three metal plans. The path analysis shows that consumers prefer silver plans over bronze plans
and the demand for bronze plans increases only because the cost of all plans are increasing. This
suggests that consumers are only moving from silver to bronze plans due to financial limitations
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caused by the price increasing, not because they prefer bronze over silver plans. Table 8 shows
the estimates for the path analysis in Figure 18:
Table 8: Path Analysis Estimates and Goodness of Fit
Step/ Goodness
of Fit

Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Unstand.
Estimate

1
CMIN/DF = .002
GFI = 1.000

Subsidy2018
SlvPercIncome
BrzPercIncome
BrzPercIncome
Subsidy2018
GldPercIncome
SlvPercIncome
SlvPercIncome
GldPercIncome
Subsidy2018
SlvPercIncome
SlvPercIncome
BrzPercIncome
BrzPercIncome

IncomePoverty
Subsidy2018
Subsidy2018
SlvPercIncome
IncomePoverty
IncomePoverty
Subsidy2018
GldPercIncome
IncomePoverty
IncomePoverty
GldPercIncome
Subsidy2018
SlvPercIncome
Subsidy2018

-1779.872
0.000
0.000
-0.547
-1779.872
0.053
0.000
-0.712
0.053
-1779.872
-0.712
0.000
-0.547
0.000

2
CMIN/DF = .066
GFI = 1.000
Complete Model

Standard.
Estimate
-0.998
0.808
-0.229
-0.681
-0.998
0.360
0.679
-0.359
0.360
-0.998
-0.359
0.679
-0.681
-0.229

Sig.
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Model
RMSEA

LO
90

HI
90

0.000
PCLOSE

0.000
0.999

0.000

0.000
PCLOSE

0.000
0.960

0.036

All variables are statistically significant at the 0.001 level in path analysis; step 1 and step 2 both
have RMSEA estimates of 0.000 meaning the model is a perfectly good fit to the data.
4.2.2: Giffen Good Conclusions
The data fully supports the argument that health insurance is a Giffen Good. Gold plans
are more desirable than silver plans, which are more desirable than bronze plans limited only by
income. As the price of less desirable plans increases, the demand for the plans also increases.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show how the income effect outweighs the substitution effect and path
analysis in Figure 18 confirms this to be true. Figure 15,Figure 16 and Figure 17 all show that
silver plans are preferable even when bronze plans are offered free of charge, and that as the
price of bronze insurance plans increases the aggregate demand and the demand as a percent of
income increases for the bronze plans.
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One limitation to the regression analysis of health insurance is that the data are limited.
The publicly available ACA data only includes information on income level for those receiving
subsidies from the government and not those not receiving subsidies. The data also only
includes regional level data and not personal level and State level data only includes income
ranges. Personal level data could allow for a more accurate measure of the demand for insurance
based on price. The price increases are also dependent on the changes in income level; further
analysis should examine how price fluctuations not caused by increases in income directly
increase or decrease individual demand. To definitively prove that health insurance is a Giffen
Good would require the ability to measure the change in price directly on individuals without
income changes causing the fluctuation in price through subsidy differences. However, the
currently available data fully supports the argument that health insurance is a Giffen Good.
Bronze insurance plans are an inferior, necessity good whose demand increases as the price
increases, thereby causing the demand for the luxury good (silver plans) to decrease. The closest
method for testing the change in demand based solely on price is to test the increase in prices
from 2017 to 2018 against the changes in demand. Data on the number of consumers purchasing
each insurance plan from CMS are also available for 2017 (CMS, 2018), and the average price
change from 2017 to 2018 was taken from the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF.org, 2018).
Figure 19 examines the changes in demand based on the changes in premium prices from the
years 2017 to 2018:

90

Figure 19: Change in Demand Due to Change in Price from 2017 to 2018
As the price of both the bronze and gold plans increases, the demand for both plans increases at
the expense of consumers of silver plans. This price change is not due to differences in income
levels and subsidies, but due to price changes between years. Subsidies and income levels
remain constant and the demand for bronze and gold plans increases as the price of both
increases. Because all three plans are health insurance, this may cause confusion. To address
this confusion, an analogy may be used: think of the three plans as three different types of food,
which is the goods Sir Giffen was analyzing when he came up with his theory (Marshall, 1895).
Bronze plans are potatoes (can meet basic caloric requirements for humans to live) with no other
direct substitutes (no other inexpensive plans), silver plans are chicken, and gold plans are steak.
As the price of potatoes and chicken increase, consumers must spend more on potatoes and less
on chicken. As the price of chicken increases faster than the price increase of steak, many
wealthier consumers substitute steak for chicken. Under this analogy, the demand for bronze
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plans increases as the price increases just to meet basic health care needs. And, the demand for
gold plans increases even though the price increased because the relative increase for silver plans
was even higher (if you can afford to purchase meat, and chicken costs almost as much as steak,
why not eat steak?). Figure 20 was created to visually demonstrate this analogy further using
the path analysis in Figure 18. The variable “subsidy” in Figure 18 (which effects all plan
metals and is therefore a more accurate measure) was replaced with the price of bronze insurance
plans for the purpose of carrying the analogy over:

Figure 20: Analogy Applied to Health Insurance Market
Figure 20 shows that as the price of potatoes (bronze plans) increases the demand also increases
and the demand for chicken (silver plans) decreases, both are statistically significant at the 0.001
level. Regression analysis of the effects of the price of bronze plans and the percent of each
income level choosing bronze and silver plans was presented in Table 9:
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Table 9: Regression Analysis, Bronze Price Effects on Demand
Independent
Variable

Model
1
Dependent Variable:
BrzPercIncome
2
Dependent Variable:
SlvPercIncome

Unstandardized
Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

(Constant)

0.213

BrzPrice
(Constant)

0.000
0.729

0.693

BrzPrice

0.000

-0.711

t

Sig.

R
Square

15.932

0.000

0.481

13.367
44.881

0.000
0.000

0.506

-14.066

0.000

As the analogy makes clearer, the data fully supports that bronze health insurance plans are a
Giffen Good. The regression shows that as the price of bronze plans increases the demand
increases with an R-Square of 0.481 and statistically significant at the 0.001 level based on
demand within 39 States. Better access to personal level data should be able to further
substantiate that increases in price of bronze plans increase the demand for bronze health
insurance plans. However, despite the limited data, the current data analysis demonstrates that
inexpensive health insurance is, in fact, a Giffen Good as hypothesized.

4.3: Comparative Analysis of Health Care Systems (Regression Analysis)
The data from the OECD cover a variety of aspects of health care systems and provides
the data in standardized forms using uniform reporting and $U.S. Purchasing Power Parity. This
means the data from the OECD allow for easy comparison between countries. The data from the
OECD also represent a sort of natural experiment to test the effects of health care systems on
health care markets and health outcomes. Most countries within the OECD are advanced
industrial nations, but the data also include some poor and/or developing nations (Chile, Estonia,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Mexico, Poland and Turkey) which allows for application to poor
and/or developing countries, as well as providing recommendations to the developed world.
Figure 21 shows the distribution of countries in the OECD based on wealth:
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Figure 21: OECD Distribution of Countries Based on Income
As can be seen in Figure 21, not only is the income range within OECD countries relatively
normally distributed, but the data also contains a wide range of wealth between countries. The
OECD data were chosen for analysis due to the quality of data, range of countries, the natural
experimental aspect of the data, and the standardization that allowed for easy comparison across
variables.
The original data set compiled for analysis had around 150 variables over the five-year
period. However, many years had missing data. In the end the data set analyzed contains over
100 variables. Statistically insignificant variables were not used in this analysis. A description
of all the variables available along with an explanation of missing cases are detailed in Appendix
B, including those not used because they were found to be insignificant as a point of reference
for future research and to dissuade arguments about other important variables missing from this
analysis. For regression analysis the most recent data (2016) available were used; SEM used
data from 2012 through 2016. Table 10 shows the variables that were found to be statistically
significant used in the final regression and SEM analyses:
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Table 10: Description of Variables for Analysis of HealthCare Systems
Variable Name

Variable Description and
Measure

Country
Year
OECDSysType

Name of Country
Year
System Type based on Insurance,
Primary care and Hospitals
GDP Per Capita in US$ PPP
Real GDP Growth
National Income Per Capita in US$
GINI at disposable income post
taxes and transfers, 0-1 scale
Per capita, current prices, current
PPPs
Percent of population over 65
Total Population at Birth in years
Life Expectancy of Females 65+ in
years
Life Expectancy of Males 65+ in
years
Infant mortality, No minimum
threshold of gestation period or
birthweight

0.00
0.00
0.00

NeonatalNoMin

PerinatalMortality

GDPperCap
GDPGrowth
IncomePerCapita
GINIoecd

%
Miss

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.34

Remedy of Missing

% Miss
After

Inferred from Previous and/or
following survey years

0.02

0.04

Inferred from Previous and/or
following survey years

0.00

Neonatal mortality, No minimum
threshold of gestation period or
birthweight

0.08

Inferred from Previous and/or
following survey years

0.00

Perinatal mortality per 1000 total
Births
Maternal mortality per 100,000 live
births

0.10

0.00

PhysicianDensity

Number of Practicing Physicians,
Per 1000 Population

0.11

GeneralPractice

Generalist Practitioners, Density
Per 1000 Population
Practicing Nurses, Density per
1000 Population

0.02

Averaged from Previous and/or
following survey years
Iceland only had 2 years reported,
US did not report, input data from
the US CDC; all other missing
averaged
Used most recent year to fill in
random missing, computed by sum
of GeneralPractice and
SpecialPractice if available
Used most recent year to fill in
random missing
Used most recent year to fill in
random missing, or used
"professionally active nurses"
when available (overestimates
number of nurses, may be in
administrative positions)

Expenditures in $1000s of US PPP
Expenditures in $1000s of US PPP
Squared
Income per capita in $1000s of US
PPP
Latent variable, measure of Access

0.00
0.00

ExpPerCapCurrent
PercentPop65up
LifeExpectancy
LEFemale65
LEMale65
InfantNoMin

MaternalMortality

NurseDensity

EXP1000s
EXP1000Squared
Income1000s
Access

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.12

0.22

95

0.00
0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00
0.00

Variable Name

Variable Description and
Measure

Quality
LnGeneralPractice
LnInfant
LnMaternal
FreeDum

Latent variable, measure of Quality
Natural Log of GeneralPractice
Natural Log of InfantNoMin
Natural Log of MaternalMortality
Free Market dummy 1=Private
insurance and provision
Socialized dummy 1=public
insurance and provision

SocialDum

%
Miss

Remedy of Missing

% Miss
After

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

4.3.1: Health Systems Framework
According to the health care market model presented in Chapter 3, wealth plus system should
determine expenditures, with free market systems spending the most, and socialized systems spending the
least on health care. Expenditures minus expenditures squared should determine quality and access to
care. Increasing expenditures will increase access to care as more resources become available, but when
expenditures are too high (as represented by expenditures squared), access to care should decrease as the
cost becomes prohibitive and reduces access. Increasing expenditures will increase competition for
consumers and thus increase the quality of care. When expenditures are too high (as represented by
expenditures squared), quality will not increase and the excess expenditures represent wasted resources
(expenditures that do not add quality and therefore represent economic waste within the system).

According to the previous discussion, a systems framework for specifying the causal
relationships of the system components can be beneficial for guiding the analysis of health care
systems and analyzing the complexity of contextual effects and policy effects on performance
and health outcomes. Figure 22 shows a path diagram used to build regression models:
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Figure 22: Path Diagram and Systems Framework for Analysis of Health Care
Figure 22 only shows the variables found to be significant through regression and structural equation
modelling. Many other variables were analyzed and found to be insignificant. The contextual (C)
variables tested in this analysis include how wealthy a country is, as well as other possible control
variables that could affect performance and health outcomes. Control variables tested included life style
factors (obesity, alcohol use, and tobacco use), poverty rates and inequality (GINI scores), and the age of
population above 65 and 80 (a larger elderly population) that could increase expenditures and decrease
health outcomes.
The system (S) design variables include dummy variables for system type (Free Market,
Universal and Socialized) as well as other policy differences within each system type. Within system
variables tested include the use of global budgeting, whether consumers have a choice of insurers and/or
providers, requirements for referrals, the use of copays, pay for performance, and the use of exemptions
of copays for the poor.
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Performance (P) variables include expenditures per capita, expenditures squared (measures the
decrease in access caused by overspending and economic waste in terms of quality from overspending),
and the levels of health care resources (numbers of providers, hospitals, and access to technology).
Outcome (O) variables analyzed included life expectancy, infant mortality, maternal mortality,
perinatal mortality, neonatal mortality, and population age (models that include population age must be
non-recursive as an aging population is a sign of good quality and access to care and also should increase
expenditures).

4.3.2: Step 1: Determinants of Expenditures
For the first step in this analysis, the causes of health care expenditures were analyzed.
Table 11 Shows the results of the statistically significant models used to predict health care
expenditures per capita:
Table 11: Expenditures Per Capita Regression Models

**
*

*

**
*

1
2

3

Dependent
Variable
Expenditures
Per Capita
Expenditures
Per Capita

Expenditures
Per Capita

Independent
Variable
Constant
Income Per Capita
Constant
Income Per Capita
Free Market Dummy
Socialized Dummy
Constant
Income Per Capita
Free Market Dummy
%Pop 65 Up
GINI

Unstandardized
Coefficient

Coefficient
S.E.

-1941.567
0.146
-1154.37
0.129
3473.701
-335.225
-4490.966
0.143
3296.086
77.737
3944.322

424.692
0.01
310.915
0.006
421.576
159.208
995.228
0.006
433.999
22.87
1891.067

Standardize
d Coefficient
0.934
0.828
0.294
-0.082
0.897
0.288
0.127
0.093

t
-4.572
14.793
-3.713
21.294
8.24
-2.106
-4.512
22.372
7.595
3.399
2.086

P
Value

Model
R²

0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.044
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.047

0.872
0.965

0.971

Model Significant at the 0.001 Level
Model Significant at the 0.05 Level

Models 1 through 3 in Table 11 predict expenditures per capita using the available data to find the best
fitting model. Income per capita was found to be a better predictor of expenditures than GDP per capita,
so model 1 shows the effects of income per capita on health expenditures rather than GDP per capita.
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Wealthier countries spend more per capita on health care than poorer countries with an R-Square of 0.872
and significant at the 0.001 level. Model 2 adds the system dummies to Model 1 and shows an improved
R-Square of 0.965, an increase in predictive power of roughly 9% more of the variation in expenditures
with all variables significant at the 0.05 level.

Model 3 was created by adding in multiple control

variables into Model 2 and reducing insignificant variables until only significant variables remained.
When GINI and the % of population 65 and up were included the socialized dummy was statistically
insignificant. Variables included but found to be insignificant included: 1.) lifestyle factors of alcohol
consumption, tobacco use and obesity rates, 2.) access to medical technology (MRI units and CTE
scanners), and 3.) research and development expenditures. In Model 3, the percent of population 65 and
up is only statistically significant if the GINI coefficient is included and vice versa. Models 2 and 3 are
very similar because socialized countries tend to be poorer. And countries with higher inequality (GINI
coefficients) have a smaller population over the age of 65. Countries with more wealth inequality (higher
GINI coefficients) are also poorer but neither the population over 65 or GINI coefficients are directly
related to expenditures. Model 3 shows a spurious relationship exists between the GINI, population over
65 and expenditures according to the correlation matrix presented in Table 12:
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix for Expenditure Predictors
PecentPop65up
PecentPop65up

GINIoecd

IncomePerCapita

ExpPerCapCurrent

SocialDum

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

GINIoecd

IncomePer
Capita

ExpPerCap
Current

SocialDum

1
34
-.421*
0.016
32

1
32

0.151
0.394
34

-.387*
0.029
32

34

0.171
0.333
34

-0.221
0.224
32

.934**
0
34

34

-0.217
0.218
34

0.072
0.693
32

-.447**
0.008
34

-.517**
0.002
34

1

1

1
34

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The socialized system dummy appears to be a more direct cause of expenditures and a better
predictor of expenditures than using the GINI coefficient and the percent of population over 65.
When GINI is included in Model 2 without the percent of population over 65, it has a P value of
0.684 while the socialized dummy remains statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Model 2 is a
better predictive model than Model 3. Expenditures are determined by income (wealth) and
system dummies (system type) as predicted by the integrative market model in Chapter 3.
4.3.3: Step 2: Determinants of Health Care Resources
The second step to affirm the health care market model created in Chapter 3 is to examine
the determinants of health care resources as partial measures of access to care:
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Table 13: Regression Models for Determinants of Health Care Resources

*

**

**

**
*

Model

Dependent Variable

Independent
Variable

1

Physician Density

Constant

2

Physician Density

3

General Practice
Density

4

General Practice
Density

5

Nurse Density

6

Nurse Density

Expenditures Per
Capita
Expenditures
Squared
Constant
Income Per
Capita

Unstandard.
Coefficient

Constant
Income Per
Capita
Constant
Expenditures Per
Capita
Expenditures
Squared
Constant
Income Per
Capita

Standardized
Coefficient

P
Value

Model
R²

3.854

0.001

0.144

t

2.131

0.553

0.001

0.000

1.306

2.176

0.037

-4.69E-08
2.692

0.000
0.474

-1.140

-1.900
5.679

0.067
0.000

1.61E-05

0.000

0.250

1.460

0.154

0.215

0.302

0.712

0.482

0.0004

0.000

1.569

2.686

0.012

-3.50E-08

0.000

-1.512

-2.588

0.015

0.696

0.270

2.577

0.015

0.058

6.73E-06
-2.179

0.000
1.623

0.186

1.073
-1.343

0.291
0.189

0.717

0.004

0.001

1.975

5.647

0.000

-2.61E-07
-1.879

0.000
1.393

-1.257

-3.595
-1.349

0.001
0.187

0

0.000

0.825

8.256

0.000

Constant
Expenditures Per
Capita
Expenditures
Squared

S.E.

0.062

0.035

0.680

Model significant at the 0.001 level
Model significant at the 0.05 level

Table 13 shows the results of regression analyses to determine the levels of health care
resources. Other variables were tested for statistical significance and found to be insignificant:
specialty practice, number of hospitals, and number of hospital beds. Table 13 includes two
different models for predicting the levels of health care resources: 1.) Income per capita, and 2.)
expenditures per capita plus expenditures squared (reduction in access, therefore a reduction in
demand and a reduction in supply). Models 1 and 2 test the effects of income and expenditures
on total physician density. Model 2 is statistically insignificant, but Model 1 is on the edge of
the 0.05 significance level and has twice the explanatory power. Models 3 and 4 test the effects
on general practice density. Model 4 is not statistically significant. Models 5 and 6 test the
effects on nurse density. Both models are statistically significant, but Model 5 explains more of
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the variation than Model 6. In all three measures of health care resources, expenditures plus
expenditures squared, represent a more accurate measure than income per capita. This suggests
that the path diagram is accurate, and that income determines expenditures but does not directly
determine levels of health care resources used.
4.3.4: Step 3: Determinants of Health Outcomes
The third step to affirm the causal model examines how health outcomes are affected by
expenditures per capita and expenditures squared in comparison with other possible models
presented in Table 14:
Table 14: Regression Models for Determinants of Health Outcomes

**

Model

Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

1

Life Expectancy

Constant
GDP Per Capita
Constant
Income Per
Capita
Constant

**

2

Life Expectancy

**

3

Life Expectancy

*

**

**

*

**

4

5

6

7

8

Life Expectancy

Expenditures Per
Capita
Constant
Income Per
Capita
Free Market
Dummy
Constant

Infant Mortality

Expenditures Per
Capita
Expenditures
Squared
Constant

Life Expectancy

Infant Mortality

Neonatal Mortality

Expenditures Per
Capita
Expenditures
Squared
Constant
Income Per
Capita
Constant
Expenditures Per
Capita
Expenditures
Squared

Unstandardized
Coefficient

S.E.

Standardized
Coefficient

t

P
Value

Model
R²

79.763
3.379
69.443

0.000
0.002
0.000

0.263

4.391
96.677

0.000
0.000

0.245

3.223
73.333

0.003
0.000

0.481

77.806
7.11E-05
76.271

0.975
0.000
1.098

0.00011
78.528

0.000
0.812

0.613

0.001
75.811

0.000
1.034

0.495

0.00013

0.000

0.693

5.200

0.000

-4.62
73.683

1.842
1.035

-0.334

-2.509
71.173

0.018
0.000

0.003

0.000

2.642

6.678

0.000

-2.61E-07
9.265

0.000
1.199

-2.234

-5.647
7.724

0.000
0.000

-0.002

0.001

-2.304

-4.660

0.000

2.28E-07
6.7

0.000
1.172

2.104

4.257
5.719

0.000
0.000

0.174

-7.06E-05
5.835

0.000
0.822

-0.417

-2.598
7.095

0.014
0.000

0.353

-0.002

0.000

-2.143

-4.109

0.000

1.43E-07

0.000

2.028

3.888

0.000
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0.513

0.376

0.628

0.419

*

**

Model
9

Dependent
Variable
Neonatal Mortality

10

Maternal Mortality

Independent
Variable
Constant
Income Per
Capita
Constant
Expenditures Per
Capita
Expenditures
Squared

*

**
*

11

Maternal Mortality

Constant
Income Per
Capita

Unstandardized
Coefficient
4.116

S.E.
0.791

Standardized
Coefficient

t
5.201

P
Value
0.000

Model
R²
0.108

-3.61E-05
27.899

0.000
3.748

-0.328

-1.967
7.444

0.058
0.000

0.498

-0.009

0.002

-2.514

-5.470

0.000

8.38E-07

0.000

2.302

5.009

0.000

17.752

3.928

4.520

0.000

-0.00024

0.000

-2.633

0.013

-0.422

0.178

Model significant at the 0.001 level
Model significant at the 0.05 level

In Table 14, Models 1 through 5, test alternative models for predicting life expectancy. Models
1 and 2 test wealth as a function of GDP per capita versus income per capita. Income per capita
is a superior model with an R-square of 0.378. Models 2 and 3 compare income per capita
versus expenditures. Model 2 is a superior model and explains more variation than expenditures.
Model 4 adds the system dummies to model 2 (Socialized systems and universal systems were
not statistically significant. There is little variation between the two systems when examining life
expectancy as a function of income per capita). The R-square of 0.481 in Model 4 represents an
increase in explanatory ability of roughly 10%. Model 5 tests expenditures and expenditures
squared versus the best alternative model (Model 4). Model 5 shows an increase of R-square
from 0.481 to 0.628 and is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Model 5 clearly shows a
better fit and accounts for nearly two-thirds of the overall variation in life expectancy. The
regression models fully support the path diagram in Figure 22 and support the hypothesis that
overspending decreases access to care and increases waste (increased spending that does not
cause a corresponding increase in health outcomes).
Models 6 through 11 test income versus expenditures plus expenditures squared for three
other measures of health care outcomes, infant mortality, neonatal mortality and maternal
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mortality rates. For all three health care outcomes, expenditures plus expenditures squared
represent better fits to the data, larger explanatory power (R-square), and are all significant at the
0.001 level whereas income per capita is only significant at the 0.05 level.
4.3.5: Regression Conclusions
Income per capita plus system dummies account for 96.5% of the variation in
expenditures per capita. Expenditures per capita plus expenditures squared account for the
different levels of health care resources and differences in health outcomes better than income
per capita. The mathematical formulas for the path diagram, in Figure 22, are represented in
Equation 4:
Equation 4: Path Diagram Formulas
Health Outcomes = β0 + β1Quality + β2Access + Ɛ.
Health Care Resources = β0 + β1Access + Ɛ.
Quality = β0 + β1Expenditures (increased quality) - β2Expenditures2 (economic
waste; expenditures that do not contribute to quality) + ζ.
Access = β0 + β1Expenditures (increased access) - β2Expenditures2 (Decreased access
due to pricing consumers out of the market) + ζ.
Expenditures = β0 + β1Income Per Capita + β2System Type + ζ.
Therefore;
Health Outcomes = β0 + β1Expenditures - β2Expenditures2+ Ɛ.
Health Care Resources = β0 + β1Expenditures - β2Expenditures2 + Ɛ.

As can be seen in Equation 4, the regression analyses fit the predicted formulas based on the
path diagram. Equation 5 shows the regression formulas applied to the path diagram:
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Equation 5: Regression Formulas Applied to the Path Diagram
Expenditures Per Capita = -$1154 + $0.129 * (Income Per Capita) + $3474 * (Free
Market Dummy) - $335 * (Socialized Dummy); R-Square 0.965.
Health Care Resources (Nurse Density per 1000) = -2.378nurses + 0.004nurses *
(Expenditures Per Capita) – 2.59E-7nurses * (Expenditures Squared); R-Square
0.717.
Health Outcomes (Life Expectancy) = 73.7years + 0.003years * (Expenditures Per
Capita) – 2.61E-7years * (Expenditures Squared); R-Square 0.628.

With R-squares between 0.628 and 0.965 the models hold up very well and explain more
variation than that of any alternative model. These results clearly show that the path diagram in
Figure 22, based on the integrative market model in Figure 14, accurately describe market
forces and effects of different health care systems on economic efficiency, quality, and access to
care. Free market systems overspend (by at least $3474), decreasing access to care and waste
money that does not increase the quality of care. Socialized systems underspend, decreasing
access to care and quality of care (the amount is not measurable through regression analysis
alone). It appears that the integrative market model created in Chapter 3 is fully supported.
Figure 23 shows a side-by-side comparison of the basic market model next to the quadratic
regression of the OECD countries:
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Figure 23: Comparison of Basic Market Model and Quadratic Regression
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Figure 24 Overlays the quadratic regression results over the most simplistic market model:

Figure 24: Quadratic Regression Overlaid on Basic Market Model
Figure 23 and Figure 24 clearly show that the data fully supports the market model presented in
Chapter 3. Reference lines for the three systems in Figure 23 are set to the mean life expectancy
and per capita expenditures of each system type but does not control for the wealth of countries.
As shown earlier, poorer countries tend to also use socialized systems and therefore the mean
expenditures for socialized systems is being driven lower than it should be when wealth is
controlled for in the regression models and in Equation 5. Socialized systems spend $335 less
than universal systems and free market systems spend $3474 more than universal systems
according to Equation 5 when controlling for income. Figure 24 uses the results from the
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regression models in Table 11 and Equation 5 to compare expenditures based on the mean of
universal systems’ per capita expenditures as a reference point instead of the mean expenditures
for each individual system. Controlling for wealth creates a more accurate representation of
differences between systems. Figure 24 shows expenditures when controlling for wealth for
socialized systems and free market systems are much closer to universal systems than using
means of the systems for comparison. However, mean life expectancy for each system type still
had to be used in the figure, as there is no statistically significant regression model that allows
for the measurement in differences in life expectancies while controlling for wealth between the
system types. Regression analysis was performed, despite being statistically insignificant, in an
attempt to control for wealth and system type for life expectancy. The results suggest that
socialized systems, when controlling for wealth, perform between 0.75 and 1 year worse than
universal systems, and free market systems perform 3.5 to 4.2 years worse, when controlling for
wealth, than universal systems.
There are a few limitations to the regression analysis that require more examination and
further modelling, which are examined presently. The first limitation is caused by the variables
multicollinearity within the regression models using expenditures and expenditures squared to
predict health care resources and health outcomes. Clearly, expenditures and expenditures
squared will create problems of multicollinearity as expenditures squared is created from
expenditures. This means regression models have a difficult time estimating the coefficients for
the variables because multicollinearity increases the standard errors. Higher standard errors lead
to less accurate estimates of coefficients within regression. However, this has no effect on the
predictive capabilities of the model or the significance of the model (Kline, 2011; PennState,
2018; Yoo et al., 2014). Scaling of variables also changes accuracy of estimates in quadratic
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regression, as higher values increase at faster rates then lower values. To address this issue,
expenditures was converted into $1000s (reducing the range of values), and “mean centering”
was performed. Mean centering takes the mean expenditure and subtracts it from each value for
each case in the data set (Kline, 2011; Moosbrugger, Schermelleh-Engel, Kelava, & G. Klein,
2009; PennState, 2018). This makes the mean value 0; cases are all then compared to the mean
value. The mean expenditures in $1000s in the data set is $4.057. The mean centered data
causes cases lower than the mean to be negative, which is then squared, which makes the values
positive, decreasing the collinearity of expenditures and expenditures squared. This allows the
regression model to more accurately measure the effects of the two variables independently
without changing significance or any other aspect to the model. Table 15 shows the comparison
of the models for predicting life expectancy based on expenditures:
Table 15: Expenditure Conversion and Model Comparison
Dependent
Variable
1 Life
Expectancy

2 Life
Expectancy

3 Life
Expectancy

Independent
Variable

Unstand.
Coefficient

S.E.

Constant
Expenditures
Per Capita
Expenditures
Squared

73.683

1.035

0.003

0.000

0.000

Constant
Exp $1000s
Exp $1000s
Squared
Constant
Exp$1000s
Centered
Exp $1000s
Centered
Squared

Standardized
Coefficient

t

P
Value

71.173

0.000

2.642

6.678

0.000

0.077

13.040

0.000

-2.234

-5.647

0.000

0.077

13.040

73.683
3.089

1.035
0.463

2.642

71.173
6.678

0.000
0.000

0.077

13.040

-0.261

0.046

-2.234

-5.647

0.000

0.077

13.040

81.919

0.316

259.564

0.000

0.971

0.146

0.830

6.663

0.000

0.773

1.293

-0.261

0.046

-0.704

-5.647

0.000

0.773

1.293
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Toler
ance

VIF

Model
R²
0.628

0.628

0.628

As seen in Table 15 converting expenditures into expenditures in $1000s and mean centering
have no effect on the significance of the relationships of the P values. The data conversions only
reduce uncertainty within the estimates of the betas, therefore it allows regression to provide a
more accurate estimate of the coefficients because regression estimates the coefficients using the
standard errors (Moosbrugger et al., 2009; PennState, 2018). This uncertainty is reflected within
the standardized coefficients. Comparing Models 1 and 2 there is no difference in the betas, but
Model 3 shows Betas below 1. Standardized betas do not necessarily need to be within absolute
value of 1, but betas outside of the unity range can cause confusion for interpretation of values
(Deegan, 1978; Joreskog, 1999). In a quadratic regression, the coefficients must be interpreted
simultaneously and cannot be interpreted independently, even though regression analysis
computes them independently. Mean centering allows for more easily interpretable coefficients
and more accurate estimates of coefficients. Figure 25 shows that the conversion has no effect
on the relationship between the variables:

Figure 25: Quadratic Regression Comparison of Expenditure Conversion
Mathematically the results of the conversion are the same, but the estimates of the coefficients
become more accurate. Model 2 estimates an increase of life expectancy of 3 years for every
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$1000 increase in expenditures from $0 and a simultaneous decrease of 0.26 years for every
increase of $1000 squared. Model 3 estimates that the increase is 1 year for every $1000
increase in expenditures above the mean expenditures and a simultaneous decrease of 0.26 years
for every $1000 above the mean squared, or a 1 year decrease for every $1000 below the mean,
plus a further decrease of 0.26 years for every $1000 squared under the mean expenditures.
Table 16 shows the regression results for the mean centered expenditures and all the previously
analyzed health care resource and health outcome variables from Table 13 and Table 14:
Table 16: Expenditures Mean Centered, Health Outcomes and Health Care Resources
Model

Dependent
Variable

1

Infant Mortality

2

3

4

5

6

Neonatal
Mortality

Maternal
Mortality

Physician
Density

General Practice
Density

Nurse Density

Independent Variable

Unstandardized
Coefficient

S.E.

Standardized
Coefficient

t

P
Value

Model
R²

Constant
Exp1000Centered
Exp1000CenteredSquared

2.884
-0.648
0.228

0.366
0.169
0.054

7.887
-3.837
4.257

0.000
0.001
0.000

0.419

-0.597
0.663

Constant
Exp1000Centered
Exp1000CenteredSquared

2.059
-0.351
0.143

0.251
0.116
0.037

8.214
-3.036
3.888

0.000
0.005
0.000

0.353

-0.499
0.639

Constant
Exp1000Centered
Exp1000CenteredSquared

4.529
-2.358
0.838

1.143
0.527
0.167

3.964
-4.472
5.009

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.498

-0.647
0.725

Constant
Exp1000Centered
Exp1000CenteredSquared

3.541
0.157
-0.047

0.169
0.078
0.025

21.003
2.019
-1.900

0.000
0.052
0.067

0.144

0.381
-0.359

Constant
Exp1000Centered
Exp1000CenteredSquared
Constant
Exp1000Centered
Exp1000CenteredSquared

1.113
0.079
-0.035
10.145
1.981
-0.261

0.092
0.043
0.014
0.495
0.228
0.072

12.073
1.867
-2.588
20.509
8.674
-3.595

0.000
0.071
0.015
0.000
0.000
0.001

0.189

0.343
-0.476
0.955
-0.396

0.709

Using the mean centered expenditures allows for the estimation of life expectancy controlling for
wealth and system type by combining the regression formulas from Table 15 and Table 17:
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Table 17: Expenditures Mean Centered by System Type
Dependent Variable
Exp $1000s Centered

Independent
Variable
Constant
IncomePerCapita
FreeDum
SocialDum

Unstandardized
Coefficient
-5.212
0.00013
3.474
-0.335

S.E.
0.311
0.000
0.422
0.159

Standardized
Coefficient
0.828
0.294
-0.082

t
-16.762
21.294
8.240
-2.106

P
Value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.044

Model
R²
0.965

Table 17 predicts the mean centered expenditures based on wealth and system type. This allows
for the calculation of life expectancy, which is performed in Equation 6:
Equation 6: Between System Life Expectancy Holding Income Constant
Exp $1000s Centered = -5.212 + 0.00013 * (Income Per Capita) + $3.474 * (Free
Market Dummy) - $0.335 * (Socialized Dummy); R-Square 0.965.
Health Outcomes (Life Expectancy) = 81.919 years + 0.971years * (Exp $1000s
Centered) – 0.261 years * (Exp $1000s Centered Squared); R-Square 0.628.
Therefore, socialized systems spend $0.335 less than universal systems, and free
market systems spend $3.474 more than universal systems in terms of means.
Universal system has a mean expenditures mean centered = 0.9359 above the mean.
Therefore, holding all incomes constant:
Universal Life Expectancy = 81.919 years + 0.971 * 0.9359 – 0.261 * (0.9359)2 =
82.599 years.
Free Market Life Expectancy = 81.919 years + 0.971 * (0.9359 + 3.474) – 0.261 *
(0.9359 + 3.474)2 = 81.125 years.
Socialized Life Expectancy = 81.919 years + 0.971 * (0.9359 – 0.335) – 0.261 *
(0.9359 – 0.335)2 = 82.408 years.
Holding all income per capita equal across system types, universal systems increase life
expectancy over socialized systems by 0.191 years (or 2.3 months) and 1.474 years (or 17.7
months) over free market systems based on the regression estimates and Equation 6.
Converting from a socialized system to a universal system, holding all other factors constant,
theoretically should result in an increase in the average life expectancy by 2.3 months.
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Converting from a free market system to a universal system, holding all other factors constant,
theoretically should increase average life expectancy by 1.474 years.
Another limitation to this analysis is that regression analysis does not allow for
connecting multiple steps within the process. Each correlation must be individually tested and
therefore the aggregate measurable effects cannot be accurately measured with regression
analysis alone. Path analysis could be beneficial to control for multiple interactions, but due to
access and quality being latent variables, path analysis cannot be directly performed. To address
these last two limitations, structural equation modelling has been added in the next section of this
analysis, as it allows for the measurement of latent variables and the measurement of multiple
correlations simultaneously allowing for more accurate measurement of direct and indirect
effects and steps within the process while testing for the theoretical connections in Chapter 3.
4.4: Comparative Analysis of Health Care Systems (Structural Equation Modelling)
Structural equation modeling (SEM) allows for the testing of theory and is a powerful
tool for measuring and analyzing latent variables. SEM was used to further test the models in an
attempt to measure the independent effects on quality and access to care based on system type.
SEM requires a larger sample size than there currently are countries in the OECD. Due to the
limited number of countries in the OECD, Time-Series-Cross-Section (TSCS) analysis to pool
yearly data together had to be added into the model. TSCS provides a method for pooling data,
in which each country is observed based on a given year. Because this study is interested in the
data based on system, not changes over time, “Time”, a control variable, was treated as a subunit
to “Country”. Mathematically this relationship is expressed based on the above theories as
Equation 7:
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Equation 7: TSCS Example
Life Expectancy(CountryTime) = Quality(CountryTime) + Access(CountryTime)
Therefore, each country is observed and regressed based on the year in which the observation
occurred. This allows for an increased number of observations controlling for time (year) of the
observation. There are currently 34 OECD member countries included in the data set. Starting
with the most recent data year available (2016 for most variables), the previous 5 years data were
added to the data set used in the analysis (2012 through 2016). There are 5 time specific
observations that span across 34 cases with a total of 170 observations. ANOVA analysis was
performed for all dependent variables found statistically significant in either regression or SEM,
factored by year; no statistically significant differences were found. Latent growth curve models
were also created to test the effects of time on all outcome variables. None of the models were
found to be statistically significant. In other words, life expectancy in 2012 cannot be used to
predict life expectancy in 2013—changes in life expectancy from one year to the next does not
follow a linear pattern. Time has no direct effect on the variables tested and differences between
years are random. Therefore, time does not need to be factored into the analysis or controlled for
within the analysis (latent growth curve analysis is not necessary within the final SEM models).
4.4.1: Measurement Model
Access and quality of care are conceptualized as latent variables that cannot be directly
measured. Because of this a measurement model for each of these latent variables had to be
created and tested. The data set from the OECD is rather limited in terms of direct measures of
access to care. However, the data set includes variables on health care resources across the 34
countries. Health care resources can be used as a partial measure of access to care. More
resources mean that more patients can get the care they need and increases in demand cause
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increases in supply. As more people have access to care through the ability to pay for care by
increasing insurance, the supply of providers should increase to meet the demand, meaning that
resources should be a partial function of access. Access also effects health outcomes. More
access to care should lead to longer life expectancy. Therefore, health care resources, in
combination with health outcomes (life expectancy), should be a reasonable measure of access to
care, albeit imperfect. A more perfect measure would also include wait periods for non-elective
procedures, wait times for consultations and specialists, and measures on delayed treatment due
to prohibitive costs. The OECD does now collect these last variables, but reporting is
inconsistent, and the data set has large quantities of missing data. The variables available on
resources included nurse density, general practice density, total physician density, specialist
density, hospital beds, number of hospitals, and measures of technology (CT scanners, MRI
units, and PET scanners). There was little correlation with some of the measures and they were
dropped from the model. The variables found significant and were included in the model are
nurse density, general practice density, and total physician density.
Quality of care can partially be measured by health outcomes when controlling for access
to care. When access to care is equal, differences in health outcomes should be a function of the
quality of the care received. The data set from the OECD also includes data on aggregate health
outcomes. The data from the OECD contains various measures of health outcomes, including
life expectancy, infant mortality, and maternal mortality. Life expectancy is a function of both
access to care and quality of care. Infant mortality and maternal mortality may be partial
measures of access to care, but because every country guarantees emergency care, these two
measures should be a bigger function of quality of care than a function of access to care.
Patients are already at the hospital in the case of infant mortality and maternal mortality.
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Previous access may have reduced the number of deaths, but once at the hospital, the number of
deaths should be a function of the quality of the care, not access to care. Other measures of
quality would be desirable, but once again, comparative, comprehensive data is limited. The
data set from the OECD also contained data on perinatal mortality, and neonatal mortality.
However, the data was not found to be statistically significant, most likely due to reporting errors
as it appears different countries defined perinatal and neonatal mortality differently when
reporting to the OECD.
General practice density, infant mortality rates, and maternal mortality rates were all
relatively skewed. SEM assumes un-skewed data within the outcome variables so the natural log
of the three variables were taken to perform the analysis. Infant mortality and maternal mortality
were inverted to be consistent in measures; less infant and maternal deaths is “good”, therefore
the mortality rates were multiplied by -1 to make higher numbers reflect better quality of care
and lower numbers representing lower quality of care. Figure 26 shows the final measurement
model used in this analysis for access to care and quality of care, with a CMIN/DF of 1.442, a
GFI of 0.989, and an RMSEA of 0.051, LO 90=0.000, HI 90=0.135 and PCLOSE of 0.406:
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Figure 26: Access and Quality Measurement Model. Standardized Estimates
Access to care also affects health outcomes and the correlation of measurement errors between
physician density, nurse density and the health outcomes of infant mortality and maternal
mortality reflect this effect. Good quality systems should also have more health care resources
than systems that are lower quality, therefore access and quality are also correlated within the
measurement model in Figure 26. The model fit indices show a good fit to the data with all
measures significant at the 0.001 level, however as previously stated, the data is limited and is, at
best, only a partial measure of access and quality. Despite the limited data, the measurement
model does represent a good fit to the data and a reasonable measurement model of access and
quality.
4.4.2: Intersystem Structural Equation Model
With a significant measurement model created and validated, a structural equation model
was then created. Regression analysis showed that income per capita plus the system dummies
accounted for roughly 96.5% of the variation in health care expenditures per capita. The
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structural equation model uses the system type dummies for free market and socialized systems.
This means the base model assumes that the system is a universal system unless notified
otherwise through the two dummy variables. This was done because a universal system uses
public insurance and private provision and, therefore, the difference with a free market system is
only in the private insurance, and the difference with the socialized system is only the public
provision which allows for the comparison of changing either the provision or the insurance.
The regression models also showed that expenditures plus expenditures squared accounted for
variations in health care resources and health outcomes; the structural equation model takes both
of these factors into account and their effects on access and quality. Increasing expenditures
should increase access and quality of care, and over-expenditure should decrease access and
increase economic waste (expenditures that do not increase quality). The SEM model has a
CMIN/DF of 1.161 P=0.272, a GFI of 0.975 and an RMSEA of 0.031, LO 90=0.000, HI
90=0.074 and a PCLOSE of 0.721, which shows an excellent model fit. Figure 27 shows the
final SEM models with standardized estimates:
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Figure 27: Intersystem SEM Standardized Estimate
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Modification indices were consulted, and only logical correlations were added to the model
which will be discussed below. Table 18 provides the regression and covariance parameter
estimates from the intersystem SEM model:
Table 18: Intersystem SEM Regression and Covariance Parameter Estimates

EXP1000Squared
EXP1000Squared
EXP1000Squared
EXP1000s
Access
Access
EXP1000s
EXP1000s
Quality
Quality
PhysicianDensity
NurseDensity
LifeExpectancy
LnInfantInverse
LifeExpectancy
LnMaternalInverse
NurseDensity
Access
LnGeneralPractice
EXP1000s
Income1000s
FreeDum
FreeDum
z4
e1
e2
e2
e3
e5
e6
e3
e3
e5

<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->

FreeDum
Income1000s
SocialDum
FreeDum
EXP1000Squared
FreeDum
Income1000s
SocialDum
EXP1000s
EXP1000Squared
Access
Access
Access
Quality
Quality
Quality
EXP1000Squared
EXP1000s
Access
LnGeneralPractice
SocialDum
Income1000s
SocialDum
z1
FreeDum
e5
e6
e5
e1
e1
e1
e4
SocialDum

e3

<-->

SocialDum

Standardized
Estimate
0.488
0.705
-0.051
0.313
-1.509
-0.299
0.816
-0.062
2.832
-2.586
0.419
0.680
0.446
0.788
0.458
0.717
0.278
2.361
0.308
0.052
-0.469
0.231
-0.244
0.676
-0.370
0.387
0.351
0.338
-0.302
-0.189
-0.204
-0.334
0.186

Unstandard.
Estimate
49.477
0.956
-1.809
3.452
-0.030
-0.600
0.120
-0.237
1.672
-0.166
1.000
8.484
3.160
0.313
1.000
0.526
0.069
0.430
0.439
0.200
-2.897
0.497
-0.020
1.049
-0.027
0.082
0.149
0.219
-0.037
-0.047
-0.197
-0.991
0.026

0.307

0.339

S.E.
1.951
0.029
0.747
0.193
0.008
0.161
0.003
0.068
0.402
0.040

C.R.
25.356
33.374
-2.422
17.850
-3.950
-3.721
44.399
-3.479
4.159
-4.191

P Value
***
***
0.015
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Label
par_21
par_25
par_29
par_6
par_22
par_23
par_26
par_28
par_4
par_31

1.661
0.880
0.075

5.109
3.590
4.153

***
***
***

0.128
0.025
0.081
0.135
0.058
0.521
0.169
0.006
0.144
0.006
0.018
0.038
0.058
0.010
0.019
0.063
0.237
0.010

4.098
2.746
5.276
3.258
3.441
-5.558
2.935
-3.283
7.279
-4.358
4.480
3.979
3.794
-3.679
-2.474
-3.114
-4.185
2.548

***
0.006
***
0.001
***
***
0.003
0.001
***
***
***
***
***
***
0.013
0.002
***
0.011

par_11
par_20
par_5
par_10
par_12
par_7
par_8
par_32
par_9
par_24
par_13
par_14
par_15
par_16
par_17
par_18
par_19
par_27

0.074

4.609

***

par_30

par_1
par_2
par_3

As Table 18 shows, all variables and their correlations are significant at, at least the 0.01 level
with most significant at the 0.001 level.
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4.4.3: SEM Regression Parameters and Effects
As expected, income plus system type determines expenditures and expenditures squared.
Free market systems are more likely to overspend than universal systems. Socialized systems
are less likely to overspend and more likely to underspend than universal systems. SEM also
allowed for the measure of the direct effect of private insurance on access to care while
controlling for the indirect effects through overspending. Private insurance not only increased
expenditures and made it more likely to overspend, but a secondary reduction in access is created
by using private insurance. Using private insurance outpriced consumers from getting access to
care and appears to further deny access for those with insurance. This supports the hypothesis
and argument that private for-profit insurance maximizes revenues by denying services to
consumers. Removing this fixed parameter increase the RMSEA to 0.077 and the modification
indexes suggest there is a correlation in the residuals for expenditures squared and access
suggesting that an important parameter is missing from the model when the decrease in access
directly caused by private insurance is not accounted for in the model. In other words, the use of
private insurance directly reduces access to care as insurers reduce benefits and deny treatments
to increase revenues.
Increasing expenditures leads to better access and quality. Countries that overspend
(represented by expenditures squared) reduce access to care by pricing consumers out of the
market and decrease quality. The “decrease” in quality is best understood as wasted
expenditures. This excess money is being spent without causing a corresponding increase in
quality.
Lastly, the modification indices suggested that there was a correlation between the
residuals for expenditures and the measurement error for general practitioners, reflecting an
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unknown factor shared in common with the two endogenous variables. Logically, as
expenditures increase, overall access increases. This overall access in terms of resources may
have different identities: more hospital beds, nurses, nurse practitioners, nurses, general
practitioners, specialist physicians, etc. There is a covariance correlation between general
practitioners (e1) and nurses (e3). Systems with more general practitioners rely less on nurses
and vice versa. Having more general practitioners or nurses both increase access to care. When
controlling for this correlation, systems that rely less on nurses and more on general practitioners
cost more. Therefore, increasing general practitioners increases costs, and thus increases
expenditures. This relationship was added into the structural equation model which means the
model in non-recursive with a stability index of 0.112 showing a stable relationship. Increasing
expenditures increases access, increasing access increases the number of general practitioners,
and increasing general practitioners in relation to the number of nurses increases costs
(expenditures).
4.4.4: SEM Covariance Parameters and Estimates
Some parameters covary rather than have a directional relationship. This covariance
needs to be controlled for so that the above SEM regression measures can be accurately
estimated. As shown in subchapter 4.3, poorer countries tend to use socialized systems which is
reflected in the covariance between Socialized Dummy and Income1000s (parameter 7). The
connection between lower incomes and socialized systems is logical, as the government may be
the only entity that has the resources to build and maintain advanced health care systems and
hospitals. Controlling for this covariance allows for a less bias estimate of per capita
expenditures. The United States is also a wealthy country and uses a free market health care
system. These two variables are correlated but not causal as represented by parameter 8. Free
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market systems are opposite to socialized system and therefore correlated but not causal as
represented by parameter 32. Expenditures and expenditures squared are obviously correlated
but measure different economic concepts, therefore the residuals are correlated represented by
parameter 9. The modification indexes suggested that there is a negative correlation between
Free Market Dummy and General Practice density, represented by parameter 24. Based on the
theory discussed in Chapter 3, this correlation is logical demand for care is reduced and therefore
the supply would be reduced; and private insurers, to save money, prefer the use of nurse
practitioners which can charge less than general practitioners. The measurement error for
physician density (e2) is correlated with maternal mortality (e6), parameter 14, and infant
mortality (e5), parameter 13, and nurse density (e3) is correlated with infant mortality (e5),
parameter 15, as discussed in the measurement model, as well as now adding a correlation
between general practice density (e1) and infant mortality (e5), parameter 16, and maternal
mortality (e6), parameter 17 under the same logic. Parameter 19 shows that increasing nurse
density is associated with lower life expectancy, when controlling for the fact that general
practitioners are being replaced by nurses, shown by parameter 18. The modification indexes
also suggested a correlation between socialized systems and nurse density (e3), parameter 30,
which implies that socialized systems also use more nurses compared to universal systems.
However, socialized systems are also correlated with fewer infant mortalities (e5), parameter 27,
when controlling for all other factors, suggesting that there is a benefit to using a socialized
system. This is, again, logical considering that poorer systems tend to use socialized systems.
Researchers have shown that poorer countries are able to increase life expectancy through the
use of socialized systems more readily than relying on free markets (Cesur, Güneş, Tekin, &
Ulker, 2017).
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4.4.5: Intersystem SEM Discussion
The model represents an excellent fit to the data. Each system type directly affects
expenditures and expenditures squared. Socialized systems are more likely to underfund their
systems as predicted by the integrative market model, and less likely to overspend than universal
systems while controlling for wealth. Private insurance increases cost and causes access limiting
price increases, while also causing a direct reduction in access as for-profit insurance further
decreases access to maximize profits. Figure 27 fully supports the hypotheses in Chapter 3 and
the integrative market model in Figure 14.
Like in the regression analysis, structural equation modelling assumes no
multicollinearity and estimates coefficients using the standard errors. This mean the structural
multicollinearity is causing the estimates for the effects of expenditures and expenditures squared
to be inaccurate on the effects of access and quality. The same method of mean centering the
data can also be used within structural equation modelling to limit the effects of the collinearity
when it is structural to increase the estimation power of the model (Kline, 2011; Moosbrugger et
al., 2009). However, unlike in regression, SEM allows for the estimation of a path analysis,
which means that mean centering can cause estimation problems with exogenous variables when
mean centering is used on endogenous variables. Mean centering causes lower values of x to
become negative, squaring the negative values then become positive. If an exogenous variable is
predicted to reduce the squared value, then squaring the negative value erases this previously
measurable variation. Figure 27 accurately represents the connections between the variables,
but inaccurately estimates the coefficients for the effects of expenditures and expenditures
squared. Despite the issue of reducing the ability to measure direct effects on expenditures
squared at low values, mean centering was performed for expenditures and expenditures squared
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in Figure 28 to provide more accurate estimates of the coefficients for expenditures on access
and quality by reducing the standard errors and thus removing uncertainty in the model:
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Figure 28: Mean Centered Intersystem SEM
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Mean centering in Figure 28 removes the correlation between the residuals of expenditures (z4)
and expenditures squared (z1) by removing the structural multicollinearity. However, it also
made the ability to predict expenditures squared by differences between universal and socialized
systems impossible, as well as predicting the likelihood of over expenditure controlling for
income. Figure 28 has a CMIN/DF = 1.106, GFI = 0.973, and an RMSEA = 0.025, LO 90 =
0.000, HI 90 = 0.068, PCLOSE = 0.789, still representing an excellent fit to the data with all
regressions and covariances statistically significant at, at least, the 0.05 level. The model fit in
Figure 28 is actually better than Figure 27 because SEM penalizes complexity of models, with
more simple models more easily achieving a good fit than complex models, even if the complex
model may be a more accurate reflection of the data. Therefore, removing the three correlations
from Figure 27 that helped control for the multicollinearity in the variables, expenditures and
expenditures squared, improved the model fit. Figure 27 more accurately represents all of the
correlations, but Figure 28 allows for a more accurate estimate of the coefficients for
expenditures and expenditures squared on access and quality. The standardized coefficient, in
Figure 28, for the effects of expenditures on access is still greater than absolute value of 1, but
should not be a cause for concern (Deegan, 1978) (Joreskog, 1999). Table 19 provides the
regression and covariance estimates for Figure 28:
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Table 19: Mean Centered SEM Model Estimates

Exp1000CenteredS
quared
Exp1000Centered

<--<---

Access
Access
Exp1000Centered
Exp1000Centered
Quality

<--<--<--<--<---

Quality
PhysicianDensity
NurseDensity
LifeExpectancy
LnInfantInverse
LifeExpectancy
LnMaternalInverse

<--<--<--<--<--<--<---

NurseDensity
Access
LnGeneralPractice
Exp1000Centered
Income1000s
FreeDum
FreeDum
e1
e2
e2
e3
e5
e6
e5
e3
e3
e3

<--<--<--<--<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->

Unstandard.
Estimate

S.E.

Standardized
Estimate

25.761
3.504

1.436
0.202

0.810
0.318

-0.037
-0.459
0.120
-0.232
0.361

0.008
0.127
0.003
0.068
0.100

-0.146
1.000
11.198
3.458
0.352
1.000
0.595

0.038

0.244
0.200
0.524
0.239
-2.892
0.461
-0.019
-0.025
0.083
0.154
0.220
-0.037
-0.047
0.025
0.338
-0.192
-0.998

FreeDum
FreeDum
Exp1000CenteredS
quared
FreeDum
Income1000s
SocialDum
Exp1000Centered
Exp1000CenteredS
quared
Access
Access
Access
Quality
Quality
Quality
Exp1000CenteredS
quared
Exp1000Centered
Access
LnGeneralPractice
SocialDum
Income1000s
SocialDum
FreeDum
e5
e6
e5
e1
e1
SocialDum
SocialDum
e1
e4

P

Label

17.943
17.376

***
***

par_18
par_6

-0.567
-0.220
0.815
-0.061
0.673

-4.692
-3.606
42.794
-3.413
3.606

***
***
***
***
***

par_19
par_20
par_22
par_24
par_4

-3.824

***

par_26

5.871
3.903
3.850

***
***
***

par_1
par_2
par_3

0.156

-0.781
0.432
0.920
0.494
0.787
0.406
0.722

3.826

***

par_10

0.079
0.033
0.131
0.073
0.521
0.167
0.006
0.006
0.018
0.038
0.057
0.010
0.019
0.010
0.074
0.062
0.236

0.306
1.058
0.378
0.063
-0.468
0.216
-0.233
-0.348
0.399
0.363
0.343
-0.312
-0.196
0.183
0.306
-0.202
-0.333

3.081
6.128
4.002
3.270
-5.551
2.767
-3.139
-4.101
4.510
4.033
3.831
-3.749
-2.537
2.476
4.590
-3.116
-4.227

0.002
***
***
0.001
***
0.006
0.002
***
***
***
***
***
0.011
0.013
***
0.002
***

par_17
par_5
par_9
par_11
par_7
par_8
par_27
par_21
par_12
par_13
par_14
par_15
par_16
par_23
par_25
par_28
par_29

1.907
0.886
0.092

C.R.

Using the regression coefficients from Table 19 the predicted life expectancy of countries using
either free market or socialized systems converted to universal systems while controlling for
wealth is presented in Equation 8:
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Equation 8: Years of Life Lost Due to System Type Controlling for Income
Life Expectancy = 1 (Quality) + 3.46 (Access).
Quality = 0.36 (Exp1000Centered) – 0.15 (Exp1000Centered)2.
Access = 0.20 (Exp1000Centered) – 0.04 (Exp1000Centered)2 – 0.459 (FreeDum).
Exp1000Centered = 0.12 (Income1000s) + 3.5 (FreeDum) – 0.23 (SocialDum).
Free Market effect on Exp1000Centered2 = 25.761.
Converting systems controlling for income to measure just the change in life
expectancy in absolute value: Free Market Expenditures = 3.5, and Socialized
Expenditures = -0.23.
Therefore;
Socialized System Converted to Universal:
Quality = 0.36 (-0.23) – 0.15 (-0.23)2 = -0.0907 years.
Access = 0.20 (-0.23) – 0.04 (-0.23)2 = 0.048 (3.46) = -0.16648 years.
Total Potential Life Expectancy Lost = 0.257 years per capita (3.08 months per
capita).
Free Market System Converted to Universal:
Quality = 0.36 (3.5) – 0.15 (25.76) = -2.604 years.
Access = 0.20 (3.5) – 0.04 (25.76) – 0.459 = -0.7894 (3.46) = -2.731 years.
Total Potential Life Expectancy Lost = -5.327 years.

According to the regression estimates in Table 19, socialized systems would improve life
expectancy by 3.08 months per capita if they converted to a universal health system. The lack of
competition within the provision of care reduces quality of care by about 0.0907 years and access
to care by 0.166 years. Free Market systems would increase life expectancy by converting to a
universal system by 2.7 years per capita due to increased access to care and by 2.6 years due to
increased quality of care. However, expenditures squared’s effects on quality are best
interpreted as economic waste that does not directly increase life expectancy. Therefore, the
likely increase in life expectancy would only be the increase in access 2.7 years, and a decrease
in economic inefficiency that should have resulted in 2.6 years of life expectancy but does not.
In other words, based on the United States’ current expenditures it should already be performing
2.6 years better for life expectancy than is currently taking place. The U.S. has a current life
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expectancy of 78.8 years, should have a life expectancy of 81.4 based solely on “quality” due to
expenditures, but is not realizing that potential due to the economic waste represented by
expenditures squared. Additionally, the United States also has an added decrease in life
expectancy of 2.7 years due to the decreased access to care. Converting to a universal system
should remove the economic waste of 2.6 years and add 2.7 years due to access, resulting in a net
gain of 2.7 years which yields a life expectancy of 81.5 years and a substantial reduction in
economic waste.
4.4.6: Intra-System Structural Equation Model
The structural equation model for intersystem effects held up very well, so the next step
was to test if within system variation in policies would have an effect on access and quality in an
exploratory approach. The OECD Health Systems Survey provides data on within system
variations in policy, including the use of global budgeting, pay for performance, choice of
insurance, cost sharing, requirement of referrals, and requirement to register with a specific
primary provider. In theory, the use of global budgets should decrease expenditures by keeping
hospitals within given budget constraints. This could decrease expenditures and expenditures
squared, but may also reduce quality and access. Pay for performance should decrease
expenditures and/or increase quality of care, as the goal is to reduce redundancy and increase
quality of care. Choice of insurance should increase expenditures and decrease access to care
(according to Chapter 3) because the competition causes insurers to create limited networks of
providers, and price negotiating power of insurers is decreased. Cost sharing should reduce
access to care and/or reduce expenditures according to the theory of moral hazard (those that do
not have to pay for services will be less careful and abuse the system). Primary registration
should reduce redundancy and thus expenditures. Referrals should reduce expenditures and/or
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access to care as unnecessary procedures are reduced through gatekeeping. These hypotheses
were added into Figure 27 and tested for significance and goodness of fit. All seven variables
were added into the model correlating them to possible effects on expenditures, expenditures
squared, access, and quality. Insignificant correlations were removed, and modification indexes
were consulted to improve goodness of fit in an exploratory approach to discovering if these
intra-system policy differences had measurable effects on expenditures, access and quality of
care. The modification indexes were an important tool for correlating the use of combinations of
policies within countries. The OECD found that policies were most often used in combination
with each other (Joumard & Nicq; OECD, 2010). The final results of the exploratory analysis
are presented in Figure 29:
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Figure 29: Intra-System Policy Variations SEM Standardized Estimates
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Intra-system policies are represented in blue, as shown in Figure 29. The model has CMIN/DF
= 1.156, GFI = 0.954, and an RMSEA = 0.030, LO 90 = 0.000, HI 90 0.060, and PCLOSE =
0.846 representing an excellent fit to the data. The stability index for the non-recursive model is
0.107. Pay for performance, cost sharing, and choice of primary provider were not found to be
significant. Pay for performance may have an effect, but none could be determined by the
model. Cost sharing had no effect for the same reason, or more likely, because moral hazard has
no effect within the health insurance system, as predicted by the theory in Chapter 3. Moral
hazard may exist within other economic markets, like investment markets, but according to this
analysis, no effect can be found within the health insurance market. This argument has face
validity to it, as it seems highly unlikely that people would risk their lives more because they
have health insurance.
As seen by the correlation between exogenous policy variables in Figure 29 many
policies are used in combination with each other as represented within the model as the
covariances between the different policies in blue. Table 20 provides the regression and
covariance parameter for Figure 29:
Table 20: Intra-system SEM Regression and Covariance Parameter Estimates
Unstandard.
Estimate
EXP1000Squared
EXP1000Squared
EXP1000Squared
EXP1000Squared
EXP1000Squared
Access
EXP1000s
EXP1000s
EXP1000s
EXP1000s
EXP1000s
EXP1000s

<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<---

Income1000s
InsCompete
PrimaryRegister
SocialDum
FreeDum
EXP1000Squared
Referral
SocialDum
InsCompete
Income1000s
Budget
FreeDum

0.953
2.308
1.492
-2.232
47.416
-0.033
0.320
-0.299
0.240
0.117
-0.153
3.213
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S.E.
0.028
0.820
0.626
0.798
1.948
0.007
0.054
0.067
0.073
0.002
0.046
0.187

Standardized
Estimate
0.709
0.055
0.038
-0.062
0.476
-1.618
0.075
-0.076
0.052
0.803
-0.037
0.297

C.R.

P

Label

34.580
2.813
2.384
-2.799
24.339
-4.383
5.944
-4.488
3.270
47.741
-3.326
17.194

***
0.005
0.017
0.005
***
***
***
***
0.001
***
***
***

par_36
par_37
par_39
par_42
par_49
par_20
par_24
par_29
par_35
par_44
par_45
par_47

Access
Quality
Quality
PhysicianDensity
NurseDensity
LifeExpectancy
LnInfantInverse
LifeExpectancy
LnMaternalInverse
NurseDensity
Access
LnGeneralPractice
EXP1000s
Income1000s
Income1000s
Income1000s
SocialDum
Income1000s
Referral
SocialDum
Income1000s
FreeDum
SocialDum
Referral
SocialDum
SocialDum
z4
e1
e1
e1
e2
e2
e3
e5
e6
e3
e3
e4
e5
e3
e3

<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<--<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->
<-->

FreeDum
EXP1000s
EXP1000Squared
Access
Access
Access
Quality
Quality
Quality
EXP1000Squared
EXP1000s
Access
LnGeneralPractice
SocialDum
FreeDum
Budget
FreeDum
InsCompete
PrimaryRegister
PrimaryRegister
PrimaryRegister
InsCompete
Referral
InsCompete
InsCompete
Budget
z1
PrimaryRegister
Referral
FreeDum
e5
e6
e5
e1
e1
e1
e4
Referral
Income1000s
SocialDum
Budget

Unstandard.
Estimate
-0.486
1.542
-0.157
1.000
8.517
3.556
0.292
1.000
0.580
0.073
0.452
0.459
0.170
-2.776
0.431
-1.749
-0.016
0.884
0.085
0.092
-0.990
0.025
0.061
-0.057
-0.041
0.064
0.935
0.049
0.035
-0.028
0.083
0.147
0.196
0.033
-0.060
-0.261
-1.031
-0.085
0.769
0.261
0.270

S.E.
0.142
0.366
0.037
1.615
0.878
0.068
0.138
0.024
0.082
0.127
0.054
0.466
0.154
0.419
0.005
0.351
0.014
0.015
0.348
0.005
0.013
0.012
0.012
0.014
0.127
0.011
0.012
0.006
0.018
0.037
0.054
0.009
0.017
0.059
0.228
0.035
0.313
0.060
0.068

Standardized
Estimate
-0.241
2.701
-2.524
0.425
0.688
0.505
0.701
0.434
0.754
0.29
2.422
0.322
0.045
-0.463
0.198
-0.31
-0.202
0.171
0.451
0.453
-0.181
0.354
0.296
-0.323
-0.211
0.304
0.69
0.261
0.185
-0.381
0.379
0.362
0.287
0.253
-0.252
-0.265
-0.346
-0.149
0.203
0.242
0.266

C.R.
-3.413
4.217
-4.268

P
***
***
***

Label
par_48
par_4
par_23

5.273
4.050
4.276

***
***
***

par_1
par_2
par_3

4.206
3.049
5.527
3.613
3.112
-5.960
2.807
-4.172
-3.217
2.520
5.885
6.136
-2.843
4.938
4.555
-4.771
-3.326
4.476
7.379
4.266
3.010
-4.951
4.512
4.024
3.635
3.562
-3.540
-4.452
-4.524
-2.397
2.458
4.376
3.976

***
0.002
***
***
0.002
***
0.005
***
0.001
0.012
***
***
0.004
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
0.003
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
0.017
0.014
***
***

par_10
par_19
par_5
par_9
par_11
par_6
par_7
par_21
par_22
par_25
par_26
par_27
par_28
par_31
par_32
par_33
par_34
par_41
par_8
par_38
par_40
par_50
par_12
par_13
par_14
par_15
par_16
par_17
par_18
par_30
par_43
par_46
par_51

Requiring patients to register with a specific primary care provider (or financially incentivizing
registration) increases expenditures squared, meaning that rather than reducing costs and
redundancy, the requirement increased the likelihood to overspend and reduces access. Allowing
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patients to see any available doctor when necessary appears to increase access and decrease overexpenditures. Choice of insurers, if there is more than one insurer, increases both expenditures
and overspending (expenditures squared), as was predicted in Chapter 3 about insurance
competition increasing costs (redundancy in administrative costs), reducing benefits, and limiting
reimbursement negotiating power of the insurer. The use of global budgeting is associated with
less expenditures, but not less expenditures squared. Global budgeting is also correlated with
poorer countries. Combining these concepts means that poorer countries that already underspend
on health care causing reductions in access and quality, are even more likely to underspend when
using global budgeting, and that global budgeting does not decrease the likelihood of
overspending. The requirement of getting referrals to see specialists increased expenditures but
had no effect on expenditures squared. This suggests that referrals did not decrease access to
care or quality of care (in fact it increases quality and access, most likely by reducing
redundancy), but did increase costs, once again, showing that moral hazard is likely not a
problem within the health insurance market. If moral hazard were a problem, referrals should
reduce expenditures and expenditures squared by reducing unnecessary treatments, and cost
sharing should have a measurable effect on reducing expenditures and expenditures squared.
None of these are true, and like argued in Chapter 3, moral hazard in health care is in no way
supported by the data and is refuted by these statistical models.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE ANALYSIS, AND
CONCLUSIONS
5.1: Implications
The implications of this analysis are substantial and cannot easily be overstated as
hundreds of millions of years of life expectancy are potentially lost depending on the system of
health care chosen. Within just the 34 OECD countries examined, the estimates of potential life
expectancy lost due to using a socialized or free market system compared to a universal system
result in over one billion years are potentially lost as seen in Figure 30:

Potential Years of Life Lost (in Millions) per Total Population
*Due to Scaling the U.S. is not Included in Figure: U.S Years of Life Lost = 872,444,250:
Total All Socialized Systems = 130,760,592 years

Figure 30: Potential Years of Life Lost Compared to Universal System (Total Population)
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Multiplying the results of Equation 8 by the population of each country that uses each system
type created the results in Figure 30. Countries with larger populations will lose more than
countries with smaller populations, but the math is stark: potentially over 130 million years of
life expectancy lost within socialized systems just within the OECD, and over 870 million
potential years of life expectancy lost in the United States due to its free market health insurance
system with income per capita controlled. To place the potential years of life expectancy lost
into context: according to a recent study by the U.S. National Institutes of Health, 13 years of life
were lost compared to the average life expectancy due to all cancers in Norway (Brustugun,
Møller, & Helland, 2014). The World Health Organization estimates that 1 in 6 people will die
of cancer and the OECD reports mortality rates for cancer across the OECD countries (currently
averaging 200 per 100,000 population for a total of 2,553,427 across all countries in the data set
for 2016). If this holds true for all OECD countries, multiplying 13 years by the number of
cancer deaths in the OECD results in 33,194,551 total potential years of life lost due to all
cancers based on the current deaths from cancer in the OECD countries within the data set.
Curing all cancer within these OECD countries would theoretically create an increase in total life
expectancy by 33.2 million years per year for the current population included within the data set,
whereas changing all health care systems from socialized and free market to universal systems
would create a one-time increase in total life expectancy by 1 billion years for the population
(this increase only applies to socialized and free market systems). It would take 30 years of no
one, within the 34 countries in the data set, dying of cancer to yield the same one-time
cumulative effects to total life expectancy as changing all system types over to a universal
system—the equivalent cumulative effect on life expectancy is the same as curing all cancer over
a 30-year period. Multiplying the economic saving per capita in that the United States would
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produce from changing from a free market system to a universal system times the current
population results in an annual saving of $1.12 Trillion in health care expenditures. This
represents a savings of 35% which also is similar to the lower Medicare reimbursement rates
compared to private insurance reimbursement rates (the Congressional Budget Office found that
private health insurance pays 189% the rate of Medicare, a savings of 50%) (CBO, 2017).
This dissertation demonstrates the benefits of multivariate modeling strategies and the
power of SEM modeling in developing and confirming theory. The integrative model shows that
policy interventions will not be equivalent between health care system types, and that the market
forces will also differ within health care system type. Research that shows individual policy
effects within countries cannot be universally applied; policy differences will only have a given
effect within a specified health care system type.
5.2: Limitations
In this dissertation, the data was previously collected and available to the public from the
OECD. No surveys were required, and all data was standardized by the OECD using purchasing
power parity, and uniform reporting of population level data and per capita data. A challenging
complication of this study was that the integration of economic theory and public policy analysis
that has not been systematically performed within the academic literature, and the availability of
data to substantiate the integrative model. These limitations were overcome.
However, there are some other important limitations to this analysis. The available data
only encompasses 34, mostly wealthy, advanced industrial nations. Fortunately, some of the
countries within the data set are less economically advanced (i.e. Mexico) and the pattern still
held strong. The World Health Organization (WHO) collects data on health care expenditures
and many health outcomes like life expectancy and infant mortality. To test if the model and
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theory built in this dissertation could be extrapolated to a wider variety of countries, the WHO
data was collected and regressed. The 2015 data is available from WHO at
http://www.who.int/gho/database/en/. Figure 31 shows the quadratic relationship that also exists
within the WHO data:

Figure 31: Quadratic Regression of WHO Data
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Figure 31 shows that the pattern of expenditures and expenditures squared holds up across the
177 countries within the WHO data set that include information on expenditures and life
expectancy. This implies that the integrative market model in Chapter 3 should apply across all
countries. Unfortunately, the WHO data does not contain information of health care system
type, so the WHO data could not be used in other models. Table 21 presents the regression
models for the WHO data for expenditures and life expectancy, as well as the mean centered
regression:
Table 21: Quadratic Regression of WHO Data
Dependent
Variable
1

Life Expectancy

Independent
Variable
Constant
Expenditures
Per Capita

2

Life Expectancy

Expenditures
Squared
(Constant)
Expenditures
Centered
Expenditures
Centered
Squared

Unstand.
Coefficient

S.E.

64.805

0.551

0.008

0.001

-7.289E-07
73.747

Standardized
Coefficient

t

P
Value

117.560

0.000

1.617

13.506

0.000

0.151

6.630

0.000
0.432

-1.013

-8.464
170.690

0.000
0.000

0.151

6.630

0.006

0.000

1.192

15.687

0.000

0.375

2.669

-7.289E-07

0.000

-0.643

-8.464

0.000

0.375

2.669

Tolerance

VIF

Model
R²
0.622

0.622

Once again, the mean centered data represents a more accurate estimate of coefficients, so it is
also provided in model 2. The R Square for the WHO data (0.622) is strikingly similar to the R
Square of the OECD data (0.628) suggesting that the integrative model should hold up very well
and can be applied to countries outside of the OECD or the developed world. However, Figure
27 suggested that there may a benefit to poorer countries choosing to use a socialized system of
care over a universal system as there may be a lack of capital in the private sector necessary to
develop the appropriate levels of health care resources.
Another limitation to the regression analysis performed in this study, is the number of
countries sampled. Due to the small number of countries (34) other variables were not found to
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be statistically significant but still may have an important effect. For example, other policy
differences within system types may be significant, but the regression models could not detect
them due to the small sample size. The data set included variables on the use of global
budgeting, copays, pay for performance, and other policy differences between countries and
within system types. None were found to be significant to expenditures, quality or access to care
when included in regression analysis. This is not to say that these policy differences do not have
an actual effect on economic efficiency, quality or access, but that due to the low number of
countries, these differences could not be statistically measured within regression analysis. A
larger data set (which is not necessarily possible as the data is based on country level) may lead
to a better understanding of which policy differences lead to better outcomes and better nuance
for comparison. Structural equation modelling helped to examine some of these within system
policy differences.
Another limitation of this analysis is that it does not discuss the moral, or philosophical
reasons for choosing one health care system over another system. This dissertation purposely
did not examine the “morality” of health economics or denying care to the most vulnerable.
However, it demonstrates that everyone benefits most when the system guarantees access to care
to all. Prices are reduced for all and access is significantly increased for the most vulnerable
without sacrificing quality of care for any when the system guarantees access to care through
universal health insurance coverage. No moral or philosophical argument is necessary; we all
benefit, or we are all harmed depending on the health care system chosen. In the case of health
care systems; what we do to others, we do unto ourselves:
40

And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye
have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.
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Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, depart from me, ye cursed, into
everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels:
42

For I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink:
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I was a stranger, and ye took me not in: naked, and ye clothed me not: sick, and in
prison, and ye visited me not.
44

Then shall they also answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, or
athirst, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee?
45

Then shall he answer them, saying, Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye did it not to
one of the least of these, ye did it not to me. (Matthew 25:40-45, The New King James
Version)

5.3: Future Research
Further research should be performed on health insurance as a Giffen good. Access to
the individual level data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services would be
invaluable. The OECD should collect system level data more frequently than every four years,
and data on market concentration may allow for the use of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index
which could not be incorporated into this analysis due to the lack of data. The index would be
highly beneficial for determining the appropriate levels of provider non-price competition that
leads to increased quality. Furthermore, the OECD should work to insure uniform reporting on
health care systems by providing fewer choices within the survey by specifying more detail in
the questions asked. Many questions were too open ended creating interpretation errors for those
reporting the data.
This study offers numerous scientific and empirical benefits for future analysis of policy
intervention in health care systems:
1. By integrating market forces, system type, and policy differences within system type, the
benefits of individual interventions can be more accurately measured, analyzed, and
predicted. Market forces and policy interventions will have different effects on quality,
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access, price, and health outcomes depending on the health care system type. Increasing
or decreasing competition within aspects of the health care system may increase or
decrease the quality of care, access to care, or price of care dependent upon system type.
a. Provider Markets: Increasing or decreasing competition in health care provision will
have different effects on health outcomes based on the health care system type.
i.

Free market systems: Decreasing competition of providers will increase costs
to consumers despite increasing technical and economic efficiency for
providers and causing an increases in the quality of care (Gaynor et al., 2014;
Lee & Wan, 2002).

ii.

Universal systems: Increasing competition will increase non-price competition
(quality competition) and thus the quality of care, without increasing prices to
consumers or decreasing access to care which is guaranteed based on income
(Gaynor et al., 2014; Krabbe-Alkemade et al., 2017).

iii.

Socialized systems: Increasing provider competition will increase access to
care and quality of care with a corresponding increase in price to account for
marginal costs (Gaynor et al., 2014).

b. Insurance Market Competition:
i.

Free market: Decreasing competition in the insurance market will increase
insurance negotiating power. Increased negotiating power of insurance
companies will decrease reimbursement rates to providers, will increase
profits to insurers, but will not necessarily reduce insurance premiums (Dafny
et al., 2012; Ho & Lee, 2017).
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ii.

Universal: Increasing competition within insurance may decrease prices of
premiums but increase reimbursement rates to providers causing an aggregate
increase in prices to consumers and thus premiums. Decreasing
reimbursement rates will decrease the quality of care as providers are
reimbursed at lower rates thus having less money to invest in quality of care.

iii.

Socialized: The effects are unknown and illogical as no country uses private
insurance and public provision of care.

c. Price has a quadratic relationship to access to care and health outcomes. As price
increases, access to care increases until the price becomes prohibitive and then begins
to reduce access to care. Furthermore, as price increases, quality increases until the
point where the excess expenditures no longer increase the quality of care and begin
to represent waste within the system. Low prices lead to decreased access, quality,
and health outcomes. High prices lead to decreased access and health outcomes
despite good quality of care due to the waste within the system.
2. Based on the above hypotheses, in Chapter 3, and fully supported by the statistical
analysis in Chapter 4, increasing competition in health care provision or insurance cannot
be assumed to increase quality and decrease price of care to consumers as assumed in
economic theory of competitive markets. Researchers cannot assume that normal
economic theory and principles apply to the health care system under investigation and
must examine how the system alters the effects of competition when creating or
analyzing policy interventions.
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3. Health insurance is a Giffen Good, altering the way policy interventions, researchers, and
economists must approach demand for care and the demand for insurance within health
care markets.
5.4: Conclusions
The research questions laid out in Chapter 1 were all able to be answered:
1. Context: What are the market forces at work within health care and how do these forces
differ from a competitive market (how does supply and demand in health care differ from
supply and demand within competitive markets)?
a. The demand for health insurance functions as a Giffen Good.
b. Providers are able to act as price setters without a unitary insurer.
c. There is no direct negotiation between consumers and providers in terms of price.
d. Market forces cause the consolidation of health care provision.
e. Market forces increase the costs of care, thus decreasing access to care.
f. Poorer countries tend to use socialized systems in response to these market forces.
g. The United States is an outlier, in the sense that, it does nothing to mediate the
negative effects of these market forces.
2. Design: Based on these market forces and their effects on the overall health care market,
what are the differences in health care policies and structures that lead to disparate health
outcomes in terms of quality, access, and economic efficiency in advanced industrial
nations (based on the supply and demand in health care, what are the different policies
used in advanced industrial nations that lead to different outcomes in terms of quality,
access and economic efficiency)?
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How do the health care policies and structures in a country affect the market forces for
health care within said country (how do different health care policies affect the supply
and demand of care)?
a. Free market systems have decreased have decreased access to care, increased quality
of care, and the most economic inefficiency.
b. Socialized systems have decreased access and quality of care, but the lowest costs.
c. Universal systems have the best access to care, quality of care, are more economically
efficient the free market systems, but less economically efficient than socialized
systems.
3. Performance: What are the differences in price, quality, and access to care caused by
these policy interventions?
a. Socialized systems perform better than the other two systems in terms of economic
efficiency, per capita expenditures are decreased. Socialized systems have better
access to care, they have more health care resources, than free market systems, but
decreased access, fewer resources, compared to universal systems. Socialized
systems have the lowest quality of the three systems.
b. Universal systems perform better in quality and access than the other two systems.
c. Free market systems overspend compared to the other two systems and have the
lowest access to care.
4. Outcomes: What are the individual effects of price, access, and quality of care to health
outcomes based on these different policies and market forces?
a. Improved access increases health outcomes.
b. Improved quality increases health outcomes.
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c. Expenditures have a quadratic relationship with health outcomes.
Health insurance is the first fully substantiated case of a Giffen good. As the price of low quality
health insurance increases, the demand for the low-quality health insurance will increase. The
income effect substantially outweighs the substitution effect causing the demand for health
insurance to defy the law of demand as predicted in Figure 4, and Figure 5. The regression
results showed that as subsidies decreased the demand for bronze level health plans increased
showing that silver and gold plans are more desirable than the bronze plans. The subsidy
decrease is the equivalent of a price increase, and therefore, as the price of bronze plans
increased the demand for bronze plans increased. The comparison of prices between 2017 and
2018 also showed that as the price of bronze increased from 2017 to 2018 the demand for the
bronze plans increased.
The integrative market model created in Chapter 3 is fully supported in both regression
analysis and through the structural equation models. The models verify that the integrative
market model has the causal relationships predicted. Price of care is not being determined by the
demand for care, health care providers act as price setters without a unitary insurer (whether
regional or national) to force price negotiation. Price negotiation that occurs between supply and
demand do not function properly in the health care market and policy interventions must be
made to compensate for these market failures. The regression models and structural equation
models all show that the health care resources and health outcomes are a quadratic function of
per capita expenditures when controlling for wealth.
As predicted by the integrative market model, free market systems overspend by $3460
per capita when controlling for the wealth of the country, have a reduced life expectancy of 2.7
years per capita due to the decreased access to care caused by the inflated price of care, and
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another 2.6 years of life expectancy not realized, despite the expenditures, representing economic
waste. Socialized systems reduce life expectancy by 0.17 years due to decreased access to care
and 0.09 years due to decreased quality of care controlling for wealth of the country compared to
a universal health care system. The difference between a universal system and a free market
system is in the identity of the insurer, private versus public. The difference between a universal
system and a socialized system is in the identity of the medical provider, private versus public.
These results show that private insurance reduces both access to care and quality of care, as well
as increasing the costs of care. Public provision of care reduces quality of care, access to care,
and the costs of care.
According to the analysis of WHO data, the results of this analysis should apply
universally, whether the country is wealthy or poor, industrializing or industrialized.
Maximizing quality of care and access to care while keeping expenditures under control requires
proper price negotiation between providers and insurers that is most easily accomplished through
the use of a universal health care system.
Universal health care systems are superior to both socialized systems and free market
systems in terms of quality and access to care. Competition and profit motives in the provision
of care increase quality of care and access to care. Competition within the insurance market
decreases access and quality even within universal systems that allow multiple insurers and
choice of insurers. Moral hazard does not exist within health care markets; copays and
gatekeeping do not reduce waste within the models. Allowing consumers free choice of
providers increases quality and access, and the requirement of referrals reduces redundancy and
increases quality. Furthermore, the effects of intra-system policy differences were measurable
once the statistical model accounted for the income level of each country and the system type
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chosen. According to Figure 29, requiring or financially incentivizing primary care registration
increases the likelihood of overspending in health care which reduces quality and access to care.
Allowing a choice of insurers (increasing competition between insurance options) increased
costs and the likelihood to overspend which reduces quality of care and access to care. The use
of global budgeting decreases expenditures but has no effect on over-expenditure meaning that
global budgeting reduces access to care and quality of care. Requiring referrals or financially
incentivizing them increased expenditures but not over-expenditures, meaning that requiring
referrals increased quality and access to care. In conclusion, the final policy recommendations
are provided:
1. Private health insurance was found to statistically increase costs and decrease access
to care and quality of care. Competition between insurers, even within universal
systems, reduces reimbursement negotiation power of insurers; and insurers reduce
access through the use of networks. Because of these facts, the use of private health
insurance, and competition within the insurance market, is not recommended. The
United States should reorganize its insurance industry to utilize a single insurer. The
simplest method would be to create individual state-wide insurance companies that
can help account for regional differences. Despite the increases in insurance
coverage caused by the ACA, the ACA will not be able to contain costs or guarantee
full access to care.
2. Competition in the provision of care is beneficial to access to care and quality of care,
but competition also increases expenditures and the likelihood of overspending.
Socialized systems should work to slowly introduce and increase free market
competition within the provision of care. Poorer countries may have to rely on public
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hospitals while their economies develop (Cesur et al., 2017) but, should work to
increase private practice for primary care with ample choice of providers to increase
non-price competition to maximize access to care, quality of care, and health
outcomes.
3. Choice of providers, as represented by not requiring or financially incentivizing
registration with a primary care provider, increased access to care and quality of care.
Therefore, all systems should work toward increasing consumer choice of providers,
thus increasing non-price competition amongst providers.
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APPENDIX A: TABLE 3.1 FROM (OECD, 2010)
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Figure 32: OECD 2010, Figure 3.1
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APPENDIX B: OECD VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
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Table 22: OECD Variables and Descriptions
Source

OECD
Health
System
Surveys
2009, 2012,
2016

Category

Variable Name

Variable Description and Measure

Country ID

Country
Year
PrimeProvis
Insurance

Name of Country
Year
Public or Private Provision of Primary Care, 1=Private 0=Public
Public or Private Insurance of Care, 0=public/ compulsory,
1=Voluntary choice of providers
Hospitals Primarily Public/ Private, 0=Public, 1=Private
System Type based on Insurance, Primary care and Hospitals
Source of Health Insurance, National=National health system (even
if run by local Gov't), Multiple=multiple insurance funds, SinglePayer=Single Health Insurer

Health System Type

Insurance Information

HospProvision
OECDSysType
InsureSource

MultiSelect
CovLevel
PriceRegulate
PrimeCostSharing
AcuteCostShare

Provision

Gatekeeping

PoorCopay
2ndInsurance
InsCompete
Capitation
FeeForService
PayPerform
Budget
PrivateHospitals
PrimeID
AcuteID
PrimaryRegister

Referral

If Multiple Insurers, how is insurer selected
Are insurers required to offer the same coverage?
Prices of premiums are regulated by the government
Cost Sharing for Patients for Primary Care, question 12, 0=No cost
sharing, 1=co-pay or cost sharing
Cost Sharing for Acute Care or Specialists, 0=No cost sharing,
1=cost sharing
Poor Exempt from Copays, 0=Poor exempt, 1=Poor not exempt
Secondary Private Insurance, 0=No, 1=yes
Insurance Competition Coded, Dummy 0=no choice, 1=choice
24b. How are these providers paid? Capitation, 1=yes
24b. How are these providers paid? Fee-for-service, 1=yes
24b. How are these providers paid? Pay-for-performance 1=yes
24b. How are these providers paid? Global budget, 1=yes
Private For-Profit Hospitals Allowed, 1=yes
Primary Identity, 0=Public, 1=Private
Inpatient Identity, 0=Public, 1=Private
36. Are patients required or encourage to register with a primary
care physician or practice? 0=No obligation or incentive,
.5=Financial Incentive, 1=Required
37. Do primary care physicians control access to specialist care?
0=No obligation or incentive, .5=Financial Incentive, 1=Required
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% Miss
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.02

0.08
0.08

Source

Category

Variable Name
PrimeChoice

OECD
Demographic
References

Population

Population
PopFemale
PercentPopF
PopMale
PercentPopM
Fertility
Pop65up
Pop65F
Pop65M
PecentPop65up
Pop80up
Pop80F
Pop80M
PercentPop80
Employed
PecentEmployed
GDPusPPPMillions
GDPperCap

Variable Description and Measure
38.a. Are patients generally free to choose a primary care practice
for primary care services? 0=No Choice, .5=Financial Incentive,
1=Free Choice
Total Population In 1000s
Female population In 1000s
% of Population Female
Male population In 1000s
% of Population Male
Children per women aged 15 to 49
Population 65+ In 1000s
1000s of Females 65+
1000s of Males 65+
% of population 65+
Population 80+ in 1000s
Female population 80+ in 1000s
Male population 80+ in 1000s
% Population 80+
1000s of persons employed
% of population employed
GDP in US$ PPP
GDP Per Capita in US$ PPP

GDPGrowth
IncomePerCapita
GINIoecd
PovertyPop
PovertyChild
Poverty18to65
Poverty65up
HoursWorked
RDExpenditures
CO2emissions
GreenGasEmissions
HealthExpGDPshare

Real GDP Growth
National Income Per Capita in US$
GINI at disposable income post taxes and transfers, 0-1 scale
Poverty Rates Total Population
Poverty Rates Children 17 and Under
Poverty Rates 18-65
Poverty Rates 65+
Average Hours Worked
Expenditures on Research and Development in US$ 2005
CO2 Emissions in thousand tons from fuel combustion
Greenhouse gas emissions in thousand tons
Health Expenditures as % of GDP

Employment
OECD
Economic
Comps
OECD
Country
Statistical
Profiles

Wealth

Income Inequality

R&D
Environmental
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% Miss

0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.24
0.24
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.34
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.03
0.07
0.20
0.24
0.00

Source

Category

Health Care
Expenditures
Expenditures
Government/Compulsory
Financing Schemes
OECD
Health
Expenditure
and
Financing
Expenditures
Voluntary/Household
out-of-pocket

OECD
Health Status

Life Expectancy

Infant Mortality Per
1000 Live Births

Variable Name
HealthExpPPPcurrent
HealthExpPPPConstant
ExpPerCapCurrent
ExpPerCapBase
ExpPerCapPPPBase
PublicGDPExp
PublicShareEXP
PubExpCurrentPPP
PubExpBase
PubExpConstant
PerCapPubExpCurrentPPP
PerCapPubExpBase
PerCapPubExpConstant
PrivateGDPExp
PrivateShareEXP
PrivExpCurrentPPP
PrivExpBase
PrivExpConstant
PerCapPrivExpCurrentPPP
PerCapPrivExpBase
PerCapPrivExpConstant
LifeExpectancy
LEFemale65
LEMale65
InfantNoMin
NeonatalNoMin

Perceived Health Status

PerinatalMortality
MaternalMortality
GoodHealth
FairHealth

Variable Description and Measure
Health Expenditures Current Prices PPP
Health Expenditures Constant Prices PPP Base Year
Per capita, current prices, current PPPs
Per capita, constant prices, OECD base year
Per capita, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year
Public Share of expenditures of gross domestic product on Health
Care
Public Share of current expenditure on health
Public Current prices, current PPPs
Public Constant prices, OECD base year
Public Constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year
Public Per capita, current prices, current PPPs
Public Per capita, constant prices, OECD base year
Public Per capita, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year
Private Share of expenditures of gross domestic product on Health
Care
Private Share of current expenditure on health
Private Current prices, current PPPs
Private Constant prices, OECD base year
Private Constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year
Private Per capita, current prices, current PPPs
Private Per capita, constant prices, OECD base year
Private Per capita, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year
Total Population at Birth in years
Life Expectancy of Females 65+ in years
Life Expectancy of Males 65+ in years
Infant mortality, No minimum threshold of gestation period or
birthweight
Neonatal mortality, No minimum threshold of gestation period or
birthweight
Perinatal mortality per 1000 total Births
Maternal mortality per 100,000 live births
Good/very good health, total aged 15+
Fair (not good, not bad) health, total aged 15+
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% Miss
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.28
0.30

Source

Category
Perceived Health Status
by Socio-Economic
Status/Education

Variable Name
BadHealth
GoodHealthPoor
GoodHealthWealth
GoodHealthEdLow
GoodHealthEdMid
GoodHealthEdHigh

OECD
Social
Protection

Public Versus Private
Insurance Coverage % of
Population

OECD
Health Care
Utilization
(includes
data on wait
times for
procedure
but very few
countries
responded)

Consultations
Immunizations Children

Hospital Utilization

Access to Medical
Technology

PercentInsured
PublicInsurance
PublicAcuteCare
PublicOutCare
PublicRx
PrivateInsuranceTotal
PrivateInsPrimary
PrivateInsuranceDup
PrivateInsComp
PrivateInsSupp
DocConsults
ImmuneDTP
ImmuneMeasles
ImmuneHepB
InpatientUse
InpatientStay
CurativeUse
CurativeStay
CTEaccess
CTEuse
MRIaccess
MRIuse
PETaccess
PETuse

Variable Description and Measure
Bad/very bad health, total aged 15+
Good/very good health, total aged 15+, Income quintile 1 (lowest)
Good/very good health, total aged 15+, Income quintile 5 (highest)
Good/very good health, total aged 15+, Low education (ISCED 0 to
2)
Good/very good health, total aged 15+, Medium education (ISCED
3 and 4)
Good/very good health, total aged 15+, High education (ISCED 5 to
8)
Total Percent of public and primary private health insurance
Government Total Health Care
Government In-Patient and Acute Care
Government Out-Patient Medical Care
Government Pharmaceutical Goods
Private Health Insurance Coverage
Private Primary Health Insurance Coverage
Duplicate Private Health Insurance Coverage
Complementary Private Health Insurance Coverage
Supplementary Private Health Insurance Coverage
Doctor Consultations (in all Settings) per Capita
Immunization: Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis % of Children
Immunization: Measles % of children
Immunization: Hepatitis B % of children
Inpatient Care Discharges Per 100,000 Population
Inpatient Care Average Length of Stay in Days
Curative Care Discharges Per 100,000 Population
Curative Care Average Length of Stay in Days
Computed Tomography exams, per 100,000 Population
Computed Tomography exams, per Scanner
Magnetic Resonance Imaging exams per 100,000 Population
Magnetic Resonance Imaging exams per scanner
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) exams per 100,000
Population
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) exams per Scanner
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% Miss
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.18
0.18
0.21
0.21
0.24
0.40
0.36
0.45
0.43
0.51
0.41
0.20
0.20
0.38
0.31
0.29
0.35
0.31
0.47
0.51
0.47
0.53
0.64
0.69

Source
OECD NonMedical
Determinants
of Health

OECD
Health Care
Quality
Indicators

Category
Tobacco
Alcohol
Obesity

Skipped Medical Care
(Costs)
Waitlist
Patient Service and
Understanding

Variable Name
SmokeAmount
TobaccoUse
Alcohol
ObeseSelf
ObeseMeasured
ObeseCombined
SkipConsult
SkipTest
SkipRx
Wait4Weeks

PhysicianDensity

Variable Description and Measure
Grams Per Capita
% of Population 15+ who are Daily Smokers
Liters per Capita age 15+
Overweight or obese population self-reported %
Overweight or obese population measured %
Overweight or obese population measured or Self-Reported %
Consultation skipped due to costs
Medical tests, treatment or follow-up skipped due to costs
Prescribed medicines skipped due to costs
Waiting time of more than four weeks for getting an appointment
with a specialist
Patients reporting having spent enough time with any doctor during
the consultation
Patients reporting having spent enough time with their regular
doctor during the consultation
Patients reporting having received easy-to-understand explanations
by any doctor
Patients reporting having received easy-to-understand explanations
by their regular doctor
Patients reporting having had the opportunity to ask questions or
raise concerns to any doctor
Patients reporting having had the opportunity to ask questions or
raise concerns to their regular doctor
Patients reporting having been involved in decisions about care or
treatment by any doctor
Patients reporting having been involved in decisions about care or
treatment by their regular doctor
Number of Practicing Physicians, Per 1000 Population

GeneralPractice

Generalist Practitioners, Density Per 1000 Population

0.02

SpecialPractice

Specialist Practitioners, Density Per 1000 Population

0.02

NurseDensity

Practicing Nurses, Density per 1000 Population

0.22

Hospitals

Total Hospitals per Million Population

0.07

HospPublic

Publicly Owned Hospitals Per Million Population

0.40

EnoughTimeAll
EnoughTimePrime
EasyAll
EasyPrime
AskAll
AskPrime
DecisionAll
DecisionPrime

OECD
Health Care
Resources

Health Care Providers

Hospitals
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% Miss
0.56
0.46
0.28
0.66
0.80
0.53
0.80
0.83
0.78
0.81
0.91
0.82
0.92
0.82
0.94
0.94
0.92
0.82
0.11

Source

Category

Variable Name

Variable Description and Measure

HospNonProfit

Not-For-Profit, Private Hospitals per Million Population

0.42

HospProfit

For-Profit, Private Hospitals per Million Population

0.42

HospBeds

Hospital Beds per 1000 population

0.18
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% Miss
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